Majority
Headnote
New Trial—Denial of—Alibi.The judgment and order should be affirmed.
While in form the appeal is from both the judgment and order, the argument of counsel is for a reversal of the order merely. No argument could well be made upon the record for a reversal of the judgment. The evidence given upon the trial was clearly sufficient to support the verdict.
The indictment charged the appellant and two other young men with the crime of robbery in the first degree, committed June 15, 1902, at the city of Buffalo, upon one Campbell in the night time, by forcibly and violently taking from his person twelve dollars in money and carrying it away. The indictment was filed June 30, 1902, a plea of not guilty was entered by appellant, and John J. Sullivan, a lawyer of Buffalo, was assigned to defend him. His trial took place July 10, 1902, before the county judge and a jury. A verdict of guilty was rendered, and July 14, 1902, the appellant was sentenced to Auburn State Prison for nineteen years. On the trial it appeared that the complainant was a man working about a lithographing shop where he had been employed for three years. He and his brother and one Reims lived in a house boat at the foot of Genesee street. He owned the boat and had lived in it since the month of September before. On the night in question he went to see a. girl at the corner of Broadway and Spruce streets; he left there about eleven-fifteen o’clock, went over to a saloon on Lloyd street and had a drink of beer. He then went to a saloon on River street, met a friend and had a second drink of beer. They left there and went together to the Frog House, a saloon at the corner of Genesee street and the Erie canal, and he had a third drink of beer. They left this saloon together and his friend went up Genesee street and he went down the street towards his boat. He was entirely sober, had had only three beers, and it was just twelve o’clock. He had to cross a bridge to go to his house
Upon being examined before sentence, appellant said he
U pon being sentenced the appellant was taken to prison July 15, 1902. Nothing further was heard about the matter until about the 1st of April, 1903, nine months after tha conviction, when counsel was employed and set about to get the conviction set aside and the appellant set at large again. The other two men, Murray and Doyle, who were arrested with appellant and indicted for this offense, were not convicted of the ofíense, but were convicted about the same tim$ of other highway robberies, and were in State’s prison at Auburn serving their sentences. Counsel talked with these three convicts and took their "affidavits in prison. The counsel made his own affidavit as to his conversation with these men and with Sullivan, appellant’s counsel on the trial, and as to what persons employed by him said they learned by talking with other persons, whose names were not stated, and added to all this the statement of his own belief in the premises. This affidavit of counsel is entitled to no consideration. The affidavits of the three convicts themselves were entitled to little, if any, credence. They were sworn to, but statements to counsel when not under oath and sworn to by him should not be considered at all. The statement as to what the lawjmr Sullivan said as to the trial, his talk with his client and what investigations he made, not under oath and only sworn to by the present counsel, were not competent or proper. Sullivan’s own affidavit should have been presented. Of course, the affidavit of the present counsel as to his own belief in the premises was of no importance. It was to be expected that the appellant and his two convict associates would swear to what
The only additional reason alleged- for granting a new trial was the claim that the complainant had acknowledged he was mistaken in his identification of appellant on the trial. After the affidavits already referred to had been obtained, the complainant was located over in Canada, and without having any interview with him, counsel prepared a typewritten affidavit in his office and sent a young law student over to see if he could get the complainant to swear to it. The record does not show what this blank affidavit so prepared contained when it left the counsel’s office. It was changed over there, and what these changes were does not appear. The young law student took a notary public of Canada and went and had an interview with the complainant. The notary testified that there was much conversation .between the complainant and the law student and finally the complainant admitted that he did not think it was appellant who had robbed him. ■ The law student testified that he discussed the matter at great length with complainant, and the latter finally stated that he did not then believe that appellant was the man who robbed him. Neither the notary nor the law student, however stated the talk and discussion had between the two parties which led the complainant finally to express the belief that appellant was not the man who robbed him. Complainant’s affidavit, as sworn to, stated, substantially, that he had been thinking over the said assault and robbery and had come to the conclusion that he was in error in positively identifying the appellant ; that it ’was not a dark night and he was not under the influence of liquor ; that he did not say it was not appellant, but he was not as positive as he was at the time he testified ; that in thinking
Complainant was a laboring man and the man talking with him was a young law student. It apparently required quite an extended discussion by the law student to procure the concessions from the laboring man, and whether the appellant fully appreciated the exact language used in the affidavit, as he finally subscribed and swore to it, is not entirely clear. After such extended discussion, nine months having elapsed since the robbery occurred, he might well feel less positive as to the identification than he did at the trial. It is a little singular that he should have at last assented to the statement that ‘ ‘ in thinking the matter over he knows that it was not the said Cameron who assaulted him,” when he had already stated in the same paper merely that he was in error in positively identifying him ; that he could not say it was not he, but he was not then as positive as at the trial. The law student put down the last expression a little too strong —that he knew it was not appellant. He could not well have known that. The whole transaction of securing this ex parte affidavit from the complainant was, to say the least, one of questionable propriety. It would have been much wiser and better to have brought the man before the county judge and had a fair examination of him. The effort was to get the best affidavit from him in the interest of the appellant which the discussion and talk with him could induce him to assent to rather than to let him talk for himself, and write down what he said and have him swear to that. But little reliance can be placed upon affidavits obtained under these circumstances. This man on the trial positively identified appellant as one of the three men, and he gave good reasons for being positive. He made no attempt to. identify the other two. It was not a dark or a light night. He could see across the street, he said, and he did see up the street and see the three'men leave the bridge
Dissent
The judgment and order should be affirmed.
