People v. Jackson

The indictment is in the common-law form, containing three counts, and in substance charges that the defendant, on the 10th day of July, 1903, did wilfully feloniously and of his malice aforethought, beat, strike and wound one Charles W. Boxbury with a club or some instrument unknown, upon his head, causing divers mortal wounds and fractures, from which he died on the 11th day of July, 1903. A jury convicted the defendant, a colored man, of murder in the first degree, and we are now called upon to review the record of the trial.

The evidence of the People discloses a case of highway rob-berry, in which the assailant inflicted upon the deceased fatal wounds, causing his death in about four hours after the assault. The murder was committed between half-past eight and nine o’clock on Friday" evening, July 10th, 1903, the victim dying at about one o’clock the next morning. The deceased is described as a middle-aged man, rather slight, and at the time of the assault in good health.

It was proved that the deceased walked, over a mile to his residence, Mo. 1817 Grane place, in the Bronx, notwithstanding a profuse hemorrhage which left drops of blood from the place of the assault to the steps of his house. The surgeon who conducted the autopsy testified that the skull on the left side was “ fractured in so many different directions that one of the pieces of bone could be lifted right out.” On his arrival home the deceased was placed in bed, soon became unconscious, was attended by two physicians, and died about one o’clock the next morning without regaining copseiousness. So far as this record discloses he gave no account of the manner in which he received his injuries.

Miss Thomasch was cross-examined at great length and admitted that at the time of the assault she did not know whether

The learned recorder, who tried this case with great fairness, seeking to guard the defendant’s rights in every way, cross-examined Miss Thomasch at considerable length, confining his inquiries as to the accuracy of her identification of the defendant at the time of the- assault. In the course of this inquiry she added to her original statement that she heard the assailant utter the word “ you ” as he approached the deceased. The court impressed upon the witness, again and again, that she stood in a position of terrible responsibility, and that her answers were likely to be matter of life and death to the defendant, and asked her if she was perfectly certain of his identity. On each occasion she said, in substance, that she clearly identified the defendant. The court then asked this question: “ Q. Is there anything about this whole matter, Miss Thomasch, that you have failed to state, anything now known to you, on your conscience, under the obligation of your oath, that you have failed to state to the jury? A. ¡Nothing. Q. Have you stated every atom of knowledge in your possession? A. Everything, yes.” The learned judge closed his examination with this question: “Q. Mow, if you have any lurking doubt in your mind as to the defendant, being the man, I want you to state it now ?

The case of the People rests not only upon the evidence of Miss -Thomasch, relating to the time of the assault and her subsequent identification of the defendant, but upon the fact, conceded at the trial, that the defendant was in possession of the watch and pocketbook of the deceased the morning after the murder. The defendant, while admitting this fact, sought to explain it, he having been sworn as a witness for the defense.

At this point it leads to a more orderly development of the facts to refer to the testimony of Lucy Mitchell, the mistress of the defendant, with whom he was living on the 10th day of July, 1903. She testified that the defendant had been in the city for some three days prior to July 10th, 1903; that he told her that he had been in Buffalo; that he had been taking care of horses o-ut there. She stated that he left his house at about half-past five on the afternoon of July 10th and did not return until about a quarter to ten .that night. She also testified to a conversation she had with the defendant that day in regard to money matters; that she informed him they owed the landlord for rent; also on furniture bought on the install

The defendant took the stand in his own behalf and denied that he committed the assault, and professed to account for his movements during the entire evening of July 10th; he is, however, corroborated by no witness covering the time of the assault. He also undertook to explain his possession of the

The defendant swore on his redirect-examination that he worked with “ Slim ” in Fleetwood park for Rogers & Sons; that he and “ Slim ” were team drivers and he worked there a considerable time; that the name of the foreman under whom they worked was Grinnon; also that he knew a colored man who worked there named John Cross; he also was a team driver. A juror asked the defendant how “ Slim ” came by the watch and he replied that he did not know.

The People in rebuttal recalled George F. Titus, a police inspector, who testified as follows: “ This pocketbook I exhibited to the defendant and asked him if he had seen it before and he said he had; that he had found it several weeks previous—five or six weeks is the language used—in a Tenth

Robert Charlton, a detective sergeant, was recalled and testified that he asked the defendant on the night of July 17th, when he was arrested, where he was on Friday and Friday night, July 10th, and he replied that he was at home all day and all the evening except when he went out for a pint of beer.

At this point the learned recorder suggested that an adjournment, as moved by counsel, might be proper in the interests of the defendant to enable witnesses to be summoned who might confirm the defendant’s statements as to acquaintanceship with the man known as “ Slim ” several years before and as to his meeting with him on the occasion when he claims he received from him the watch and pocketbook. Thereupon an adjournment was taken, the court instructing the police officials td render all the assistance in their power in serving subpoenas and reaching these witnesses. At the reassembling of the court after this adjournment the defendant’s counsel announced that the defense rested. The district attorney expressed surprise and said that they had served several subpoenas and witnesses were now present in court. The defendant’s counsel insisted that the People ought to put them on the stand and give him the right of cross-examination. The district attorney objected, but the court directed he should proceed in that manner. The court also ordered, on motion, that as to these witnesses when one was testifying the others should be excluded from the court room.

