In re Allison

This is a proceeding commenced by Charles S. Allison, as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of Eli Allison, deceased, as trustee under the last will and testament of William J. Laz.ear, deceased, for the judicial settlement of the account of said Charles S. Allison, as administrator, etc., of Eli Allison, as such trustee, and for the distribution of the funds of said estate of William J. Lazear, deceased, which were held by said Eli Allison as trustee under said will. There is no question as to the correctness of the account of said administrator, or of the said trustee. The only question is as to who owns the principal of the trust funds,- when and to whom the same shall be paid, and whether the trust mentioned in the will of William J. Lazear still continues as to the whole of said principal fund during the lifetime of Cornelius G. Lazear, or whether one-fifth of the principal of said fund continues to be held in trust during the lifetime of said Cornelius G. Lazear. The answers to those questions involve the construction of the last will of said William J. Lazear, deceased.

William J. Lazear died in the town of Wayne, Steuben county, N. Y., on the 29th day of January, 1883, leaving his last will and testament, dated and executed on the 24th day of January, 1883. This was

At the time the said William J. Lazear, the testator, made his said will, and at the time of his death, he was residing with the said Eli Allison at the latter’s home in the town of Wayne, Steuben count)-, N. Y., and the said William J. Lazear had made his home with said Eli Allison for three or four years next preceding the time of his death. In the fall of 1882, at the time of the marriage of said Frank Swarthout to Minor E. Swarthout, the family of said Eli Allison consisted of said William J. Lazear, the testator, said Frank Swarthout, said William J. Lazear, 2d, and Eli Allison; and the said William J. Lazear, the testator, and William J. Lazear, 2d, his grandson, continued to reside with said Eli Allison at his said home up to the time of the death of said testator, William J. Lazear. At the time the will of said William J. Lazear was made, his son, Cornelius G. Lazear, was living in New York or Brooklyn, and he had been living away from his father, William J. Lazear, the said testator, from in or about the year 1876 or 1877, and the said Cornelius G. Lazear had been leading somewhat of a dissipated life, which,was known to his said father, and he did not have any property to speak of at the time the said will was made, and had practically been out of business for several years before, and apparently had not succeeded in business, but had lost money in business. He had lived in different places, and at the time he was living in New York he had not been in any business that amounted to anything. While the said grandson, William J. Lazear, 2d, resided with the said Eli Allison as aforesaid, the said testator. William J. Lazear, paid said Eli Allison for his said grandson’s board and lodging. On the 21st day» of April, 1884, the said Surrogate’s Court made and entered a decree in proceedings commenced by Silas A. Price and Eli Allison, as such executors, to judically settle their account as such executors, in and by which decree it was adjudged that the said executors had on hand $8,050 of said trust estate, and they were directed to hold the same pursuant to the terms of said will, as trustees therein named, and were then discharged and released from all other obligations and liabilities as such executors. Thereafter, and in or about the year 1893, a decree was made by said Surrogate’s Court, in proceedings brought therein for that purpose, whereby the accouni of said Silas A. Price, as such trustee, was judicially settled, and his

The following is a copy of so much of .the will of William J. Lazear,deceased, as disposes of his property:

“Alter the payment of my just debts and funeral expenses, I give, devise, and bequeath to my son, Cornelius Q. Lazear, and my grandson, "William J. Lazear, the use of notes and mortgages as follows: [Here are enumerated certain notes and mortgages]—being about $8,200.00; and I hereby appoint Silas A. Price and Eli Allison trustees to bold the above notes and mortgages, and they shall reinvest the same, when they shall be paid, to the best advantage, and shall collect the interest and pay it as follows: One-fifth to my son, Cornelius G. Lazear, and four-fifths to my grandson, William J. Lazear. The said interest for my grandson shall be paid for iris support and education until he is twenty-one, after that go to him direct. This interest shall be paid annually during their natural life. At the death of Cornelius G. Lazear, the whole of said interest shall be paid to William J. Lazear, and at his death the principal shall be paid to the children of said William J. Lazear, if he shall have any; if not, it shall be paid to my granddaughter, Frank Swarthout, or her heirs.

“Second*. I give, devise, and bequeath to my granddaughter, Frank Swarthout, the balance of my mortgages and notes, which is in amount equal to that given to my son and my grandson.

“Third. If there shall be anything left of my personal property in the shape of money or notes, other than mortgages and notes, it shall be equally divided between the three above described.”

