Majority
Headnote
Frauds, Statute of—Debt of Another—Original Promise—New Consideration.The dismissal of the complaint under a plea of the statute of frauds was error. The evidence adduced shows that the plaintiff’s claim was founded on an original promise. The plaintiff was a subcontractor under one Musnitsky, who had been employed by the defendant to make certain alterations and repairs to premises owned by him. Owing to the nonreceipt in full of an earned installment, the plaintiff concluded to abandon the work. Being informed of the situation, the defendant sought the plaintiff and said to him:
“Go ahead with your work, and I will pay you as soon as you finish the job.”
The learned trial justice concluded that the promise made by the defendant was to answer for the debt of Musnitsky, and was void because not reduced to a writing signed by the defendant. That was a mistaken conclusion. The defendant, the promisor, was the owner of the property undergoing repairs. The labor and materials furnished by the plaintiff tended to improve and enhance the. value of that property. The contractor had neglected to pay an agreed installment, and the plaintiff was then within his rights in refusing to proceed further with the work. The promise inducing the resumption and completion of the work, made under such circumstances, was original, not collateral. It was founded upon a new consideration, the prompt and uninterrupted prosecution of the work, which inured to the benefit of the defendant. That benefit formed the consideration. The debt became that of the defendant. His promise was not to pay Musnitsky’s debt, but his own. The contract was new a'nd independent. As such, though oral, it was valid and enforceable. The rule controlling the disposition of this case is stated by Finch, J., in White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222 -227, 15 N. E. 320 , in this language:
“Where the primary debt subsists and was antecedently contracted, the promise to pay it is original, when it is founded on a new consideration, moving to the promisor and beneficial to him, and such that the promisor thereby comes under an independent duty of payment, irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor.”
The relation of the parties to the obligation here sought to be enforced is analogous to that which existed between the litigants in numerous cases which have engaged the attention of the courts, and the uniform conclusion has been that the promise does not fall within the statute, and is valid and effectual without a writing. Snell v. Rogers, 70 Hun, 462 , 24 N. Y. Supp. 379 ; Almond v. Hart, 46 App. Div. 431 , 61 N. Y. Supp. 849 ; Mannetti v. Doege, 48 App. Div. 567 , 62 N. Y. Supp. 918 ; Reisler v. Silbermintz, 99 App. Div. 131 , 90 N. Y. Supp. 967 ; Schild v. Monroe, Eckstein Brewing Co., 108 App. Div. 50 , 95 N. Y. Supp. 493 ; Raabe v. Squier, 148 N. Y. 81 , 42 N. E. 516 . The judgment must be reverséd.
Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- White v. Rintoul 108 N. Y. 222 p. 123
- Reisler v. Silbermintz 99 App. Div. 131 p. 123
- Schild v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co. 108 App. Div. 50 at 95 p. 123
- Raabe v. Squier 148 N. Y. 81 p. 123