McLennan, P. J., and Stover, J., concurred. Dissenting opinion for reversal by Spring, J., Hiscock, J., concurring.
The indictment charged, and the defendant was convicted of, robbing in company with two others, one Campbell, of twelve dollars in money and a knife, in the city of Buffalo, shortly after twelve o’clock on the morning of June 15, 1902. The conviction was founded upon the testimony of Campbell, who testified that he recognized the defendant as one of his assailants and subsequently identified him in the police station.
Upon the motion for a new trial the affidavits of two young men, each serving a sentence in the State’s prison at Auburn for robbery, were presented to the court, setting forth that the defendant was in the saloon with them during the entire evening when the robbery was committed. Very little credence can be given to these affidavits in view of the character of the affiants.
In addition to those affidavits, however, the defendant included among his moving papers the affidavits of John Foley, Lena Preusser and Florence Preusser. Foley testified that he was at the Frog House saloon from seven-thirty on the evening of June fourteenth until about one-thirty the next morning ; while he was in the saloon, and about ten o’clock, the defendant and the man Murray came in and passed through into the dining room in the rear óf the saloon, and that he, Foley, followed them into that room, all of them remaining in there with the two Preusser girls until the time of the arrest, except Foley, who started for home about one-thirty, and after going a short distance saw the police at the saloon. Others were in and ouf of the saloon during this evening.
In addition to these papers the affidavit of Campbell was used upon the motion, in which he stated that on reflection he had come to the conclusion he was in error in testifying upon the trial he positively identified Cameron as one of his assailants on the night of the robbery, and then goes on to say : “ That deponent does not now say that it was not the said Cameron, but deponent does say that he is not as positive as he was at the time he testified ; that in thinking the matter over he knows that it was not the said Cameron who assaulted him.”
Campbell was living in Ontario, Canada, at the time he verified this affidavit. A proposed affidavit had been prepared by the counsel for the defendant, and by his clerk submitted to Campbell, who directed changes to be made in it, which was done. The clerk and the notary before whom the affidavit was verified make affidavits in which they say
We have, therefore, this situation presented : ■ The affidavits of three apparently disinterested persons whose reputation is not impugned by any one, setting forth facts which, if true, show that Cameron, bad as he may be, did not commit the crime of which he has been convicted. Then we have the affidavit of the complaining witness who alone connected the defendant with the crime, asserting that he was in error in testifying that the defendant was one of those who assaulted and robbed him.
Desirable as it is that criminals should be brought to justice, it cannot be that the most rigorous enforcement of our criminal law will justify the conviction of this young man of twenty years and his imprispnment for nineteen years without a further opportunity to prove his innocence.
It is urged that a complaining witness may often be induced after a trial to change his testimony upon being requested so to do upon behalf of a defendant. If that change goes, to the very pith óf his testimony, and, if true, shows that the one charged with the commission of a grave crime is innocent, courts should not hesitate to allow the convicted person a new trial, especially where the changed story is corroborated by other proof, as in this case. A young man should not be compelled to servé out a long term in a State’s prison, the only warrant for which, is the testimony of a main, certainly not of high character, who solemnly declares he. testified falsely when he sworé the convicted man committed the crime.
Cameron is of unsavory character. He undoubtedly is of no benefit to society, and probably it is better for the public that he be in State’s prison. He is now incarcerated, however, for a particular crime, and even a bad man should not be imprisoned for ah offense which subsequent developments indicate he did not commit. It is urged that he was
We think, in view of these affidavits, the defendant should have another trial.
Hiscock, J., concurred.
Judgment of conviction and order denying motion for new trial affirmed.