Charles S. Allison, as administrator, etc., claims that the principal of said trust fund belongs to him as such administrator. Minor E. Swarthout claims that the principal of said fund belongs to him as such executor of the last will and testament of his wife, Frank Swarthout, deceased, and to him as sole legatee under said will. Cornelius G. Lazear claims that the principal of said trust fund belongs to him by operation of law; that is, because he was at the time of the death of William J. Lazear, 2d, the then sole heir at law of Frank Swarthout, deceased. Neither Nellie Lazear nor Marvin Price, as administrator, claim any interest in said fund. Cornelius G. Lazear claims that the remainder in said fund did not vest at the death of the testator, but that it was a contingent remainder, and. vested at the death of William J. Lazear, 2d, in the person who was then the surviving heir at law of Frank Swarthout; and Cornelius G. Lazear claims that, inasmuch as the remainder did not vest until the death of William J. Lazear, 2d, and Frank Swarthout died before William J. Lazear, 2d, and her father, Eli Allison, who survived her, having also died before William J. Lazfear, 2d, then the only heir'at law of Frank Swarthout, at the time of the death of William J. Lazear, 2d, was Cornelius G. Lazear, as he was the brother of the mother of Mrs. Frank Swarthout. Charles S. Allison, as administrator, claims that the said remainder vested at the time of the testator’s death in Mrs. Frank Swarthout, who survived the

We will first consider the claim of Cornelius G. Lazear. There are several cardinal rules in the construction of wills, which may be referred to in the discussion of the several questions involved, viz.: The intention of the testator, which is to be derived from the language of the will itself, and which is to be interpreted in the light of surrounding circumstances, is the controlling element in the construction of wills, and, so far as the same can be ascertained in accordance with the rule stated, shall be taken into consideration and carried into effect. Byrnes et al. v. Stillwell et al., 103 N. Y. 458 , 9 N. E. 241 , 57 Am. Rep. 760 . Aid may be sought from the situation and the relation of the parties. Matter of Russell, 168 N. Y. 174 , 61 N. E. 166 . The law favors the vesting of estates. Stokes v. Weston et al., 142 N. Y. 433 , 37 N. E. 515 . The remainder shall not be considered as contingent in any case where, consistently with the intention of the testator, it may be construed as vested. Hersee et al. v. Simpson, 154 N. Y. 496 , 48 N. E. 890 ; Connelly v. O’Brien, 166 N. Y. 408 , 60 N. E. 20 . The rule is that where a person or persons to whom, or the event upon which, the estate is limited to take effect, remains uncertain until the termination of the life estate, the remainder is contingent. Clark v. Cammann, 160 N. Y. 327 , 54 N. E. 709 . If, when the will goes into effect, there is no contingency, either as to the person entitled in remainder or as to the event by which the intermediate estafé is to be determined, then the remainder is vested. Van Axte v. Fisher et al., 117 N. Y. 403 , 22 N. E. 943 . If the postponement of the payment is for the purpose of letting in an intermediate estate, then the remainder shall be deemed vested at the death of the testator, and the class of legatees is to be determined as of that date, for futurity is not annexed to the substance of the gift. Matter of Crane, 164 N. Y. 71 , 58 N. E. 47 . The word “heirs,” when applied to the succession of personal property, means next of kin. Tillman, as Ex’r, v. Davis et al., 95 N. Y. 17 , 47 Am. Rep. 1 ; Drake v. Pell, 3 Edw. Ch. 251 ; Wright v. M. E. Church, Hoff. Ch. 202. The words “and heirs” are words of limitation, and not of purchase. Thurber v. Chambers, 66 N. Y. 42 ; Matter of Allen, 151 N. Y. 248 , 43 N. E. 554 ; Matter of Wells, 113 N. Y. 396 , 21 N.

The general rules for the construction Of wills are not controlling. They are but aids to the construction, and, where the language of the will itself is reasonably plain, or not obscure, recourse to these rules is not necessary. They are simply to aid in ascertaining the intention of the testator, when considering the language of the will, and the relation and situation of the testator, and the parties affected. As stated in Matter of Russell, supra, aid may be sought from the situation and the relation of the parties. It is clear, from the reading of the will in question, that the testator only intended to give his son, Cornelius G. Eazear, the use for his life of one-fifth of one-half of all his notes and mortgages, and to his grandson, William J. Eazear, 2d, the use for his life of four-fifths of one-half of -all his notes and mortgages, and that he did not intend that either should ever have any portion of the principal of his notes and mortgages; and it appears that at the time he made this will all of'his estate, with the exception of about $750, consisted of bonds, notes, and mortgages, and that the residuary clause of said will would not have carried to exceed $750 of personal property, so he practically excluded his son and his grandson from any enjoyment of his estate, except the incomes above stated. His son, it appears, had not been successful in business, was practically insolvent, and had not resided with him in many years. His grandson was about 12 years of age, and his father apparently was not supporting him, but the testator was supporting bim at the home of Eli Allison; and it is evident that the testator did not consider it prudent or wise to intrust either his son or his grandson with the ownership of his estate, and that it -was wise that about one-half of the same should be placed in trust for their use and benefit, and so placed that they could not disturb or waste any of the principal. So by a plain reading of the will, in connection with the position and relation of the parties, it is. apparent that he did not intend his son, Cornelius G. Eazear, or his said grandson, ever to receive any of the principal, except possibly a small share in the residuary estate of $750.

