People v. Carpenter

The defendant was charged with the murder of his wife, and was found by the jury to have killed her under ■circumstances warranting a conviction of murder in the first degree.

It appeared on the trial that some years before the killing he had intended or attempted a similar act and struck down a woman in a church in this. city whom he believed to be his wife, .for which offense he was sent to the State prison; and further, that while in the prison he had expressed his determination upon his liberation to kill his wife, which he did soon after his discharge. The facts and circumstances establish beyond all peradventure, therefore, deliberation, premeditation, and a brutal murder.

The appellant' complains of errors committed during the empanelling- of the jury which originated, as is claimed, in this way; Two jurors were interrogated as to the defense of insanity, namely, Francis A. White and James M. Lehmaier, and asked if that defense were interposed on behalf of the appellant on the trial, whether they would have any prejudice against it, and the result of the examination of each on that subject was substantially that they had a prejudice against that defense which would remain with them; but it may be said that notwithstanding this supposed bias, it is patent upon the whole examination that they felt that they would be guided and controlled by the evidence notwithstanding the impression mentioned. Assuming, however, that this was doubtful, the complaint made cannot avail the accused, as we shall see. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides, by section 376, for particular causes of challenges, which are of two kinds. First, for a bias which when its existence is ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror, and which is known in the Code as “ implied bias;” Secondly, for the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror with reference to the case, or to either party, which satisfies the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that he cannot try it impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging, and which is known as “ actual bias.” But it is declared that the previous expression or formation of an opinion as to the guilt or inno

It' must be further observed that no juror has any right, and .should not be regarded as having any right to entertain any prejudice against any defense, whether of insanity or otherwise. It is his duty to consider impartially all the evidence submitted to the court of which he forms a constituent part, and if in the discharge of his duty as a juror, he permits a bias or prejudice against a particular defense to control him, he violates his oath, disobeying the law of the land, and perpetuating an outrage in the administration of justice. He would subject himself by such a course to indictment and to punishment, which he would richly deserve. Indeed it may be said with propriety that no juror should be excused, if the statute did not exist authorizing him from serving in a case involving capital punishment, simply because he had a prejudice against that penalty. He has nothing to do with the punishment. His province is to say whether the accused is guilty of the' crime charged as a matter of fact upon the evidence. The punishment is declared by the Legislature and pronounced by the court. He shall not be permitted to entertain any prejudice as a citizen of the State in which he is called upon to serve as a juror; he is bound by the laws which there prevail, and when he takes his seat in the jury-box he has no right whatever to interpose his private views against the law

The laws are not to succumb to the prejudices of men who are required to acquiesce in and to be governed by them. There is no doubt that they must be so required, for a violation of law is punishable sometimes lightly, sometimes with severity, and perhaps in the gradation of punishment frequently too lightly. If a man becomes a citizen of the State, it devolves upon him at once to yield his private conclusions about its laws, whenever placed in a position where he is called upon to perform a public duty; and if he does not, he assumes at once the attribute of an outlaw who stands arrayed against the rules prescribed by due authority for his government and control It is unnecessary, however, to pursue this subject further.. The conclusion arrived at is, that whether there was or was not a bias against the defense of insanity, was wholly immaterial.

The appellant also complains that he was not permitted to exercise the right of peremptory challenge after the jury were sworn. In regard to this, however, it appears that each juror after his examination, and the failure of the accused to challenge peremptorily, was sworn to try the issue between him and the people. On that subject section 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, that the court may in its discretion, for good cause, set aside a juror at any time before evidence is given in the action. The right of peremptory challenge continues, it is true, until the juror has actually been sworn. We so decided in this case when it was before us on a former appeal, and there seems to be no doubt that the rule declared by the section just referred to, prevailed before its passage. Tweed’s Case, 13 Abb. (N. S.) 371, n; People v. Damon, 13 Wend. 351 .

There is nothing in this case to show that, in refusing to permit a peremptory challenge'to be taken after the juror was sworn, the discretion with which the court was invested was in any way abused, and the accused can take nothing by the objection stated.

