Majority
Headnote
1. Master and Servant—Injuries to Servant—Mines—Safe Plage.The defendant is a corporation engaged in mining gypsum at Oalcfield, in Genesee county, N. Y. There was a shaft 50 or 60 feet in depth sunk to the bottom of the mine, and from the bottom of the shaft were tunnels leading to different parts of the mine, following as near as could be the veins of gypsum. Extending over the strata of gypsum there was a stratum of ash rock, which was of some two feet or more in thickness, and over it was a limestone formation which covered the whole. The gypsum and material necessary to be removed in order to reach the gypsum were loosened by means of blasts, and this loose material was removed from the place where located by means of little cars run upon a tramway, which, when loaded, were moved along the track to the bottom of the shaft, and then raised to the surface of the ground. The ash rock, when exposed to the air, was liable to become slaked and to fall unless properly supported by props; and, as the work progressed, it was the duty of one of defendant’s employés, who was called a “prop setter,” to place the props in such manner as would prevent the ash rock from coming down, and this was done under the direction of the superintendent or foreman who represented the master. The accident occurred on the 23d day of October, 1906, at which time the plaintiff’s intestate, who was an Italian, was engaged with another workman in moving the little cars to the bottom of the shaft from the place where
It appears very conclusively that plaintiff’s intestate was not engaged in making the mine safe. He knew nothing about the danger attending the failure to properly prop the mine. He was not engaged in that work. He simply was asked to deliver and unload the props at the end of the line where he was at work, so that they could be obtained and used by the prop setter. • So that it seems to me clear that the plaintiff has a right to insist that it was incumbent upon the defendant to provide his intestate with a reasonably safe place in which to work. That the place was not safe, and that its unsafe and dangerous condition was known to defendant, is absolutely beyond dispute. It appears that a space some 50 or 60 feet square where the deceased was working was allowed to remain for more than a month without any props, and the experience of the defendant and of its then superintendent taught them that the ash rock was liable to fall at any time when jarred by the force of the blasts which were constantly being put in the vicinity of this large space of unsupported roof. In other words, without going into the details of the evidence, it seems to me that the negligence of the defendant is absolutely established because of its failure to provide the plaintiff’s intestate with a reasonably safe place in which to work. That negligence is not only proven by the plaintiff; but the superintendent of the defendant, the only witness called by it, testifies practically to the same thing. There is no basis in the evidence upon which to charge plaintiff’s intestate with contributory negligence. He was doing his work at the time of the accident precisely as he had been told to do it and as he had been doing it ever since he had been in defendant’s employ. Neither is there anything to support the suggestion that he assumed the risk. He had no knowledge that any danger existed from the falling of the rock, and he had a right to assume that the roof would be supported in a reasonably proper manner.
The appellant insists that the judgment should be reversed because of the erroneous admission of certain evidence; and, while the particular evidence of which it complains is not pointed out in the brief of appellant’s counsel, he refers to the whole of the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness, a Mr. Watts, which is contained in the record at folios 155-224. Several of the answers given to the questions propounded by plaintiff’s attorney were clearly incompetent. Mr. Watts had been superintendent of the mine for some years and up to within three or
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concur, except KRUSE and ROBSON, JJ., who dissent.