It will be recalled that the defendant when testifying had stated that he worked for some time with the firm of Rogers & Sons, and that William Grinnon was superintendent. William

A colored man named John Cross was placed on the stand and testified that he was a driver for Rogers & Sons; that he knew the defendant, and that he worked for that firm about three years ago-, he supposed. He also testified that there was a man who was known as “ Slim ” there, who worked there about four years, to the best of his knowledge; that he could not say that defendant and “ Slim ” were working for Rogers & Sons at the same time; that he did not think he could recognize “ Slim ” if he saw him. He also stated that there never was in his time but one man known as “ Slim ” who worked for that firm.

Harvey Thompson was then sworn and testified that he formerly worked for the firm of Rogers & Sons; drove a team; that he knew William Grinnon, who was the stable boss; that he worked for Rogers & Sons three or four years; that he knew a colored man named John Cross, who worked for the firm; that he never saw the defendant; that on the 10th day of July, 1903, he was at Croton dam and was not in the city of Hew York on the 11th day of July, 1903. He testified that he went by the nickname of “ Slim ” when working for Rogers & Sons,

The defendant had testified that he called once with u Slim ” on his sister-in-law, Lizzie Jackson. She was sworn and testified that the defendant had never called on her with a man named “ Slim,” and that she had not seen the defendant for three years.

It thus becomes clear that the defendant failed to account for his possession of the watch and pocketbook, and it is evident that he used the name of “ Slim,” recalling it possibly as a person he had met years before at the works of Rogers & Sons; it is equally clear that he had no interview with “ Slim ” as he testified, at least the jury were justified in taking this view of the evidence in reaching the conclusion that the entire story was fictitious.

The failure of the defendant to account for the possession of the watch and pocketbook is further shown by the conflicting statements made by him to the officers of the law after his arrest. Robert Charlton, a detective sergeant, testified that the second day after the murder he went to the house of the defendant and found the pawn ticket for the watch and secured the pocketbook, and afterwards obtained the watch, James McCafferty, a detective sergeant, testified that he was Avith Charlton Avhen the arrest Avas made on the lYth of July, and that he asked the defendant where he obtained the watch that he paAvned on the 11th day of July, and he said he found it in Danbury, Connecticut, under a seat in Barnum & Bailey’s

It seems useless to investigate further the network of falsehood in which, this defendant entangled himself, creating a situation that undoubtedly led the jury to discredit his entire statement. This being so, the defendant is in the attitude of one having failed to explain the possession of the watch and pocketbook of the deceased the morning after the murder.

In Greenleaf on Evidence (Vol. 1 [16th ed.], p. 129) the rule of law governing this situation is thus stated: “ But possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission is . prima facie evidence of guilty possession, and, if unexplained either by direct evidence or by the attending circumstances, or by the character and habits of life of the possessor, or otherwise, it is taken as conclusive. This rule of presumption is not confined to the case of theft, but is applied to all cases of crime, even the highest and most penal. Thus, upon an indictment for arson, proof that property, which was in the/ house at the time it was burnt, was soon afterwards found'in the possession of the prisoner, was held to raise a probable presumption that he was present, and concerned in the offense. The like presumption is raised in the case of murder, accompanied by robbery; and in the case of the possession of an unusual quantity of counterfeit money.”

In Knickerbocker v. People ( 43 N. Y. 177 ) it was held: “ The proof of exclusive possession by the prisoner, recently

In Wills on Circumstantial Evidence (6th Am. ed. [1881] p. 53) the rule is thus stated: “ Since the desire of dishonest gain is the impelling motive to theft and robbery, it naturally follows that the possession of the fruits of crime recently after it has been committed, affords a strong and reasonable ground for the presumption that the party in whose possession they arc found was the real offender, unless he can account for such possession in some way consistent with his innocence. . . . But if the account given be unreasonable or improbable on the face of it, or if the party has given different accounts of the same transaction, then he will not be relieved from the pressure of the general rule of presumption. (See, also, Rickman’s Case, 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown, 1034, 1035; Commonwealth v. Talbot, 84 Mass. [2 Allen] 161, 163; Roscoe’s Criminal Evidence [2d ed.], 453.)

In Wilson v. United States ( 162 U. S. 613 , 619, 620) the court, after recognizing the above rule, states: “ Proof that defendant had in his possession, soon after, articles apparently taken from the deceased at the time of the death is always admissible, and the fact, with its legitimate inference, is to be considered by the jury along with the other facts in the ease in arriving at their verdict. (Williams v. Commonwealth, 29 Penn. St. 102 ; Commonwealth v. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299 ; Sahlinger v. The People, 102 Ill. 241 ; State v. Raymond, 46 Conn. 345 ; Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 762.)”

