Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Corporations—Streets—Encroachments—Revocation of License.The action is brought to compel the removal of a stone stoop and steps and a railed areaway in front of Nos. 1424 and 1426 on the easterly side of Broadway, in the city of New York, between Thirty-Ninth and Fortieth streets, erected and maintained by the defendants, on the ground that they constitute a public nuisance in that they are encroachments upon the street. The stoop extends into the sidewalk beyond the building line about seven feet and the areaway about six feet, and they were erected and constructed in 1870 under claimed license from the city.
On the trial the plaintiff proved by competent engineers, familiar with the locality and the landmarks and street lines, that they measured the distance on Thirty-Ninth and Fortieth streets from the west line of Sixth avenue to the building line on the east side of Broadway, and that they corresponded with the distánces shown by the distances on the map of 1869, and that the structures complained of encroached upon the street from six to seven feet. This evidence was not disputed, and could not well be. It established the east line of Broadway and' the encroachment. Even if the defendants had a license to construct originally, it was revocable and had been revoked. Plaintiff, therefore, made a case entitling it to the relief prayed for. The defendant Farrington is the tenant of the premises in question, under a lease in writing by which he is bound to make certain repairs. Each defendant served his answer upon his codefendant, demanding that, in case a removal of the structure should be decreed, it should be adjudged that the other bear the expense, The law permits such an issue to be determined in the one action, and both the landlord and the tenant have asked that- we determine on this appeal the question of law involved.
When Andrew Scher, under whose will the defendants hold title as trustees, purchased the premises, the encroachments existed as they now are, and defendant Farrington was tenant. In 1902 he entered into a further lease with his codefendant whereby he covenanted that he would “do all repairs required to the walls, ceiling, and paper, plumbing, elevator, ranges, pipes, fixtures, glass and the woodwork in and about the premises, and repair and make good any damage occurring excepting by fire or the elements, to said building, or any portion thereof, and do all inside and outside repairs necessary to said premises, including roofs, sidewalks and yards thereof, * * * ” and “comply promptly with all the rules, regulations and ordinances of the board of health, fire department and building department, or other city departments and city ordinances applicable to said premises.” In another portion of the lease it is provided that the tenant shall quit and surrender the premises at the expiration of his term in as good state and condition as they were at the commencement, reasonable use and wear and damage bv the ele
1 We see nothing in these covenants, or in the lease as a whole, which imposes any obligation upon the tenant to incur the expense of removing the encroachments in question. .Certainly their removal was not in the minds of the parties when the lease was entered into. The tenant’s agreement to comply with all the rules, regulations, and ordinances of the various city departments did not contemplate the tearing down of the stoop and steps and building a new entrance to the building, or the abandonment of the areaway and the providing of a new mode of outside entrance to the basement. Leases, like other contracts, are to be reasonably construed according to the apparent intention of the parties. May v. Gillis, 169 N. Y. 330 , 62 N. E. 385 ; Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N. Y. 549 , 555, 55 N. E. 292 . Where particular repairs are speci-' fled in a lease, they limit the construction to be put upon broader language used in that connection. Ducker v. Del Genovese, 93 App. Div. 575 , 87 N. Y. Supp. 889 . The removal of the stoop and areaway is surely an alteration of the building. By the lease the tenant is prohibited from making any “alterations, additions, or improvements” to the premises without the written consent of the landlord. This negatives the idea that the tenant agreed to bear the expense of such alterations if they should be forced upon the building by any superior authority.
The landlord insists that because the encroachment or nuisance existed, and the present tenant was in possession at the time of the leasing, a more liberal rule applies to him. This circumstance, on the contrary, we think is favorable to the tenant. If a landlord leases premises with an existing public nuisance thereon, there certainly is no implied agreement that the tenant will be to the expense of remedying the evil. ’ If the structure is unlawful as between the owner and the tenant, it is incumbent upon the owner to make it legal, certainly in the absence of an express agreement by the tenant so to do. ’
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant against the respondent trustee to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- May v. Gillis 169 N. Y. 330 p. 577
- Gillet v. Bank of America 160 N. Y. 549 at 555, 55 p. 577