•defendant was advised that it was the purpose of the plaintiff to bring a competing road upon its tracks, and into its station at Port J.ervis, it insisted that the terminal facilities at that place should be paid for at their value, which it fixed at $300 per month, commencing March 1,1888. The plaintiff paid that •charge for March, 1888, and then ceased paying anything. No further payments having been made after March, on May 22, 1888, the plaintiff was notified that the privilege of using the defendant's property at Port Jervis would be withdrawn after June 1st. By subsequent arrangements the rise was continued to June 21, 1888, when the connection was severed. This action was then commenced, and July 21st a temporary injunction was granted, under which the connection was restored and continued until the trial of this action •and the entry of final judgment. The case was tried before Justice J. F. ¡Barnard. The plaintiff claimed that it had vested, permanent, and inalienable right to use the defendant’s property without compensation, and based such claim on certain conversations between two of the directors of the original Monticello Company and Fisk and Gould, at the time president and vice-president of the Erie Railway Company. It is conceded that no written instrument existed giving any such right, and it was uncontroverted that no action was ever taken by the directors of either company claiming or granting such right. The trial justice found as a fact that no such right existed as the plaintiff asserted. He, however, stayed all proceedings of the defendant on the decision for 60 days, to give the plaintiff opportunity to move for a commission to fix the terms on which the plaintiff might connect its road with that of the defendant under the statute in such cases. The plaintiff did not avail itself of the privilege thus given, and after the expiration of the 60 •days judgment was entered dismissing the complaint on the merits. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed, and the case is now here for review.' It is contended by the defendant that the judgment appealed from is right; that the decision of the trial court was correct on the facts; and that, in any view that can be taken of the testimony, the claim of the plaintiff cannot be sustained as a matter of law.
T. F. Bush, for appellant. L. E. Carr, for respondent.
The testimony at the trial was to some- extent conflicting, but the decision made was abundantly sustained by proof; nor can we say that there is any preponderance of proof in favor of the appellant. On the contrary, we are of opinion that, if the utmost credit be given to the testimony introduced by plaintiff, it does not show an agreement that equity can enforce; for, if it be conceded that an understanding was reached that terminal facilities should be accorded without charge, we do not find that any time was specified during which that arrangement should continue. Other arrangements were also made, and the Erie might claim, with much show of fairness, that the continuance of the terminal facilities without charge was to be limited to the duration of the other portions of the agreement. Where •so much is uncertain, a court of equity has not the means of establishing, with adequate precision, what were the terms and conditions of the agreement, if it be that one was definitely made. We must therefore affirm the judgment.