The learned counsel for the defendant presented his case at the bar with great earnestness, and we will now consider the

The defendant’s counsel points out that Miss Thomasch testified that immediately before the assault she saw following herself and the deceased to the south of them a man in the company of a woman; she- further testified that the assailant came from behind in making his attack. From these facts it is argued that the conclusion from her testimony is irresistible that the assault was committed by that man with that woman. As we read the record it is barren of any evidence showing from whence the assailant came save that he approached the witness from behind. The- jury were bound to- deal with the situation according to the proofs before them. It was proved that the man and woman following the deceased and his companion were about two- hundred feet distant.

It is argued that the articles belonging to the deceased might have come into defendant’s possession in a number of different ways, in addition to the one he stated, that would not in anywise have connected him with the assault. This suggestion hardly seems deserving of serious consideration.

Defendant’s counsel also urges that as the deceased bled profusely, any one robbing his person, as the defendant is

In point VIII of defendant’s brief it is stated that the court erred in excluding proof that the defendant was not under pressing money needs that night, and, hence, that no such motive existed for his committing the deed as the prosecution sought to show. The ruling complained of arose when defendant’s witness, William Smith, was on the stand. Smith had testified that he knew the defendant and had known hifn for about eight months; that he lived within a block of him; that on the evening of the murder he saw the defendant at his (Smith’s) house between seven o’clock and five minutes past seven. He was asked this question: “ Q. Did he say anything to you about money, that he was hard up, or wanted money, or wanted to borrow money, or must get any money that night?” The question was objected to and excluded. The evidence called for was negative in its character and its exclusion not prejudicial. It would have in no way affected the defendant’s case with the jury if the witness had been allowed to answer this question in the negative; nor would it

In point IX of defendant’s brief it is urged that the trial judge erred in refusing to direct the district attorney to give to counsel for defendant for examination and for the purpose of making copies for use upon the trial the sworn statements of witnesses made before the coroner. At the opening of the trial the defendant made a motion to direct the district attorney to permit him to inspect sworn statements of certain witnesses, not naming them, that were taken by the coroner, and to hold them long enough to make copies for use in the trial, the district attorney having refused, upon demand, to grant permission to do so. In discussing this motion defendant’s counsel admitted that he was in possession of the copy of the testimony that was produced before the coroner in the Coroner’s Court, but that he understood that certain sworn statements of witnesses, not naming them, were taken by the coroner, which he claimed the right to inspect. The district attorney replied that so far as he knew the counsel for the defense had all available papers that were proper for -him to receive, being the minutes that were taken before the coroner in the Coroner’s Court. He also intimated that if the district attorney had the ex parte statements referred to he was perfectly willing the defendant’s counsel should see them. The court ruled, after some discussion between counsel, as follows: “ I do not see that it is within my power to make an order as to things I have no judicial knowledge of. I suggest that a subpoena duces tecum to the district attorney to produce the papers, perhaps, would be a proper remedy.” A proper disposition was made of this motion. There. Was no direct evidence that any ex parte statements were taken before the coroner of witnesses whose names were disclosed, nor does it appear that the district attorney’s office was in possession of any such stater

The defendant’s counsel requested the court to charge (seventeenth request) as follows: “ That evidence of good character may, of itself, create a reasonable doubt, where otherwise no reasonable doubt would exist. The Court: I so charge. And, in relation to that, you can give such testimony that consideration that you think it is entitled to, and no more, taking it into consideration with all the other facts and circumstances of the case.” Counsel argues that, while the court charged as requested, the qualification following was error, citing People v. Bonier ( 179 N. Y. 315 ; 18 N. Y. Crim. 516 ). The charge as requested and made was within the rule laid down in the case cited, .and the qualification that followed neither added to nor took from the proper rule as stated to the jury.

The remaining exceptions may be considered together. Thef officers who arrested the defendant were sworn by the People, and under cross-examination were asked if the defendant made any offer to escape or manifested nervousness. This evidence was ruled out. The pawnbroker’s representative, when on the stand, was asked this question: “ Q. At no time has there been any question of any crime connected with any article that defendant ever pawned at your shop ?” The objection to this question was sustained. These rulings obviously presented no legal error.

A careful examination of this record satisfies us that nowithstanding the fact that the guilt of the defendant rests in part upon circumstantial evidence, the jury rendered the only verdict possible under the circumstances.

The question of deliberation and premeditation does not enter into this case, as the defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time he inflicted the fatal wounds upon the deceased, his offense thus falling under the statute

The judgment of conviction should he affirmed.

Cullen, Oh.' J., Gray, O’Brien, Haight, Vann and Werner, JJ.,-concur.

Judgment of conviction affirmed.