Majority
Headnote
1. Deeds—Gifts—Vacation—Evidence.A purchase of the trust property by a trustee of himself, or at .his.own sale, or even at a judicial sale, is voidable at the mere election of the beneficiary, within a reasonable time, without regard to its fairness (Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252 ; Jackson v. Walsh, 14 Johns. 407 ; Conger v. Ring, 11 Barb. 356 ); but a gift or sale of the trust property by a beneficiary to his trustee does not come under this rule. It is not voidable at the election of the beneficiary, but may only be set aside by a court of equity at the suit of the beneficiary for fraud, undue influence or unfairness. The only distinction between such a suit and a similar one not by beneficiary against trustee is that the burden of proof is on the trustee to show that the transaction was free and fair. Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167 ; Graves v. Waterman, 63 N. Y. 657 ; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249 , 35 N. E. 430 ; Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N. Y. 432 , 44 N. E. 163 , 32 L. R.
In her letter of June 12,1879, to her said brother John, she expresses a gathering if not an already gathered intention of giving to him the remainder of her share. “If there should be anything more after this to come to me I should like you to keep it out there and invest it for yourself or the children,^ she writes. In this letter she acknowledges receipt of $12,000 (her specific legacy of that amount) which had already been sent to her, and encloses three receipts of herself and her two sisters signed in advance for $25,000 more for each out of the residuary. The learned trial judge overlooked this fact, and says that she then only knew of the $12,000, and thought that it was substantially all that she was to get. But if her letter suggests any lack of knowledge by her, we have in the letter which her said brother wrote to her and her two sisters after the receipt of it, viz., on July 5, 1879, and accompanying the drafts for $25,000, absolute proof that he had no thought of taking advantage thereof; no thought of deceiving her by concealing from her the substantial magnitude of the amount of her share remaining. He writes concerning the mortgages of the estate, and says that the share of each of them therefrom will be $30,000, not $20,000 as the learned trial judge inadvertently says. This alone disclosed to the sisters the substantialness of their remaining shares. It completely disposes of the claim which prevailed below, that when Mary made the deed of transfer or gift of her remaining share to her
But this letter does not stand alone. The tenor of all of the" letters and acts of the trustee is so uniformly one of frankness and honesty that it would falsify a finding of fact that he cheated his sisters by concealing from them knowledge of the substantial amount of their shares. Why should he conceal it? He never asked them to give him their remaining shares. He lived 3,000 miles away from them, and they voluntarily, and without a suggestion from him, wrote to him that they gave him such shares. And when we bear in mind that their brother James and cousin Herbert, who lived near them, and with whom they were on terms of intimacy and affection, and with whom they advised about the estate, received their shares in full by payments made from time to time after the said deed of transfer was made, we would be taxing credulity beyond what it could bear to believe that they never told the amounts they received to the sisters. Were they in a conspiracy of silence and concealment with their trustee to cheat the sisters? It is to be presumed that family matters in which all the members of the family are taking part, and consulting together about, are known to them all. The trustee should not be disgraced after his death by adjudging that a family arrangement which has gone unquestioned for a generation was procured by him by a breach of trust by him to his sisters, without the most' careful consideration if not hesitation.
But it is said that it is not proved that Mary ever saw the said letter or was informed of its contents. The three sisters were living together in affection and concord at Southampton, England, in the home of the one of them who was married, Mrs. Billett. The letter is addressed “My dear sisters,” and in it the writer says he encloses the three drafts of $25,000, one for each. The envelope was addressed to Mrs. Billett. The learned trial judge says there is no evidence that she “transmitted” the letter to Mary, overlooking that the sisters were all living'together,
And the giving of the powers of attorney of itself meant that they all knew that what remained of the estate was considerable. They were not given merely to deal with a remaining trifle after the estate had been substantially administered and divided.
It is said that it is incredible that Mary would have made the deed -of gift if she had known that there was a substantial amount still to come to her. And yet her two sisters did the same thing without suggestion or request from their brother and trustee, -but wholly on their own initiative, as their letters to their brother 3,000 miles away show, and as Mary in all probability, and according to the testimony of Mrs. Billett and her letter of July 24, 1879, knew. While their preference toward their brother may seem extraordinary, it must be remembered that in England, growing out of the rule of primogeniture, the family tie and family pride is very strong, and the notion of a family head possessing the bulk of the family property is the general and controlling one. The three sisters were fairly educated, intelligent and prudent, as their letters show, and at the time Mary executed the deed of gift she was 39 years old. That she was then
It is also said that Mary’s letter to her said brother of December 10,' 1880, proposing to pay for the draft of her marriage settlement which he had drawn at her request and sent to her, shows that she-could not have been aware that she had only four months before made him a gift of such great magnitude. But we find the other two sisters, who had made the same gift to him, uniting with their brother James and cousin Herbert in proposing to pay their brother the expense of the powers of attorney they had executed before the American consul. English formality and punctiliousness required that they should make the suggestion of payment, however well they knew it would not be entertained. We must not judge their conduct by what would be improbable elsewhere.
