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People ex rel. Stokes v. Risley

4 N.Y. Crim. 109 Court Supreme Court-General Term-Third Department. English

Delivered by Landon, J.

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p. 109
Supreme Court-General Term-Third Department.
November, 1885.
PEOPLE ex rel. STOKES v. RISLEY.

Headnote

Jurisdiction of Courts of Special' Sessions.
' The punishment imposed, by a Court of Sessions cannot exceed a fine of fifty dollars, or imprisonment for six months, or both, and the judgment may also direct that defendant be imprisoned until the fine is satisfied, but in no case to exceed one day for every one dollar of the fine. Code Grim. Pro. §§ 717, 718.
The relator was sentenced, in a Court of Sessions, to a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars, and to stand committed not exceeding one year, till the fine was paid. Held, that the sentence was invalid, and that the relator could not be imprisoned thereunder, even to the extent of fifty dollars fine or fifty days imprisonment.
"When the power of a court to pronounce a judgment has been exhausted, or has never existed, such judgment is not a ‘ ‘ final judgment ” as to which a writ of habeas corpus is ineffective.
.A prisoner held under such a void judgment is not confined to an appeal as his remedy, but may seek his discharge by habeas corpus.
Appeal by. the relator, Richard Stokes, from an order of "Hon. Wm. S. Kenton, county judge of Ulster county, of "February 9, 1885, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus.
The relator was, on the 81st day of January, 1885, convicted ■of having disposed of property covered by a chattel mortgage, and adjudged “ to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars, and stand committed to the county jail of Ulster county until the fine be satisfied, not exceeding one year,” at a Court of "‘‘Special Sessions, held by F. D. L. Montayne, Esq., a justice of 'the peace of' the town of Marbletown, and thereon a commitment was issued to the sheriff by whom the relator was detained in the Ulster county jail until brought before the county judge on habeas'corpus. These facts were returned by the sheriff, and ■.after a hearing had, the county judge dismissed the writ
From that order this appeal is taken.
p. 110
J. N. Fiero, for relator, appellant
A. T. Clearwater, district attorney, for defendant, respondent.
—1 The conviction was valid. Pen. Code, § 571.
II. The remedy of the relator was by appeal. Code Crim. Pro. § 543; People ex rel. Devoe v. Kelly, 2 N. Y. Crim. 428 .
IH Even should it be held that the judgment was invalid, the application for discharge was premature. People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 569 ; People ex rel. Trainor v. Baker, 89 Id. 460; People ex rel. Woolf v. Jacobs, 66 Id. 8; Matter of Sweatman, 1 Cow. 144 .

The conviction of the relator was valid. Penal' Code, § 571. He, therefore, is not entitled to his discharge, because he should suffer proper punishment People ex rel Devoe v. Kelly, 2 N. Y. Crim. 428 . But he was convicted before a Court of Special Sessions held by a justice of the peace. Whatever punishment a court of record might impose upon conviction for this offense, a Court of Special Sessions is restricted by section 717, Code of Criminal Procedure: “ The fine cannot exceed fifty dollars nor the imprisonment six months.” Here-the fine was two hundred and fifty dollars, with this addition, “ and stand committed to the county jail of Ulster county until the fine be satisfied, not exceeding one year.” Section 718, Code of Criminal Procedure, provides that: “A judgment that the defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied, specifying the extent of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed one day for every one dollar of the fine.” These sections are in Part V, entitled “ of proceedings in Courts of Special Sessions and Police Courts.” Section 718-is a transcript of section 484 in Part IY, entitled “of the proceedings in criminal actions prosecuted by indictment” It thus seems that the days of imprisonment cannot exceed the dollars of fine in any court. We think a Court of Special Sessions could not pronounce the sentence thus imposed.

The suggestion is made that the sentence is valid to the-extent of fifty dollars and a liability to fifty days’ imprisonment We think not, non constat, that the relator would not,

p. 111
immediately have paid the fifty dollars if that had been imposed, and thus have escaped imprisonment altogether. Two hundred and fifty dollars may be quite beyond his ability to pay. Thus the illegal sentence confines him in jail where a legal one might not, and in this respect the case is distinguished from People ex rel. Trainor v. Baker ( 89 N. Y. 460 ).

People v. Kelly is authority to the effect that a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy. The relator is detained upon an invalid judgment; it needs a valid one lawfully to detain him. Section 2016, Code of Civil Procedure, denies habeas corpus to a person “ when he has been committed or is detained by virtue of the final judgment or decree of a competent tribunal.” It was held in People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscombe ( 60 N. Y. 559 ), as explained in People ex rel. Wolf v. Jacobs (66 id. 10), that • when in pronouncing its sentence the court has exhausted its authority, if it proceed further to impose additional sentence, such additions are void. Thus “ the final judgment ” must be “ of a competent tribunal,” and where the competency to pronounce it is exhausted or never existed, it does not come within the definition of the final judgment as to which habeas corpus is ineffective.

It is suggested that the relator’s remedy is by appeal No doubt upon appeal the court could set aside the illegal judgment and pronounce a legal one (Code Crim. Pro. §§ 543, 764); but meantime it is true that the relator is unlawfully detained upon an invalid sentence, and he should be speedily freed from that restraint, since we cannot detain bim upon this sentence, and in this proceeding cannot ourselves pronounce any, and it is impracticable to remand him to the Court of Special Sessions; we must discharge him.

The order of the county judge is reversed and the relator discharged.

Learned, P. J., concurs.

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