Majority
Headnote
1. Beneficial Associations—By-Daws—Construction.Plaintiff, while a member of the Pennsylvania Voluntary Relief Fund, so called, which is administered by the defendants, lost his arm by accident while in the service of the Northern Central Railway Company. The Pennsylvania Voluntary Relief Department maintains a fund which is contributed by its members for the relief of members sustaining injury while in the service of the Pennsylvania Railroad or its subsidiary companies. The regulations governing the relief fund provide, among other things:
“42. Members will be entitled to the following benefits: First, payments-while disabled by accident in the company’s service for each day during a period not longer than fifty-two weeks, at the rate of fifty cents a day for a member of the first class, and of a greater amount for members of the other classes, in proportion to their contributions, and at half these rates after fifty-two weeks and during the continuance of the disability.”
Regulation 45 provides that, in order to be entitled to benefits, “there must be exterior or other positive evidence of injury, and satisfactory evidence that it renders the person wholly disabled to labor, or when of a permanent character to earn a livelihood in an employment suited to his capacity. Disablement from accident occurring otherwise than as aforesaid will be classed with sickness.” The accident to plaintiff occurred March 7, 1904, and he was paid out of the relief fund $1 per day, the amount applicable to his membership, up to February 1, 1905. On January 3, 1905, the medical examiner notified him that under regulation 45, as to permanent disablement, his benefit would cease February 1, 1905. After this, correspondence was had by the plaintiff and his counsel with the officers of the relief fund, and the
“Questions as to the permanent character of disability and the continued payment of benefits on account of the same shall be determined by the advisory committee.”
Before -the plaintiff’s injury, this regulation was amended so as to provide that, in case of a disablement “of a permanent character, benefits will cease when a member shall be declared by the medical examiner as able to earn a livelihood in an employment suited to his capacity.” The plaintiff’s contention is that this case must be governed by section 45 of the regulations as it existed when he became a member, and that the words, “to earn a livelihood in an employment suited to his capacity,” refers to his capacity as it existed prior to the time of the injury, and not at the time when he is claiming benefits on account of his disablement. This voluntary relief fund is not an indemnity or accident insurance company, but is the administration of a fund created by the members themselves to relieve an unfortunate member during the time when by accident he is prevented from earning a livelihood. The provision of section 43 that the payments are “while disabled by accident,” together with the provisions of section 45, show that the payments are to a person wholly unable to labor on account of a temporary injury, or who is unable to earn a livelihood in an employment suited to his disabled conditions where his 'injury is permanent.
So far we have not considered the amendment to the by-laws made after the plaintiff became a member of the association, for the reason that the amendment does not substantially change the plaintiff’s rights. In the original by-law the advisory committee was to determine as to the continuance of benefit. Under the amended by-law the medical examiner was to make such determination,' with a right to appeal to the superintendent and the advisory committee. These were matters as to the internal management of the fund or association of' which the plaintiff was a member, and by his application for membership he agreed to be bound by the regulations of the fund as it then existed and by any other regulations thereafter adopted, and the regulations of the fund also provides that he is especially bound by proper amendments and by-laws. The amendments were reasonable, and violated no rights of the plaintiff. Wright v. Knights of Maccabees (decided at the November term of this court) 106 N. Y. Supp. 1150 . As stated before, the record is without evidence that the plaintiff is unable to earn a livelihood in an employment suited to his capacity, and therefore he has failed to establish a cause of action.
The judgment should therefore be reversed upon the law and the. facts, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur; COCHRANE, J., in result, on the ground that plaintiff should have exhausted his remedy within the organization before resorting to the courts.