The payment by the trustee to the sisters of the. one-sixth share of each in the fund of $10,000 set apart by the will with the executors in trust for uncle John Billett, for him to receive the income of it for life, and then be divided by the trustees among the residuary-legatees, which trust -terminated in 1884, whs not inconsistent with the fact, of the gifts by the sisters. The deed of gift was in terms confined to the residuary estate, to such moneys and property as the executors had collected or should collect or have for the residuary, whereas the trust fund was set apart and was a separate fund out of the residuary fund and could never go back, into it and thus return to the hands of the executors as such. It is true that the executors were the trustees, but nevertheless they did not hold the fund as executors. If (to illustrate) the executors had all died, the fund would not have gone to an administrator with the will annexed, but to a .trustee appointed by the court, and by the terms of the trust he would, not. on the death of the beneficiary pay the fund to the administrator to go into the residuary, but would himself divide it among and pay it to the residuary legatees. It was not a part of the residuary estate, and the executors, as such, could never get it back, but had to divide and distribute it as trustees under the trust, clause of the will.
It would be easy to make too much of the letter of John to the sisters, or one of them, that they need not take any notice of the citation to the executors’ accounting, as he would attend to it. This, though a thing not to be encouraged, is often done with no wrong-intention; and where there is a dishonest intention it is not done so-directly and openly.
There are three rules of law which govern the case in the aspects-in which it stands on the facts:
1. If the beneficiary was substantially informed of the magnitude-of the gift she was making, her deed of -transfer must stand; for it was found below that she knew of the purport of the instrument, and there were no undue influence or affirmative statements or acts-of fraud. The cases on this head have already been cited. A voluntary transfer or gift is as much protected by law as is a transfer or contract for a full consideration. Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N. Y. 432 , 44 N. E. 163 , 32 L. R.
3. After the lapse of a considerable time the rule putting the burden of proof on the trustee does not apply without some evidence •on the plaintiff’s side at the outset showing ignorance of the facts by the beneficiary when he made the gift or sale. To quote from a case of highest authority:
“The plaintiff is not entitled to a strict application of the equitable rule, ■which she might have invoked if she had moved with some degree of diligence to set aside the agreement and release, and to demand an accounting. An acquiescence for sixteen years requires some explanation. If it was due to an ignorance of the facts for which the executors were responsible, it should have been shown.” Geyer v. Snyder, 140 N. Y. 394 , 35 N. E. 784 .
The delay in the present case was 17 years during the beneficiary’s life and 7 years after her death. There was no evidence on the plaintiff’s side in explanation or excuse of the failure to rescind the deed •of gift and bring a suit for that purpose, and the burden of proof was therefore not on the defendants, although the case was decided and has been reviewed in this opinion, on the theory that it was.
The judgment should be reversed on both the law .and the facts.
Interlocutory judgment reversed on the law and the facts, and new trial granted; costs to abide the final award of costs. All concur, except HIRSCHBERG, P. J., not voting.
Cases cited
- Anderson v. Fry 116 App. Div. 740 p. 917
- Jackson ex dem. Colden v. Walsh 14 Johns. 407 p. 920
- Conger v. Ring 11 Barb. 356 p. 920
- Nesbit v. Lockman 34 N. Y. 167 p. 920
- Graves v. Waterman 63 N. Y. 657 p. 920
- Barnard v. Gantz 140 N. Y. 249 p. 920
- Pickslay v. Starr 149 N. Y. 432 p. 920, p. 924
- Hull v. Littauer 162 N. Y. 569 p. 923
- Cobb v. Hatfield 46 N. Y. 533 p. 925
- Strong v. Strong 102 N. Y. 69 p. 925
- Adair v. Brimmer 74 N. Y. 539 p. 925
- Harrington v. Erie County Savings Bank 101 N. Y. 257 p. 925
- Kahn v. Chapin 152 N. Y. 305 p. 925
- Geyer v. Snyder 140 N. Y. 394 p. 925