Majority
Headnote
(1.) Appellate Jurisdiction of Courts Purely Statutory.On August 23rd, 1909, the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in and for the county of ¡New York made an order directing that a charge against the defendants for violating subdivision 12 of section 41 of the Penal Code should he submitted to the grand jury. The papers upon
It is necessary to state briefly the history of the case. The defendants were indicted on April 14, 1908, for the crime of making a false statement of the result of the canvass of the ballots cast at an election while they were inspectors of election. They interposed a demurrer to the indictment which was allowed by Judge Cbaust and judgment was duly entered in their favor on June 11, 1908. At that time no direction was given by the court that the case should be resubmitted to the same or another grand jury. More than a year later, however, upon August 23, 1909, an order was mads at a term of the Court of General Sessions held by Judge Kosalsky, directing that the attorney-general submit to the grand jury of the county of New York the violation of the Penal Code alleged to have been committed by the defendants herein. Under that order another indictment has been found which the defendants have unsuccessfully moved to dismiss. The purpose of the defendants upon the present appeal is to review the jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions to make an order directing the resubmission of the charge to another grand jury under the particular circumstances of this case—that is to say, months after the decision upon the demurrer and when a different judge was presiding over the court.
Section 519 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specified the cases in which an appeal may be taken from a judgment or order of the Appellate Division to the Court of Appeals in criminal actions. These are: 1, from a judgment affirming or reversing a judgment of conviction; 2, from a judgment affirming or reversing a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer to the indictment, or from an order affirming, vacating or reversing an order of the court arresting judgment; and, 3, from a final determination affecting a substantial right of the defendant. The third category is the only class in which this case could possibly be included in any point of view. It is argued that the dismissal of the appeal by the Appellate Divi- # sion is in effect a final determination that the defendants may be prosecuted under an order for the resubmission of the charge against them to a second grand jury where the direction for such resubmission was not given by the court at the time of the allowance of their demurrer, and that a determination of this character affects a substantial right.
The answer to this argument is that the determination is not necessarily final. In view of the fact that a second indictment has been found under the order permitting a resubmission of the case to the grand jury it is difficult to see how a reversal of the order for the resubmission would now inure to the benefit of the defendants, for the second indictment would be left still standing. There appear to be two ways, however, in which the defendants can raise the question of the validity of the order to resubmit, which was made so long after the determination of the demurrer and by another judge. They could treat the allowance of the demurrer unaccompanied by any order for a resubmission of the case as equivalent to an acquittal and could interpose to the second indictment the plea of a
Cullen, Ch. J., Gray, Werner, Hiscock, Chase and Collin, JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Frost v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 168 N. Y. 187 p. 346
- People v. Priori 163 N. Y. 99 p. 346
- In re Montgomery 126 App. Div. 72 p. 347
- Snee v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad 193 N. Y. 659 p. 347
- People ex rel. Scharff v. Frost 24 N. Y. Crim. 388 p. 349