Majority
Headnote
1. Landlord and Tenant—Lease—Cancellation—Summary Proceedings— Liability fob Rent.The demurrer is upon the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The complaint shows that the plaintiff leased, by an instrument in writing, the mezzanine floor of the “Slater Buildings,” at No. 11 West Forty-Second street, borough of Manhattan, N. Y., to the defendant for a term of years, commencing on the 15th day of February, 1902, and ending on the 1st day of May, 1907, for the annual rental of $2,600, until the 1st day of May, 1905, and $3,000 thereafter, to be paid in equal monthly installments in advance; that it was provided in the lease that if the lessees should violate any of its covenants or conditions, or if the premises should become vacant, the landlord should have the option to declare the lease void and to regain immediate possession in the manner prescribed in case of the nonpayment of rent, or to take such other proceedings to recover possession as he might elect, and that the said lessees should be liable also for damages; that defendants entered into possession under the lease, but
Of course, it is the law that an eviction by summary proceedings cancels the lease so far as it relates to the relation of landlord and tenant, and terminates the liability of the tenant to pay future rent as such. Code of Civil Procedure, § 2253; Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N. Y. 293 ; McAdam on Landlord & Tenant, 1301; McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 406 , 65 N. E. 208 . There is no statute, however, forbidding an agreement in the lease or otherwise between the landlord and tenant by which the tenant may obligate himself to pay damages sustained by the landlord in consequence of his failure to pay rent, even though the landlord regains possession of the premises through summary proceedings or otherwise, nor is such an agreement prohibited by public policy. It is entirely competent, therefore, for the parties to agree that the tenant in such event shall pay the damages sustained by the landlord, and it is well settled that such a covenant, if made, survives the severance of the relation of landlord and tenant by the summary proceedings. Hall v. Gould, 13 N. Y. 127 ; McCready v. Lindenborn, supra; Baylies v. Ingram, 84 App. Div. 360 , 82 N. Y. Supp. 891 ; Anzolone v. Paskusz, 96 App. Div. 188 , 89 N. Y. Supp. 203 . Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381 , 62 N. E. 425 , is not opposed to this doctrine. The court there merely decided that the proper interpretation of the covenant before the court was to pay a deficiency in rent arising on a reletting after the landlord had regained possession by re-entry by ejectment, as distinguished from a re-entry by summary proceedings. The allegation of the amended complaint concerning the covenant in the lease on the part of the tenant to pay damages in the event of eviction by summary proceedings or otherwise is meager; but, in view of the liberal rule applicable to a demurrer to a pleading, it is sufficient to admit proof upon the trial of a covenant in the lease on the part of the defendants to pay the damages sustained by the landlord by reason of his inability to rent the same after exercising his lawful right to regain possession for as high rental as was reserved to him in the lease. The form of such agreement is not material. There is no hard and fast rule that it must be in the usual form by which the tenant consents that the landlord may relet as his agent. It would be quite as binding if in general terms to pay the damages sustained by the landlord, provided it clearly appears that the clause relates to damages to be sustained after regaining possession of the premises, which would necessarily be the difference between the rent reserved in the lease and the rent which the landlord subsequently received, or should have received in the exercise of reasonable efforts to release the premises.
Dissent
This action is brought not for rent, but for the damages caused by the tenant’s failure to observe his covenant to rent, which resulted in damage to the landlord through his exercise of his legal right to regain possession of the premises. It cannot be said that the landlord has brought these damages upon himself. Had he allowed the tenant to remain in possession, and had the tenant persisted in his course, the landlord would have received no income from the premises; but, by regaining possession, the landlord was in a position to relet the premises should an opportunity be afforded, and thus minimize his loss, and reduce the damages for which the tenant should be held.
It follows that the amended complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the demurrer thereto should 'have been overruled. The interlocutory judgment should therefore be reversed, with costs, arid the demurrer overruled, with costs, but with leave to defendants to withdraw the demurrer and answer on payment of the costs of this appeal and of the demurrer.
CLARICE and SCOTT, JJ., concur. LAMBERT, J., dissents.
I dissent. By the execution of the warrant in the dispossess proceedings the term demised came to an end and the relation of landlord and tenant ceased, and there could be no claim for damages against the tenant that accrued after the legal termination of the demised term. Undoubtedly the parties could have agreed that the tenant should be liable for the rent until the landlord was able to rent the premises, but no such agreement is alleged. The tenant would also be liable for any direct damage springing from his failure to comply with the covenants of the lease. But the only damage that is alleged results from the failure of the landlord to rent the premises after the lease terminated, and this loss to the landlord does not at all flow from the failure of the tenant to pay the rent prior to the termination of the lease, but arises from the act of the landlord in terminating the relation of landlord and tenant by dispossessing the tenant. The tenant would have been liable under the lease for the rent, and the damage that the landlord sustained in virtue of nonpayment would be the interest upon the amount of the
I think, therefore, this judgment should be affirmed.
Cases cited
- Hall v. Gould 13 N. Y. 127 p. 997
- Anzolone v. Paskusz 96 App. Div. 188 p. 997
- Michaels v. Fishel 169 N. Y. 381 p. 997
- Chamberlain v. Parker 45 N. Y. 569 p. 998
- De Lavallette v. Wendt 75 N. Y. 579 p. 998
- Dickinson v. Hart 142 N. Y. 183 p. 998