Majority
Headnote
1. Reference—Accounts—Examination Incidentally Allowed.The plaintiffs complain on a quantum meruit for services rendered the defendant as professional auditors and accountants in examining the defendant’s books and accounts, reporting thereon, and making recommendations in relation thereto over a period from September, 1898, to December, 1903, and for disbursements amounting to $95.89 incurred in connection therewith, and allege the reasonable worth of such services and disbursements to have been $7,931.59, and that only the sum of $250 had been paid thereon. The answer is in effect a general denial, except that it admits the payment of $250, and sets up a counterclaim for $26,279.96 for moneys embezzled by the defendant’s servant, alleged to have been due to the negligence, carelessness, and want of skill of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs furnished the defendant a statement, itemized by days, showing the time they and their servants were engaged in said work. While this statement covers several pages of the record, it is long simply because it enumerates each day of the employment. Upon said statement, the pleadings, and an affidavit setting forth the Issues to be litigated and enumerating a large number of books and accounts, which the defendant claims the plaintiffs were employed to examine and of which an examination on the trial is claimed to be necessary, the defendant moved at Special Term and obtained a compulsory order of reference, pursuant to section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure, from which this appeal is taken.
It is claimed that the trial will involve the examination of a long account, first, to ascertain the services rendered by the plaintiffs; second, to ascertain the defalcations of the defendant’s servant, which are claimed to have extended over a period of several years, and to ascertain which will involve the examination of a large number of books.
As to the latter claim, it is plain that the examination of the account referred to is only incidentally or collaterally involved, and is therefore not such an account as warrants a compulsory reference within the meaning of the statute. Loverin v. Lenox Corporation, 35 App. Div. 263 , 54 N. Y. Supp. 724 , and cases cited. As to the first claim, we think it equally plain that the trial will not necessarily involve the examination of a long account within the meaning of the statute. From the papers presented on the motion, it is apparent that the two issues seriously to be litigated are the value of the plaintiffs’ services and the question of their carelessness or want of skill. The mere fact that the statement of the time spent by the plaintiffs, when itemized by days, is long, does not make it a long account within the meaning of the statute. It is manifest that these items can be so grouped on the trial that
It is apparent from the papers that the services can all be embraced under two heads, to wit: First, those rendered before the discovery of said embezzlement; and, second, those rendered after such discovery. They were all performed under one employment, and are the same in character. The fact that they extended over a period of years and were performed on many different days does not necessitate the examination of a long account, within the meaning of the statute.
The order should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, with costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- Thayer v. McNaughton 117 N. Y. 111 p. 196
- Spence v. Simis 137 N. Y. 616 p. 196
- Feeter v. Arkenburgh 147 N. Y. 237 p. 196