Majority
Headnote
1. COUBTS—COUBTS NOT ON RECOBD—MUNICIPAL COUBT OF NEW YOBK GtTT.The facts which are deemed important in the consideration of this appeal are not in dispute. The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, in the borough of Richmond, on the 14th day of April, 1905, for $76.43, a transcript of which judgment was filed and the judgment docketed in the office of the clerk of the county of Richmond on the 29th day of April, 1905. On May 31, 1905, execution was duly issued upon the judgment to the sheriff of the county of Richmond, who, finding no personal or real property, returned it wholly unsatisfied in July of that year. Supplementary proceedings were then instituted against the defendant, $50 was paid on account of the judgment, and thereafter, on the 12th day of July, 1906, a second execution was issued on the judgment and delivered to the sheriff of the county of Richmond. On that day the sheriff gave notice of the sale of real property owned by the defendant, in which he stated that “I will sell at public auction, at the village hall, Stapleton, in the borough of Richmond, New York City, on the 29th day of August, 1906, at 12 o’clock noon of that day, all the right, title, and interest of Edna Bell, which she had pn the 14th day of April, 1905, or at any time
The order should be reversed, and the motion granted. The Municipal Court of the city of New York is a court not of record (sections 2, 3, Code Civ. Proc.; Laws 1897, p. 481, c. 378, §§ 1350; 1351; Laws 1901, p. 575, c. 466, §§ 1350, 1351) ; and a judgment rendered by that court does not become a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor until the judgment is docketed in the office of the clerk of the county wherein is situate such real property or chattels real (Municipal Court Act of the City of New York, Laws 1902, p. 1565, c. 580, § 263). The judgment in this case, rendered on the 14th day of April, 1905, did not become a lien upon the property described in the notice of sale until it was docketed in the office of the clerk of the county of Richmond on the 29th day of April, 1905, and so far as appears from the undisputed facts in the record before us, by reason of the mortgage to Homes, the judgment debtor’s interest in the property on the 29th day of April was less than on the 14th day of April. The second execution issued upon this judgment complied with the provisions of section 1369 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and commanded the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out of the real property belonging to the judgment debtor at the time when the judgment was docketed in the office of the clerk of the county of Richmond, or at any time thereafter. Disregarding, this mandate, the sheriff gave notice that he would sell such interest as the judgment debtor had on the 14th day of April, 1905, 15 days before the judgment was docketed in his county; and while this unwarranted notice and a possible sale pursuant thereto might or might not affect the rights of third persons, acquired subsequent to the 14th day of April, and before the judgment actually became a lien upon the property, the orderly conduct of collecting the judgment by the process of levy and' sale, under the execution, required the sheriff to comply
Upon this appeal we are not called upon to determine the rights of a purchaser under a sale pursuant to the incorrect notice of sale which appears in this record. This attack upon the notice of sale is not collateral, but direct, by the judgment debtor herself, before the sale is had, and arises out of the sheriff’s refusal to accept payment of the judgment and his fees, unless he is likewise paid the charge for printing and posting this inaccurate, and, so far as it deals with the time when the lien of the judgment obtained, unauthorized, notice of sale. It is true that the publication was made necessary by the judgment debtor’s refusal to pay the judgment; but, when offering to pay it, she should not be required to reimburse the sheriff for posting and publishing a notice of sale, such as the one in this case, which, without fault on her part, was so worded as likely to lead to confusion and doubt.
The order should therefore be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with $10 costs. All concur.