People ex rel. Andrews v. Packer

The petitioner is the husband and committee of the person of Blanche L- Andrews, who on the 13th day of March, 1907, pursuant to the provisions of the insanity law (chapter 545, p. 470, Laws 1896), was committed by a justice of the Supreme Court to “The Knolls,” a private sanitarium situate at 361st street and Broadway, city, county, and state of New York, conducted by the respondent, Flavius Packer, upon whom the writ was served. A copy of the commitment and the proceedings upon which it was based was annexed to the petition. The validity of the commitment was not attacked by the petition, which merely charged that the incompetent person had so far recovered that her confinement in the sanitarium was no longer necessary, and that she should be either discharged or paroled from the sanitarium pursuant to the provisions of section 74 of the insanity law. Annexed to the petition was an affidavit of a specialist in the treatment of mental diseases showing that he visited the incompetent at the sanitarium on the 3d and 9th days of February, 1908, and, after setting forth briefly the condition in which he found her, he recommended that she be taken to her home “upon the customary 30 days’ parole for a test of her ability to remain there, and to continue in the tranquil and well-conducted condition in which she is at the present time”; that she be put under the medical care and general direction of the physician under whose care she had been, but that she remain as a committed patient of “The Knolls”; and that the customary report of her condition be made to Dr. Packer. The return of Dr. Packer does not controvert the allegations of the moving papers; but, in addition to setting forth the commitment under the insanity law, it sets forth an order of the Special Term of the Supreme Court made in this proceeding on motion of Nannie V. Roosevelt, a sister of the incompetent, on notice to and after hearing the petitioner, which modified a prior order of the Special Term with respect to the custody and visitation of the incompetent, made on the 18th day of December, 1906, by permitting the sister of the incompetent to visit.her at certain times and directing that the petitioner be excluded from the room on such occasions, and enjoining him from interfering with or interrupting such visits, and directing that the then abode of the incompetent at Dr. Packer’s said sanitarium “shall not be changed without first giving notice in writing to John E. Roosevelt, Nannie V. Roosevelt, and C. J. Sullivan, special guardian, and without further order of this court,” and a certain other order of the Special Term of the Supreme Court made on the 33d day of November, 1907, on a motion to confirm the report of a referee to whom an order of reference had been granted on application of the committee of the - person of the incompetent for an order directing the committee of the estate to reimburse him for certain expenditures and fixing a monthly allowance to be thereafter paid to him for the care of the incompetent, and to confirm the report of the same referee concerning the judicial settlement of the accounts of the committee of the estate of the incompetent made on the application of the other two members of the committee. The return also makes the opinion delivered at Special Term in granting

. The relator traversed the return, alleging that the commitment under the insanity law to “The Knolls” was void, for the reason that it was made without notice to the alleged incompetent, which point, as. already observed, he did not take in his moving papers; that her confinement is further illegal because she is no longer insane, and because the provisions of section 62 of the insanity law, under which the proceedings were had, are unconstitutional and void, and it de

The contention that section 62 of the insanity law which authorizes the commitment without notice to the alleged incompetent person provided the judge before whom the application is made dispenses with such notice and states in a certificate to be attached to the certificate his reason (see 1 Laws 1896, p. 493) therefor is unconstitutional does not require special consideration, for the point has been authoritatively decided adversely to such contention. Matter of Clark, 57 App. Div. 5 , 67 N. Y. Supp. 631 ; Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N. Y. 9 , 84 N. E. 406 . The facts upon which the justice dispensed with the service of notice are meager. It merely appears by the affidavits of the physicians that service of such notice “would excite and harm her,” and that reason is assigned in the certificate of the justice. The propriety of dispensing with personal service of notice on these facts was addressed to the sound discretion of the justice. It cannot be said that rthe facts were insufficient to confer jurisdiction to dispense with such -service. The petition for the commitment was presented by her husiband who was then the committee of her person. It is quite likely that Ihe learned justice was influenced by the fact that she had been previously duly adjudged insane and committed to Bloomingdale Asylum and that she was an insane person; the custody of her property and of her person being then vested in committees appointed by the court. The conduct of the committee of the person of the incompetent is now urging that the commitment which was issued on his application and upon which he procured the incarceration of his wife in the sanitarium is void is open to just criticism. Section 73 of the insanity law provides as follows:

“Any one in custody as an insane person is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, upon a proper application made by him or some friend in bis behalf. Upon the return of such writ, the fact of his insanity shall be inquired into and determined. The medical history of the patient as it appears in the case book, shall be given in evidence, and the superintendent or medical officer in charge of the institution wherein such person is held in custody, and any proper person, shall be sworn touching the mental condition of such person.”

