Majority
Headnote
1. Larceny—Wrongful Appropriation of Money—Control as Officer orThe demurrers, by the traverse to the returns to the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, challenge the sufficiency of the depositions taken before the magistrate, who issued the warrant under which the relator was arrested. The crime charged is grand larceny, and unless the evidence before the magistrate justified a
The statute of this state which defines the crime of larceny is found in section 528 of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
“Section 528. Larceny defined.—A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use or benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, either (1) takes from the possession of the true owner, or of any other person, or obtains from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing, or secretes, withholds, or appropriates to his own use, or that of any person other than the true owner, any money, personal property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind; or (2), having in his possession, custody, or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association, or corporation or public officer, or as a person authorized by agreement, or by competent authority, to hold or take such possession, custody or
control, any money, property, evidence of debt or contract, article of value of any nature or thing in action or possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any other person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof, steals such property and is guilty of larceny.”
A study of this section must convince the student of criminal law that it is not probable that the relator can be charged with the crime of larceny as defined by subdivision 1 thereof. Prior to the adoption of the Penal Code in 1881 the crime of larceny was an offense as defined at common law and by the Revised Statutes then in force. The Penal Code extended the scope of the crime of larceny so as to embrace acts which were declared criminal by various provisions of the statutes, including such crimes as embezzlement and breach of trust. People, etc., v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502 , 508, 509, 13 N. E. 325 . It is reasonably clear that to hold, in this case, that the crime of larceny was committed, it must be found under subdivision 2. It must appear that the relator “with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person * * * having in his possession, custody or control * * * as trustee or officer of * * * any corporation * * * ” said property “appropriates the same to his own use or that of any other person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof.” In contemplation of law a person found guilty of the crime described “steals such property.” The relator concededly at the times alleged was a trustee of the corporation mentioned. Did he, as such trustee, appropriate from the funds or moneys of such corporation upwards of $48,000 to his own use or to that of Cornelius N. Bliss, as chairman of the National Republican Committee, who was a person other than-the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof, with the intent to deprive the corporation of its said property? It is seriously argued by the learned counsel for the relator that he had not the custody, possession, nor control of the money of the corporation and of necessity, therefore, there could be no appropriation by him of said moneys. It is claimed that his relation to the transaction was one of mere passivity; that he was an instrument performing the bidding or request of the president of the corporation, his superior officer, and that, however negligent he may be found to have been in that behalf, for which he might be civilly liable, he does not come within the meaning of section 528 of the Penal Code. It seems to me that these deductions are fallacious and inconclusive and based upon a strained and narrow reading of the statute. Aside from the provisions of section 29 of the Penal Code, which make an accessory before the fact a principal, it is incomprehensible to me how it can be sound legal doctrine to hold that a trustee and vice president of a corporation, and in this case a chairman of its finance committee, may deliberately receive and take from another officer of the corporation moneys belonging to it with full knowledge that the act constitutes an unlawful diversion of funds and not be deemed to have the “control” of said moneys. As trustee an affirmative, active and vigilant duty devolved upon him. It is well settled that a co-trustee cannot assume an attitude of passivity when he knows of improprieties
“Felonious intent, where used in penal statutes, means criminal -intent, and criminal intent is an intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property.”
An inquiry into the intent would not be essential where the acts charged were expressly prohibited by law an'd were declared to be a crime. Thus, if the giving of money of the corporation to a political campaign fund were at the time expressly prohibited and made criminal by a statute which since the hearing in this proceeding has been enacted, then the offense being malum prohibitum would be complete when the act is intentionally done. And the accused in such a case could not be heard to say that he was ignorant of or that he honestly misconstrued the law (People, etc., v. Powell, 63 N. Y. 88 , 92, citing Gardner v. People, 62 N. Y. 299 ), where it was held that the indictment for a crime malum prohibitum would be supported irrespective of motive or intent. In the Powell Case the defendants were commissioners of charities, convicted for conspiracy in purchasing certain articles without advertising for proposals, as expressly required by law: The criminal charge, it will be observed, did not rest upon the mere violation of the statute requiring the defendants to advertise,
“To make an agreement between two or more persons to do an act innocent in itself a criminal conspiracy it is not enough that it appears that the act which was the object of the agreement was prohibited. The confederation must be corrupt. 3 Greenleaf, Evidence, 75. The agreement must have been entered into with an evil purpose as distinguishable from a purpose simply to do the act prohibited in ignorance of the prohibition. This is implied in the meaning of the word conspiracy. * * * The actual criminal intention belongs to the definition of the offense and must be shown to justify a conviction for conspiracy. * * * It was open for the jury to find upon 'the evidence that no criminal intention existed, and if this had been found, to have acquitted the defendants. The argument that they were presumed to know the law and that they, therefore, intended to violate it might properly have been urged before the jury, but the presumption was not in this case conclusive and they could not be made conspirators by presumption and intendment in the absence of any intent to violate the law."