The fact that the will provides that upon the death of William J. Eazear, 2d, without children, the principal of said trust fund “shall be paid,” etc., does not mean that-the vesting of the said remainder was postponed, but that the enjoyment of the same was postponed. Roosa v. Harrington, supra, and many other cases. The remainder

The only difference between the claims of Charles S. Allison, as administrator, etc., and Mr. Swarthout, as executor, etc., is that the former claims that the remainder, though vested at the time of the testator’s death,«was divested by reason of Mrs. Swarthout’s death before the death of William J. Lazear, 2d, and the latter claims that the remainder vested in her absolutely at the testator’s death. Mr. Allison bases his claim upon the words “or her heirs,” in that part of the will where it says:

“Tlie whole of said interest shall be paid to William J. Lazear, 2d, and at his death the principal shall be paid to the children of William J. Lazear, 2d. if he shall have any; if not, it shall be paid to my granddaughter, Frank Swarthout, or her heirs.”

Mr. Allison contends that the words “or her heirs” have not the same effect as the words “and her heirs,” and that the words “or her heirs” shall not be construed as words of limitation, but as words of purchase or of substitution, and that when Mrs. Swarthout died, during the lifetime of William J. Lazear, 2d, leaving, her surviving, as her sole heir at law, Eli Allison, then by force of the words “or her heirs" the said remainder became vested in Mr. Eli Allison, and that Charles S. Allison, as administrator, etc., by operation of law takes the title to the said remainder. We have above quoted several cases which held that the words “or heirs” may be construed ás “and heirs,” and vice versa. It must be remembered that this will was not drawn by a lawyer, but was drawn by a layman, and from its appearance it was

In the first place it is noticeable that he used the word “heirs” in reference, not to real estate, but to personal property, and the will nowhere purported to dispose of real estate. It is plain on its face that it was disposing of personal property only, and yet the scrivener used the word “heirs” where he should have used the words “next of kin.” In the case of Connelly v. O’Brien, 166 N. Y. 406 , 60 N. E. 20 , the Court of Appeals shows how far it was willing to go in order to construe a remainder into a vested one. In that case it construed the word “then” to refer to the time of the death of the testator, instead of to the time of the termination of the life estate. In the case of Miller v. Caragher, 35 Hun, 485 , where the gift was to a person, from the deceased “to Henry or his heirs,” the court held that the remainder vested in Henry if he survived the testator, and went to his heirs only in'case Henry had died before the testator. In that case it was construed that by the words “or his heirs” it meant that, in case Henry died before the testator, then it would go to his heirs, but, in case Henry survived the testator, then the words “or his heirs” were words of limitation, and not of purchase, or of substitution. Matter of McCormick v. Burke, 2 Dem. Sur. 137; Wright v. Trustees, Hoff. Ch. 202. In the above cases the words “or heirs” were construed to be words of purchase, and in those cases it was held that, where there was a gift to a person or his heirs, those words meant that, in case the legatee died before the testator, then the words “or heirs” became words of purchase, but that, in case the legatee survived the testator, then they were construed as words of limitation, or, perhaps more correctly speaking, they were not considered at all, but were of use only in case the legatee failed to survive the testator, and that the testator in using those words referred to the case of the death of the legatee during the testator’s lifetime, and not the legatee’s death at any period after the fiPíi fh rtf tnp fpsfrtfrvr

