Majority
Headnote
1. Bankruptcy—Assignments—Constructive Fraud.This action was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside certain transfers of property alleged to have been made by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors. The complaint alleges, in substance, the bankruptcy proceedings commenced in October, 1904; the discharge of the bankrupt, John S. Roddy, now deceased, in December of the same year; the appointment of the plaintiff as trustee "in October, 1906; deficiency judgments recovered against Roddy in March, 1901, in two actions in favor of two of the present defendants, which judgments remain unsatisfied with the exception of a small sum -paid on one of them; Roddy’s conveyance in December, 1900—during the pendency of these two actions and while he was insolvent—of •certain property, which is described, for the purpose and with the intent of defrauding his creditors, which fact was known to the grantees; ■the recovery of another judgment against Roddy, in favor of Sullivan, another defendant in this action, in August, 1903, which remains wholly unpaid; that Sullivan did not file proof of claim or appear in the bankruptcy proceeding, and had no notice or knowledge thereof; that there are debts of said bankrupt proved and unpaid amounting to upwards, of $3,000 above all assets which have come into ■the hands of the trustee, and that the debts of the bankrupt, as stated in the schedules, amount to $4,000, above his assets, all or most of which indebtedness was incurred prior to December 17, 1900, the date of the alleged fraudulent conveyances. The judgment demanded is that the conveyances in question be declared void, the plaintiff be authorized to sell the real estate conveyed, and that an accounting be had of the rents, issues, and profits derived therefrom. At the opening of the trial, and before any testimony had been offered, the attorney for the representatives of the bankrupt, and certain other defendants, moved to dismiss the complaint, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The motion was granted, and the plaintiff appeals from the judgment and order denying a motion to set aside the dismissal.
The dismissal of the complaint, as appears from the opinion of the learned justice who presided at the trial, was put upon the ground that the lien of the judgments set forth in the complaint survived the dis- ■ charge in bankruptcy by virtue of the provisions of section 1268 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that such judgment creditors are now in .a position to enforce their judgments, either by a sale of the land, ■or by bringing an action in equity to have the transfers in question ■declared void; but that this right does not vest in the plaintiff—the trustee in bankruptcy—citing Hillyer v. Le Roy, 179 N. Y. 369 , 72 N. E. 237 , 103 Am. St. Rep. 919 .
I am of the opinion that the court erred in dismissing the complaint, and that the reasons assigned are wholly inapplicable to the facts pleaded. Whether the complaint states a cause of action, of course, depends upon the construction to be put upon certain provisions of the bankruptcy act of July 1,1898 ( 30 Stat. 544 , c. 541 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]). Under the act, an assignment or transfer of property, if made within four months prior to the filing of the petition, is a con.structive fraud upon the bankruptcy act, in that it interferes with the
“That the debts of said bankrupt, as stated in the schedules, amount to-$4,000 over and above his assets, all of which indebtedness, or the greater part of which, was incurred prior to the 17th day of December, 1900.”
If the plaintiff, therefore, can set aside these transfers, it must be under some other section, and this I think he can do under section 70, which-provides:
“(a) The Trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon Ms appointment and qualification, and Ms successor or successors * * * shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt * * * to all * * * (4) Property transferred by him in fraud of his creditors.' * * * (e) The trustee may avoid any transfer of the bankrupt of his property which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided and may recover the property so transferred, or its value, from the person to whom it was transferred, unless he was a bona fide holder for value prior to the date of the adjudication. * * * ”
The trustee, by this provision of the act, is invested with the title of all property of the bankrupt transferred by him in fraud of creditors, unless his right in this respect is restricted, which I do not believe it is, by subdivision “e.” The policy of the act is to secure an equal distribution of all property of the bankrupt among all his creditors. Por that purpose, the trustee represents all the creditors, and may maintain an action to set aside any transfer which any creditor could or which any creditor might acquire by any process taken by him. In re McNamara, 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 566; Mueller v. Bruss, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 442, 112 Wis. 406 , 88 N. W. 229 ; Sheldon v. Parker, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 152, 66 Neb. 610 , 92 N. W. 923 ; Beasley v. Coggins, 12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 355, 48 Fla. 215 , 37 South. 213 . Under the bankruptcy act of March 3, 1867 ( 14 Stat. 517 , c. 176), which contained a provision to the effect that title to property fraudulently transferred vested in the trustee, it was held that the trustee could maintain an action to set aside such transfers, whether any individual creditor could have done so or not. Platt v.
“Numerous other authorities might be cited to sustain the position that an assignee may proceed to recover property transferred in fraud of creditors whether any creditor was in a position to attack the transfer or not, and that his title accrues by force of the act, and not through the rights of the creditor to assert the fraud.”
The same view was entertained by the Court of Appeals in Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424 . There the court had under considera- • tion the construction to be put upon chapter 314, p. 506, Laws 1858, in connection with the bankruptcy act of 1867. The provisions of that act are somewhat similar to the one under consideration, in so far as relates to the maintenance of an action by a trustee, irrespective of the rights of individual creditors. The court, speaking through Judge Allen, said:
“Upon sound reason and the policy of the law, as well as the authorities quoted and others that might be referred to, there can be no doubt, we think, that the plaintiff as assignee has a right of action for property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, although none of the creditors has acquired a specific lien. It is not such liens, or any particular interest in the property, or an interest for the benefit of any one creditor or class of creditors, that is vested in the assignee, but the entire property fraudulently transferred and for the benefit of all the creditors. The assignee takes title, not under any claim of right existing in the creditors, but- under the statute, and that right he may assert by action, although no individual creditor, or all the creditors combined, could have a standing in court to challenge the conveyance.”
Therefore it seems to me, even though it be held, as contended, that the complaint does not show that any of the creditors whose claims were filed in the bankruptcy proceedings were in a position to attack the transfers, nevertheless the trustee may do so. This must be so if the reasoning in the authorities cited be sound. To hold that a trustee cannot attack a fraudulent conveyance made by the bankrupt more than four months before the filing of the petition, without showing that some creditor had obtained a judgment and issued execution thereon, so that he could maintain a similar action, would be simply to provide an easy and convenient method for a dishonest debtor to dispose of his property. In that case, the debtor could fraudulently dispose of all his property more than four months before bankruptcy proceedings were instituted, and, unless some creditor— intermediate the disposition of the property and the filing of the petition in bankruptcy—had put himself in position to attack the fraudulent transfers by obtaining a judgment, issuing an execution and having the same returned unsatisfied, the trustee would be powerless to reach the property fraudulently disposed of.
But I think the complaint under consideration shows, or facts are stated from which an inference may be fairly drawn, that at least two of the creditors of the bankrupt who were in a position to attack the transfers at the time the petition was filed did file their claims in the bankruptcy court. Indeed, it is not claimed by counsel for the respondent but what such fact is to be inferred from the complaint,
The judgment and order appealed from therefore must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, .with costs to appellant to abide event.
PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM and HOUGHTON, JJ.. concur. SCOTT, J., dissents.
Cases cited
- Hillyer v. LeRoy 179 N. Y. 369 p. 474
- West Co. v. Lea 174 U. S. 590 p. 476
- Southard v. Benner 72 N. Y. 424 p. 477