To paraphrase from this opinion “the actual criminal intention belongs to the definition of the offense of larceny and must be shown to justify a conviction.” What proofs, then, are required to justify the finding of an intent to deprive another of his property within the meaning of the larceny statute? In People, etc., v. Herrick, 13 Wend. 87 , 91, which was a criminal case involving false representations, the court held that “the intent is inferred from the fact and that if there could be a false representation with an innocent intent the defendant should have shown it.” In Stokes v. People, etc., 53 N. Y. 179 , 13 Am. Rep. 492 , it is said that “the intention may be inferred from the act, but this in principle is an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury and not an implication of law to be applied by the court.” If the act of the trustee in appropriating trust property to the use of another was illegal and a breach of trust, and if the act was willfully done, the criminal intent may be inferred from the act itself. The proof of intent in such case would, of course, be presumptive only, subject to be overcome by proof of facts and circumstances that may be considered by the jury called upon to pass on the question of guilt. Indeed, in all cases where intent is a necessary incident to the commission of a crime, the question of intent must be submitted to the jury, who alone may determine that fact. People, etc., v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324 , 26 N. E. 267 , 11 L. R. A. 807 . Is the application of corporate funds to political uses illegal? In Moss v. Cohen, 158 N. Y. 240 , 53 N. E. 8 , cited by the relator, it is said that a contract made without legislative saction by a corporation, “and hence in excess of its powers, but involving no moral turpitude and offending against no express statute, is not illegal in such a sense as to prevent the maintenance of an action upon it. Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24 , 45 N. E. 390 , 36 L. R. A. 664 .” It is further there said:
“In discussing the questions of that case Andrews, G. J., states what has already been suggested, that the word ‘illegal’ has often been used to describe a contract which was simply unauthorized and calls attention to several cases where the inexact and misleading use of the word' ‘illegal’ has been alluded to. He also says that public policy is promoted by the discouragement of fraud and the maintenance of the obligation of contracts, unless the parties are guilty of a wrong.”
“Every additional power given to, or usurped by, a corporation extends its advantage over persons unincorporated. If a bank is permitted to trade in merchandise it comes into competition with others so employed. * * * The importance of limiting corporate bodies to the exercise of those powers and the enjoyment of those privileges and franchises, which haive been specifically conferred upon them, must, I think, be obvious. They are rapidly multiplying. Their privileges give them decided advantages over mere private, unincorporated partnerships. They have large capitals and numerous agents and are capable of entering into combinations with each other. They are not only formidable to individuals, but might even, under some circumstances, become formidable to the state. They are, or should be, created, as we have seen, for public reasons alone, and the Legislature is presumed to have carefully considered the public interest and to have granted just so much power and so many peculiar privileges as those in-interests are supposed to require.”
Judge Comstock differed from his distinguished associate in the conclusion that every unauthorized act of a corporation was illegal, arguing that when the unauthorized act affected mere private rights the act should not necessarily be declared illegal. But there was no difference between them in the characterization of the act, as illegal and void, where the act itself offended public policy. According to Judge Comstock “the illegality of the act is determined in its quality.” Page 270. In other words, according to Judge Selden, every unauthorized act of a corporation offended public policy and was hence illegal. According to Judge Comstock only such an unauthorized act which by reason of its quality or character could be said to be contrary to public policy or which is wrong in itself or expressly prohibited by law is illegal. There has never been a dissent in any judicial utterance, so far as I know, from the proposition that if the unauthorized act of the corporation was wrongful per se, or malum prohibitum, or offensive to public policy, it was an illegal, and, therefore, a void act. The test of illegality or wrongdoing must be found in the quality of the act complained of. Each unauthorized act must thus be specifically scrutinized to determine whether it is an illegal one or not. The duties of a trustee of a corporation are confined to the management and. control of the specific business to which it is restricted by the state. Any use of the property by such a corporation to a purpose not directly connected with or involved in the business of the corporation clearly would be an unauthorized act. Assuredly it is not the part of the business of a life insurance company to participate in political ques
Unlike private business corporations, the investments of a life insurance company are limited by law. Indeed, the only justification for the course pursued which has been urged is that the opinion of the relator and other trustees of the company was that the success of the Republican Party in 1904 was essential to the maintenance of values of the securities held by the company. But the trustees are not responsible for fluctuations in the values of securities resulting from political of general economic conditions brought about by no manipulative acts of theirs. They are not the repositories of the political opinions or consciences of the policy holders. It is safe to say that many thousands of the policy holders of the company in question differed radically from the relator and his associates in the belief that the best interests of the country would be served by the success of the Republican Party. . To justify the act of trustees of such a corporation in contributing funds to a political campaign it would be necessary to find that, by virtue of their position as trustees, they may, according to their political views, be they for a protective tariff, free trade, socialism, prohibition, free silver, greenbacks, or what not, take the money from the pockets of their policy holders and, in effect, force many of them to contribute to a political party which they may be actively opposing by personal effort and with private means. It is clear that such acts could be countenanced only by those who shared the political views of the trustees, upon the theory that the end justified the means. But as every unauthorized act of a corporation is not necessarily illegal, it is pertinent now to inquire into the quality of the act under review and determine if it is also an illegal one. Is it an act that offends public policy? If it does, it is a public wrong, and therefore illegal. I appreciate that public policy is not determined by the opinions of private individuals, however great the aggregation of such opinions. Public clamor does not determine public policy. Public policy is manifested by public acts, legislative and judicial, and not by private opinion, however eminent. License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 462 , 18 L. Ed. 497 . Is the application of the moneys of a life insurance company towards political campaign purposes an inherent wrong? The right of suffrage is exclusively accorded natural persons, citizens of the United States.
