Majority
Headnote
(1.) Practice—Code Crim. Pro., § 22, sirs. 6, Removing indictment to Court of General Sessions.The defendant was indicted in the Supreme Court. On June 28, 1911, he served upon the district attorney a notice that a motion would be made on Thuhrsday, June 29,1911, before Mr. Justice McCall, presiding at a Criminal Term of the Supreme Court, Part 1, for an order transferring such indictment to the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in and for the city and county of Hew York for trial. By what appears to be an extract of the minutes of the Trial Term, Part 1, of the Supreme Court, held on Thursday, June 29, 1911, it is stated that counsel for the defendant moved for an order of the court transferring the indictment to the Court of General Sessions, and after hearing counsel the court stated that the Supreme Court in which the indictment was found had adjourned for the summer vacation, hut the Court of General Sessions would, during the summer months, have at least three of its several parts in operation, and that there was thus afforded an opportunity for the defendant to be heard speedily in defense; that the court, after a careful consideration of the entire subject, could find nothing to justify him in a denial of the application, and the motion was granted. What is contained in the minutes is also printed as pn opinion of the learned trial justice presiding at the Criminal Term, and annexed, to the record is an affidavit of the assistant district attorney stating that the foregoing decision or opinion rendered on July 13, 1911, is the only decision or opinion rendered by the justice holding the Trial Term; and from this order or determination the district attorney appeals.
The first question presented is, whether or not there is any decision or determination presented in the record from which
The first question raised by the respondent is, that this order is not appealable, and that question must be determined by the record as it is presented. There is nothing in this record to show that the term at which this order was made had at the time the order was made actually adjourned. There is, therefore, nothing to show that the term of the court had for any reason lost jurisdiction of the indictment, or was without authority to exercise such jurisdiction as was conferred upon it by law. That being so, we have on the record an order entered in the minutes of the court in Which, although it was recited that the order was granted on motion of the defendant, the court had exercised its undoubted jurisdiction and had transferred the indictment to the Court of General Sessions. Ho thing appears, therefore, in this record io justify the court in entertaining the appeal. In People v. McLaughlin, No. 1 ( 2 App. Div. 408 ), this court entertained an appeal from an order of the Special Term denying a motion to remove a criminal case from the county of Hew York to another county and reversed the order. Upon an appeal to the Court of Appeals ( 150 N. Y. 365 , 11 N. Y. Crim. 523 ), that court apparently upheld the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division to review that order and reversed the judgment of conviction, saying: “ We are unable to perceive any proper ground upon which the action of the Appellate Division can be sustained, so far as it failed to set aside the proceedings and trial.” In several cases the Appellate Division has entertained appeals from orders entered upon motion to remove an indictment under subdivision 2 of section 344 of the Criminal Code. (People v. Georger, 109 App. Div. 111 ; People v. Bartels, 110 id. 922; People v. Jackson, 114 id. 697; People v. Sarvis, 69 id.
McLaughlin, Laughlin, Clarke and Miller, JJ1., concurred.
Appeal dismissed. Order to be settled on notice.
Cases cited
- People v. McLaughlin 150 N. Y. 365 p. 446
- People v. McLaughlin 11 N. Y. Crim. 523 p. 446
- People v. Georger 109 App. Div. 111 p. 446
- In re Montgomery 126 App. Div. 72 p. 447
- Snee v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad 193 N. Y. 659 p. 447