In addition to the remedy for a discharge on writ of habeas corpus in case the detention is without lawful process, the Legislature by this section expressly extended the writ of habeas corpus to cases of lawful commitments of persons as insane who have subsequently, while held under such lawful commitments, recovered their reason. The relator did not show that his ward had become sane, and therefore he was not entitled to have her discharged under this section of the insanity law on a writ of habeas corpus, which was only intended to apply to cases where the incompetent person has become sane. Doubtless the committee of the person who is ordinarily entitled to the custody of his ward might, were it'not for the orders' of the court, procure a writ of habeas corpus to obtain her custody, even though she be not fully restored to reason, in a case where she has been discharged or paroled, as prescribed in section 74 of the insanity law, but is still held in custody, and perhaps to obtain her custody from any institution on clearly showing that she has so far recovered as to render it safe and advisable to remove her from the custody of the institution. In the case at bar, however, we have an adverse decision of the Special Term on conflicting evidence as to whether it is for the best interest of the incompetent person to be removed from the sanitarium. Moreover, it appears that the Special Term in a controversy arising between the husband, who is the committee of the incompetent, and her other relatives, decided that she should be left in this sanitarium, not only until the further order of the court, but until the further order of the court on notice to her sister and her brother-in-law, and to the special guardian appointed for her in the proceeding now pending in the Supreme Court for the removal of the relator as the committee of her person on charges involving his fitness to hold that position and involving charges of immorality on his part in his own house, while she was an inmate thereof, being the same house to which he now desires to remove her. It appearing that these orders remain in full force, the court could not with propriety have ignored them, nor should it have modified them without notice to the parties whom the Special Term previously decided were entitled to notice: The application, in so far as it was not based upon the claim that the alleged incompetent has recovered her sanity and that the commitment was void, should have been in the form of a notice of motion to modify these orders on notice to the parties thereby entitled to notice. If the incompetent person sufficiently recovers to render it advisable that she be released from the sanitarium, other provision should be made for her comfort and welfare than returning her to her home in charge of her husband, until after the termination of the proceeding for his removal as committee of her person.

CLARKE and HOUGHTON, JJ., concur.

(dissenting). The petitioner is the .committee of the person of his wife, Blanche L. Andrews, an incompetent, having been appointed on October 29, 1903. On March 13, 1907, upon the petition of the present petitioner, the said incompetent was committed to a private sanitarium known as “The Knolls,” at Riverdale, N. Y. On April 8, 1907, on motion of Nannie V. Roosevelt, a sister of the incompetent, an order was made regulating the times at which Mrs. Roosevelt might visit her sister. The order also provided that the present abode of the incompetent at “The Knolls” should not be changed without first giving notice in writing to John E. Roosevelt, Nannie V. Roosevelt, and C. J. Sullivan, special guardian, and without further order of the court. By section 2320 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court is vested with the care and custody of the persons and estates of incompetent persons, such jurisdiction to be exercised by committees of the person and of the estate to be appointed by the court. Section 2232. The committee of the person therefore stands as the representative of the court, and, of course, is subject to its control and directions. The mere fact that a person has been appointed the committee of the person of an incompetent implies that the person so appointed enjoys the confidence of the court, and any suggestion or recommendation made by him is entitled to great weight. Especially is this so when the committee, having the ability to properly care for the incompetent, desires to assume the personal charge of such incompetent, and to relieve him or her from involuntary detention in an asylum. In the present case all the evidence is to-the effect that the incompetent has a well-appointed home and an ample income to insure her proper care in that home.

The great weight of the evidence is that she has so far recovered her mental poise that it will not be unsafe or detrimental to her if she be permitted to return to her home under proper regulations as to attendance and medical care. In my opinion the application of the petitioner should be granted, and the incompetent should be provisionally released from the sanitarium to which she stands committed and remitted to the personal charge of the committee of her person. The fact that some one has thade .charges against the committee, which lack ■ substantiation, should not operate to the disadvantage of the incompetent, and extend her restraint in an asylum .longer than her condition demands. So long as the committee remains undischarged, he should be presumed to be fit to have the care of the incompetent. If he is shown to be unfit, another committee should be appointed, but in the meantime the incompetent should be allowed to return to her home, with such provisions for her care and comfort as due care for her interests requires. I am of opinion that the order should be reversed and the incompetent restored to the custody of the committee of her person, the order to be settled on notice to her sister and her special guardian.

INGRAHAM, J., concurs.