Hunter v. McCammon

By her industry and economy the plaintiff had acquired real property of the value of about $20,000, besides some additional money with which she had made unfortunate investments. On the 5th day of April, 1900, without any money being paid therefor, she conveyed this real estate to the defendant, her daughter and only child; the conveyance containing a clause that the defendant should execute to the plaintiff a life lease of the premises, and further, as part consideration for the conveyance, that in case the plaintiff should become destitute or unable to support or care for herself the defendant would provide such care and support. The lease was executed and delivered, and in 1905 this action was brought to set aside the conveyance on the ground that it was procured by fraud, duress, and undue influence, and that plaintiff was in' such state of mind that she did not comprehend the nature of her act. A decree setting aside the conveyance has been granted, from which the defendant appeals.

While the evidence is meager, we think it is sufficient to uphold the judgment. The plaintiff was old and in feeble health, and disturbed in mind, and had gone to Ithaca, N. Y., respecting some money which she had loaned, and the defendant followed her there and demanded that she be given a deed of the real property, threatening, if this was not done, to have nothing further to do with the plaintiff. According to her own statement the plaintiff did not understand the full purport of the transaction. She says that the defendant procured an attorney to draw the papers, which was done without the title deed, so that any specific description of the property could be given, notwithstanding she pleaded to postpone the execütion of the paper until she could consult her own attorney. In addition, the defendant proceeded to acquire whatever else of value the plaintiff had by way of money and jewelry. The plaintiff was ill from time to time, and a patient in several hospitals, and frequently called upon the defend

From the testimony it is apparent that the plaintiff’s mind at the time she executed the conveyance was greatly weakened from illness and anxiety, and that the daughter, by threats of abandonment and promises of comfort and care which she never intended to bestow, persuaded the plaintiff to divest herself of all the property which she possessed. While it may be impossible to say that any specific testimony meets the legal definition of actual fraud, or duress, or undue influence, yet the evidence, taken as a whole, shows the existence of confidential relations between the mother and daughter, weakened and impaired intellect on the part of the mother, and a strong and overmastering will on the part of the defendant. This situation imposed upon the defendant the burden of showing that the transaction was fair, open, voluntary, and well understood. Where the relationship between the parties is that of parent and child, principal and agent, or where one party is situated so as to exercise a controlling influence over the will and conduct of another, transactions between them are scrutinized with extreme vigilance, and clear evidence is required that the transaction was understood, and that there was no fraud, mistake, or undue influence. Where those relations exist there must be clear proof of the integrity and fairness of the transaction, or any instrument thus obtained will be set aside or held as invalid between the parties. Ten Eyck v. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341 , 50 N. E. 963 ; Green v. Roworth, 113 N. Y. 462 , 21 N. E. 165 ; Rosevear v. Sullivan, 47 App. Div. 421 , 62 N. Y. Supp. 447 .

The defendant failed to meet this requirement of law, and to show that the mother fully understood the transaction and that the deed was procured without any deception or unfair advantage being taken. The defendant confessed that her promise of support was not given in good faith, and all of her Subsequent conduct goes to show that her only object was to’ get possession of her mother’s property by preying upon her fears and deceiving her as to the necessity of the transfer.

The plaintiff’s right is not barred by her delay in bringing the action. The defendant had promised to reconvey on more than one occasion. In view of the relations between the parties, such prompt action as would be required against a stranger was not a necessity.

We are of the opinion that the judgment is right, and that it should be affirmed, with costs.

PATTERSON, P. J., and LAMBERT, J., concur.

This is an appeal from a judgment setting aside a deed of conveyance of certain real estate in the city

Nor is there anything in this record to show that the mother took any other view of the transaction until after the property was acquired by the railroad company, and then her dissatisfaction seems to have been, not because she had executed the conveyance to the daughter, but because the daughter did not then buy her another place. The mother testified:

“Q. And you know, in 1902, where she lived (referring to her daughter) ? A. The property was not sold then. I did not bring any action then. Why should I? Q. You were satisfied that she should have the property in her name? A. Yes. 1 was satisfied that she should have this property until she threw me on the street. Q. When did she throw you on the street? A. Was not my house sold?”

The deed, as already said, was given on the 5th of April, 1900, and there was then pending an action which had been brought by the mother to recover damages for certain alleged injuries to or rights in connection with the property. This action came on for trial in June, 1900, and the complaint was dismissed on the ground that the mother had given the deed in question. The daughter was then asked to reconvey, which she refused to do. The mother, referring to such refusal; testified:

“She said it was all right, and said at any time the house was sold we would buy another piece of property. I asked her lots of times to give the "deed back to me. She always refused to do so. I said: ‘Sophie, this property may be sold. What then?’ She. turned to me and said: ‘Mother, we will buy another piece of property, and we will give it to you on the same terms.’ I said: -All right’”

SCOTT, J., concurs.