Majority
Headnote
1. Criminal Law—Jurisdiction of Offense—Misdemeanors—Petit Larceny.The appellant, arraigned for a grand larceny, was held and was committed to the sheriff of Kings county to answer to the grand jury. The grand jury, by its foreman, wrote on the papers :
“Sent to Court of Special Sessions by grand jury, to be disposed of as petit larceny, December 7, 1906.”
The papers further show:
“Received Court of Special Sessions, Second Division, Dec. 7, 1906. Received at district attorney’s office, Brooklyn, N. Y., Dec. 7, 1906.”
The district attorney of Kings county on December 7, 1906, laid information accusing the relator of the crime of petit larceny. The relator was brought up on habeas corpus issued on December 16, 1906, to the sheriff of Kings county. The return made by the warden of the Kings county jail on December 17, 1906, is that the relator was detained by virtue of a commitment dated December 14, 1906, made by
I think that the order must be affirmed. The prosecution for petit larceny was begun by the information of the district attorney, for which his authority is section 742 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As petit larceny is a misdemeanor (section 535, Penal Code), the Court of Special Sessions has jurisdiction (section 64, Code Cr. Proc.; section 1409, Greater New York Charter, Laws 1901, p. 602, c. 466). The provision of section 1410 dispensing with a jury trial is not unconstitutional. People v. Stein, 80 App. Div. 357 , 80 N. Y. Supp. 847 , and authorities cited. The traverse does not directly challenge the procedure on the petit larceny charge, which has only gone to a commitment.
The fact that the grand jury has failed to indict the defendant for grand larceny is not a bar to prosecution for petit larceny. People v. Stein, supra. The legality of the detention under a commitment upon the information for petit larceny does not depend upon the question as to what the rights of the defendant were under a charge of grand larceny, or upon the question whether the grand jury had statutory authority to make the specific disposition of the case in question. Even if we assume that its province was either to indict or to dismiss the charge, its disposition was not any step in the procedure for a petit larceny which was ■ initiated by the information laid by the district attorney. Even if the grand jury had dismissed the charge, the district attorney had full authority to proceed as he has done.
Order affirmed. All concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Stein 80 App. Div. 357 p. 174