To my mind v. Gilbert et al., 144 N. Y. 68 -75, 38 N. E. 979 , and Davidson v. Jones, 112 App. Div. 255 , 98 N. Y. Supp. 265 , should determine the contentions between Mr. Allison, as administrator, and Mr.- Swarthout, as executor, etc. In Miller v. Gilbert et al. the will provided"as follows: The testator gave to his wife the use, etc., of certain houses and lots so long as she continued his widow, and, when she ceased to be such by death, then the premises were directed to be sold, and the proceeds equally divided among the testator’s four children, named, “or their heirs.” The four children named survived the testator, but two of them died before their mother, and the court held that the fee of the premises vested upon the testator’s death in the four children. In discussing the meaning of the words “or heirs,” the court said:

“It is also urged by the appellants’ counsel that the words ‘or their heirs,’ in the clause of the will under consideration, disclose the intent to substitute a deceased son’s issue for himself in case the latter died at any time before the widow. It is difficult to say what was in the mind of this illiterate testator when he employed these words, lie may have improperly deemed them essentia! in framing an absolute devise to the sons. * * * It is quite inconceiv

able that he supposed the words created a substitutionary bequest or devise in the event of the death of a son before his mother, but it may more reasonably be assumed they were ignorantly used. It is a case where the court might well substitute ‘and’ for ‘or.’ Roome v. Phillips, 24 N. Y. 403 ; Jackson v. Blanshan, 0 Johns. 00 , 5 Am. Dec. 188 . If these words are given the full force and effect claimed for them, they would fall within the rule of con-, struetion that where there is a devise to one person in fee, and in ease of his death to another, the contingency referred to is the death of the first-named devisee during the lifetime of the testator, and that, if such devisee survives the testator, he takes an absolute fee. Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433 , 37 N. E. 515 , and cases cited.”

In Davidson v. Jones, supra, the will there under consideration devised all of testator’s property to his wife “for her sole and separate use for and during the term of her natural life, and on her decease to her children or to their legal representatives.” It was there contended that the words “or their legal representatives” were words of substitution, and postponed the vesting of the remainders by creating remainders in the heirs of such of the testator’s children as should die during the life of the life tenant, who was still living. It was held by the court:

“Though the remaindermen took possession ‘on her decease,’ meaning the life tenant’s decease, such words as ‘on,’ ‘when,’ ‘after,’ and ‘from and after,’ standing alone, do not of themselves make a remainder contingent, unless their meaning is enlarged by the context. They relate to the time of the enjoyment, and not to the time the interest vests; for the law favors the vesting of estates. Though the words ‘legal representatives’ refer technically to executors or administrators, yet they may also mean heirs at law or next of kin, and, where used in reference to real estate, they mean ‘heirs of the testator’s deceased children.’ The intent of the testator was to vest the absolute title to his real estate in such of his children as were living at the time of his death, and in the heirs of such as may have died before that event, and only the time of enjoyment was postponed until the death of the widow. As none of the children of the testator had died before him, the remainder vested absolutely in them, and a conveyance by them conveyed the title.”

In that case the words that raised the principal question were the words “or to their legal representatives,” and the court held that it meant to their heirs. From the cases cited or referred to, or mentioned in the cases cited, we are satisfied that the words “or heirs” meant “next of kin,” and that they were not words of substitution, and that, Frank Swarthout having survived the testator, the said remainder vested immediately and absolutely in her at the time of the testator’s death, subject to the contingency of William J. Lazear, 2d, having children, which is now immaterial, as that contingency never occurred. Therefore we must hold that the said remainder did not pass to Eli Allison upon the death of Frank Swarthout, and therefore Charles S. Allison, as administrator, has no interest in said remainder, and we must hold that the remainder vested in Mrs. Frank Swarthout, and that she had a right to will the same, and that she did will the same to Minor E. Swarthout, and he, as her executor, is entitled to the payment of the principal of said remainder to him.

However the said payment to him must be subject to so much of the trust as still exists in favor of Cornelius G. Lazear, and here is a question that would be troublesome, if it were not for the consent of the parties. The will provided that the interest of said fund should

Let a decree made upon this judicial settlement providing and adjusting, among other things, that four-fifths of the principal of said fund, less its share of the commissions, expenses, and allowances, be distributed and paid to Minor E. Swarthout, as executor of the last will and testament of Frank Swarthout, deceased, and providing that one-fifth of the principal of said remainder, less commissions, expenses, and allowances, be paid over to such person as shall be appointed trustee under the last will and testament of William J. Lazear, deceased, and be held in trust by such trustee under said will, and be kept invested and the interest collected and paid over annually to Cornelius G. Lazear during his lifetime, and upon his death the said one-fifth of said principal be distributed and paid to Minor E. Swarthout as such executor. The question of costs and allowances to be heard on at least five days’ notice from the moving party to those interested.