A corporation is an artificial creation, existing by the will of the people, as expressed through its lawmaking bodies, with the right to exercise such powers only as are expressly conferred upon it. To permit an artificial creature of the state, unless it be a corporation expressly permitted by law to engage in political matters, by the unau
Aside from the point that the intent may be inferred from the act, it may also be said that from the special facts appearing in this case a criminal intent may be inferred. It is shown that the moneys were not voted nor directed to be paid by the board of trustees of the life insurance ’ company, but were taken from the company’s treasury by the individual acts of the president and the relator, passively acquiesced
“The rule that where unimpeached witnesses testify positively to a fact and are uncontradicted, their testimony must be credited, is subject to many qualifications, and among them is this, that the interest of the witness may affect his credibility.” Elwood v. Western Union Ry., 45 N. Y. 553 , 6 Am. Rep. 140 ; Wohlfahrt v. Beckert, 92 N. Y. 490 , 44 Am. Rep. 406 .
The question of the credibility of the testimony would in such a case be for the jury to determine. I do not desire, in the remotest degree, by what I have said, to have it construed that I am expressing an opinion of the intent of the relator, my meaning and purpose being solely to show that, from the facts submitted, it would be peculiarly the province of the jury upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances to find the intent, and that upon this application the court cannot affirmatively find that there is no evidence of intent. Since writing the foregoing I am in receipt of a supplementary brief submitted by the learned counsel for the relator, calling my attention to the passage by the Legislature, on April 16th, of an act to amend the general corporation law relative to political contributions by corporations. It is argued that where the intention of an earlier statute is doubtful, a subsequent legislative construction is of weight with the court, and further, that a construction of section 528 of the Penal Code that campaign contributions by directors of corporations are felonious, and therefore prohibitive, would be to assume that the statute just passed is mere brutum fulmen. I am not impressed by the force of either of these arguments. We are not confronted with the construction of a statute which specifically relates to political contributions by corporations, apparently inconsistent with another statute treating of the same subject, but with the application of a general law defining larceny to a given state of facts. The statutory enactment of a few days ago makes a political contribution by a corporation or its officers participating therein a misdemeanor. It is malum prohibitum. It by means follows, however, that because of this new provision a trustee who may hereafter be shown to have appropriated moneys of a corporation for political purposes would not be amenable to the larceny statute. It° may be that if a case at some future time arise for the crime of larceny under a state of facts analogous to those here appearing,
The writ must be dismissed and the prisoner remanded to custody.
Cases cited
- People v. Dumar 106 N. Y. 502 at 508, 509, 13 p. 429
- In re the Accounting of Niles 113 N. Y. 547 at 558, 21 p. 430
- McCourt v. People 64 N. Y. 583 p. 430
- People v. Powell 63 N. Y. 88 at 92 p. 430
- Gardner v. People 62 N. Y. 299 p. 430
- People v. Herrick 13 Wend. 87 at 91 p. 431
- People v. Flack 125 N. Y. 324 p. 431
- Moss v. Cohen 158 N. Y. 240 p. 431
- Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy 151 N. Y. 24 at 45 p. 431
- Bissell v. Michigan Southern & Northern Indiana Railroad Companies 22 N. Y. 258 p. 432
- United States v. Vassar 72 U. S. 462 p. 433
- Wohlfahrt v. Beckert 92 N. Y. 490 p. 435