Before the oath was administered to the last juror, the counsel for the accused asked that the jury be sworn as a body to try

Upon these incidents the counsel for the accused insists that by ordering the jury to be sworn collectively as a body at one and the same time, the oath administered or taken by each of the jury individually was vacated, and the right of peremptory challenge attached as if none of the jurors had been sworn. This is very ingenious but extremely metaphysical. It seems to be destitute of merit, however, and particularly when the act of which the accused seeks to avail himself was one performed by his particular request through his counsel If the swearing of the jury, however, created such an extraordinary result as that claimed by the counsel for the accused, and he should be permitted thus to take advantage of his own wrong, nevertheless it would not avail him, for the reason that after the jury were sworn he neither interposed a peremptory challenge nor claimed to exercise any right to do so.

It is also contended on behalf of the accused that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. The defense was insanity. There was no pretense of any other, and the case presented facts and circumstances which left no other conclusion to be drawn than that a deliberate and brutal murder had been committed.

Some facts and circumstances were arrayed on behalf of the accused which it was supposed furnished evidence of a diseased mind, and several medical gentlemen were examined on his behalf, whose testimony tended to establish the existence of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense of which

It is urged, and perhaps with some reason, that the learned justice in presenting his views upon the defense of insanity, so expressed himself as to convey to the jury an impression of his personal prejudice against that defense, or at least such a view of it as rendered it necessary for them to examine with extreme caution and scrutiny every element of it presented on behalf of the accused, and thus suggesting a difference between that and any other defense. In the case of Sindram v. People ( 88 N. Y. 169 ), Justice Bapallo said: “ Comments upon the testimony, so long as the judge leaves all the questions of fact to the jury, and instructs them that they are the sole judges of matters of fact, are not the subject of legal exception. It is desirable that the court should refrain, as far as possible, from saying" anything to the jury which may influence them either way in passing upon controverted questions of fact, and perhaps comments on the evidence might be carried so far as to afford ground for assigning error. But in the present case, whenever its attention was called by the prisoner’s counsel to any part of the charge which he considered as an infringement upon the province of the jury, the court promptly and clearly withdrew the remarks objected to, and emphatically reminded the jury that they alone had the right to determine the facts.”

Bat the court held in that case, inasmuch as the observations complained of were promptly withdrawn, and the jury instructed emphatically that they alone had the right to determine the fact, the judgment should not be interfered with

The same features mark this case. Although the learned justice presiding would seem to have had very decided views, not only in regard to the defense of insanity, the ease with which it might be simulated, the comparatively small reliance

It is impossible for us to say, however, that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, nor can we say that the charge of the learned judge was in antagonism to the established rules. For these reasons the accused can derive no benefit from the contention already considered.

We have examined this case with great care and attention, and find that no other exception was taken or presented for our consideration which would justify us in disturbing the verdict appealed from. We have not discovered in any of the propositions urged on the part of the accused, therefore, any reason why a new trial should be granted. The defense of insanity was rejected by the jury upon a conflict of evidence on the subject, and it was the only defense interposed, and indeed, as developed by the record, the only defense that could he interposed by which the accused could hope to be relieved from the consequences of the crime he committed, which was long meditated and most mercilessly executed.

The judgment must be affirmed.

I concur in the opinion of my brother Beady in so far as its results depend upon the following propositions discussed so ably by him :

First. That there was no error in overruling the several challenges, because on the testimony of the challenged jurors the court properly held that no existing bias was shown that disqualified either of them to sit in the case.

Second. That the existence of a prejudice or bias in the mind or opinion of a juror against any supposed or proposed defense is not such a one as is a proper legal basis of a challenge to the favor. Inquiries on such subjects may properly be allowed or made of a juror, under control of the court, for the purpose

Third. That the administering of the oath to each juror as he was found competent was a lawful mode of swearing the jury, and the oath thus taken by each precluded a subsequent peremptory challenge of him.

Fourth. That the re-swearing of the jury as a body, at the request of the defendant, did not alter his rights in respect of peremptory challenge.

These conclusions, of my brother Beady, dispose of all the material questions of the case, and justify his conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed, and upon them I concur in that conclusion.

Judgment affirmed.