general merchandise was to be but one-half per cent., and as to sulphur, etc., there was to be no return commission. All office expenses, postages, telegrams, etc., were to be defrayed by the New York agency. The above resolutions were approved by the council of administration at their meeting of February 15, 1889, as we were informed at the time. My firm duly accepted said appointment as agents, and entered upon the performance of its duties. After the first few consignments of steamers, my firm received a check for its commissions, pursuant to said resolutions; but, since said receipt, although my firm has carefully performed all its agreements under said resolutions, as the New York agents of defendant, has looked after the defendant’s interests here, the collection of freights, the berthing of vessels, and the like, employing for said purpose the firm of Hirzel, Feltmann & Co., of 55 Beaver street, New York, for a valuable consideration allowed by us to said Hirzel, Feltmann & Co., said defendant has failed to pay said commission to plaintiff’s firm, and has directed said Hirzel, Feltmann & Co. to return and remit to defendant all moneys collected, and by letter dated May 6. 1890, informed my firm that the defendant had decided, at a general meeting on April 23d, to make no further payment to us of commissions from the time of the arrival of the steamships Edwin, and Bolivia, which steamers arrived as far back as November 5, 1889. We have duly demanded of the defendant through Angelo Tagliavia, our agent in Palermo, the carrying out of their contract of agency with us, or at least the payment to us of commissions earned, and of such return commissions as are due us as consignees of fruit. Ourdamages through the absolute refusal of the defendant thus to pay us, and through the summary breach of their contract with us, amount to $5,000. Said Hirzel, Feltmann & Co. have also refused to account to us for our said commissions, or for any sum whatever, which said firm has been collecting for us. My firm is entitled to recover said sum of $5,000 from defendant over and above all counter-claims known to me or my said firm. No previous application for a warrant of attachment against defendant has been made by plaintiffs.’” The objection taken to the affidavit is that it failed to set out how the damages of $5,000 were computed. Defendant appeals.
Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and Brady and Daniels, JJ.Ullo & Ruebsamen, (James W. McElhinney, of counsel.) for appellant. Hinrichs & Rudolph, (Fred. W. Hinrichs, of counsel,) for respondent.
We think that the motion should have been granted. There are no facts set up in the affidavits upon which the attachment was granted from which the court can judge what amount, if any, of damages have been sustained by the plaintiff. In an action upon contract for the payment of a sum certain, it appears from the contract itself what the damages will be. In an action, however, for unliquidated damages, it depends upon the facts of the case as to whether the plaintiff has sustained merely nominal or real damage. A cause of action may be completely set forth where only nominal damages can be recovered, and therefore, in an affidavit upon which to found an application for an attachment where the damages are unliquidated, it is- necessary for the plaintiff to set out the facts which he claims proves his damages, in order that the court may judge as to whether he has evidence of damage, and that his allegation of damage is not mere matter of speculation. The Code requires an affidavit which must show a cause of action, and necessarily, where the damages are unliquidated, show the amount of damage in order to entitle the party to an attachment. A complaint will not suffice, because it is the office of a complaint to allege conclusions of fact deduced from evidence, whereas it is the office of an affidavit to set out the evidence establishing these conclusions of fact. Therefore, although an allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff has suffered damage by reason of the breach of a contract to the amount of $5,000 may be sufficient, yet, in an affidavit,