Majority
Headnote
(1.) Disorderly person—Telling fortunes[1] —Spiritualist—Evidence.The Code of Criminal Procedure provides in section 899: “ The following are disorderly persons: * * * 3. Persons pretending to tell fortunes,” and it is provided in section 901[2] that if the magistrate is satisfied that the accused is a disorderly person, he may require that the person charged give security that he will be of good behavior for the space of one year, and in section 902, if the security is given the defendant must be discharged, otherwise he must be convicted, and (§ 903) committed to the city prison or penitentiary for not exceeding six months at hard labor or until the security is given. In this case the magistrate having found the defendant guilty, she gave the security required. The evidence before the magistrate presented a question of fact whether the defendant was an offender against the statute, and his finding is sustained by the evidence. The defendant denied that she was a fortune teller, or pretended to tell fortunes, claiming that she was the president and a minister of the “ Brooklyn Spritualist Society.” She denied that she “ prophesied ” for the complaining witness, because, as defendant said, “ it is against the law.” Her defense was that she simply gave the complaining witness “ advice.” Dr. George
* Douay Version.— [Rep.
At any rate, the magistrate did not believe the defendant, and; even taking the witness Warne’s definitions and distinctions,, the evidence justified the finding that she was telling fortunes, for money in the ordinary sordid sense condemned from time-immemorial by the law.
Defendant’s second point is that the statute is unconsti-. tutional in that it deprives the defendant of the exercise and enjoyment of her religious profession and worship in violation, of article 1, section 3, of the State Constitution, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Applying DoctorWarne’s interpretation of the tenets of spiritism under the facts, as found by the court, defendant was telling fortunes for money. This modern attempt to excuse violations of lawful salutary police regulations enacted for the protection of the community, by appeals to constitutional rights and religious beliefs, does not find favor with the courts. The State may-not interfere with the religious beliefs and opinions of a, citizen, but it may prohibit acts and practices which are deemed to be detrimental to the community. (Reynolds v. United. States, 98 U. S. 145 , 165; Mormon Church v. United States,. 136 id. 1; People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201 , 210.) These-religious and constitutional arguments are always important but should be carefully examined to see that they are not a cover for some old-time wrongdoing or indecency sought to be-brought to life again. This seems to be such a case. There is.
“ So far as the testimony involved an issue of fact, as the witnesses were before the magistrate who had the benefit of •seeing them and hearing them testify, his finding that the testimony of the complaining witness was true cannot be disturbed here. The defendant, however*, contends, first, that as the statute provides that those who ‘pretend ’ to tell fortunes are disorderly persons, an element of deceit or fraud must be shown in order to justify a conviction; and, second, that where the efforts of the defendant are based upon so-called science or system such as astrology or palmistry is claimed to be, the prediction of future events does not constitute fortune telling within the meaning of the statute. On the other hand, the people contend, first, that the words ‘ pretending to tell fortunes ’ in the statute simply signify the fact that the Legislature •deemed it an impossible thing to tell fortunes and made it unnecessary to present proof that fortunes were really told, by providing that any one pretending to tell fortunes should be convicted. And second, that, as the statute contains no exceptions as to the method employed by defendants, any prediction of future events for hire is prohibited. Should the first contention of the defendant be upheld, it would be obvious that no person could be convicted under this statute until the lapse of time had proved that the prophecy was false, which would nullify the efficacy of the statute. In my opinion the Legislature employed the language of the statute to signify its disbelief in human power to prophesy human events. If this is so, as the statute contains no exceptions, I am unable to see that the basis on which such prophecies are made or the methods by which such prophecies are arrived at can be material. It is obvious that where a palmist or astrologer merely deduces
the character of the person consulting, and gives general advice as to the future, based upon such reading of character, no telling of fortunes is involved; but in this case the defendant went much further and prophesied as to specific events, such as marriage, death and travel. In my opinion, therefore, she brought herself within the language of the statute and was properly convicted.”
The judgment of the County Court of Kings county affirming the judgment of conviction of the Magistrate’s Court is affirmed.
Thomas, Mills, Rioi-i and Putnam, -Id., concurred.
Judgment of the County Court of Kings county affirming judgment of conviction of the Magistrate’s Court affirmed.
Footnotes
- * Since amended by Laws of 1917, ch. 517.— [Rep.,
Cases cited
- Reynolds v. States 98 U. S. 145 at 165 p. 124
- People v. Pierson 176 N. Y. 201 at 210 p. 124
- People v. Malcolm 90 Misc. Rep. 517 p. 125