Robbins v. Clock

This is an action for specific performance of a contract to convey real property, or, in the alternative, for damages for breach of contract, if specific performance cannot be decreed. The defendant has refused to perform, principally on the ground that the contract was procured by false and fraudulent representations as to the value of the property on the part of the vendee or his privies. The contract was signed by the defendant about February 19, 1906, while she was residing in the state of Florida. The land in question is located in Nassau county, N. Y., near the village of Amityville. The defendant is a woman of 70 years of age, but, as she appeared on the witness stand, of unimpaired faculties and considerable natural talents and shrewdness. At the time the contract was made she resided with her daughter and son-in-law at West Palm Beach, Fla. It was forwarded to her by mail for execution, and signed, acknowledged, and returned by her. It was not the result of a sudden impulse, and there was at least some time for reflection. It covered some 45 lots of land, and, in addition, a long strip of land running along a public highway, and but 10 feet in width. The specific consideration was the sum of $350. She claims to be entitled to be relieved from this contract because one Jeremiah Robbins, who she says was acting for the plaintiff, had represented to her that the land was of but little value, whereas, in fact,

It is urged, however, that equity will not decree specific performance of a contract to convey land where there is so great a difference between the agreed price and the actual market value as to render the position of the vendor inequitable from the point of view of the hardness of the bargain. Many authorities have been cited by the defendant to this effect. When the systems of law and equity were distinct, there was such a rule unquestionably. . Whether the rule has any present force is vey doubtful. When equitable relief was refused formerly, it was only for the purpose of relegating the parties to their remedy at law. Now, however, since the two systems have been united, the court which has acquired jurisdiction in an equitable action will retain the case and adjust the legal rights of the parties, if equitable relief be found impracticable under the circumstances of the case. Miller v. Edison Electric Light Co., 184 N. Y. 17 , 76 N. E. 734 , 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1060 . The difference in the respective values placed upon the land in question is astounding. Much of it is due to valuations made of the 10 foot wide highway strip, which the defendant’s expert appraises at $3,700, and the plaintiff’s expert at $37. The plaintiff, however, does not ask specific performance as to this strip, having on the trial expressly eliminated it from his demand, - because of some uncertainty of title. It will therefore be omitted from consideration now. As to the remaining 45 lots there is again a conflict between the experts. The plaintiff’s witness appraises them at $720 in bulk, while the defendant’s witness places their value at sev

Apparently, however, the vendor sold for a price much less than the actual value, but this fact would not in itself alone constitute a defense even in equity. Losee v. Morey, 57 Barb. 561 . At law it would be no defense at all concededly in the absence of fraud. In this action the plaintiff is entitled either to specific performance or to his. damages. His damages would embrace those covered by the loss of his bargain. Pumpelly v. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59 , 100 Am. Dec. 463 ; Sloan v. Baird, 162 N. Y. 327 , 56 N. E. 752 ; Marsh v. Johnston (Sup.) 109 N. Y. Supp. 1106 . According to the plaintiff’s proof, such damages would not be less than $370; while, according to the defendant’s proof, they would exceed several thousand dollars. In either event the defendant would be similarly affected, whatever be the remedy applied. The defendant relies upon Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 155 , as indicating a different rule. That case, however, distinctly recognizes the rule now existing that, in an action for specific-performance, the damages may be adjusted in the action, if specific performance be refused as impracticable. There specific performance could not be granted for the very important reason that the vendor did not own the property in question, having only a dower interest therein. It is true that the court assigns also other reasons; but if these reasons did not exist, specific performance could not have been granted. It lays down, however, a different rule of damages, applicable only to the peculiar facts of that case and not constituting a general rule. Marsh v. Johnston, ut supra. I do not see how the position of the defendant can be improved in this case by a refusal of specific performance and an admeasurement of the damages recoverable. Under these circumstances specific performance should not be refused.

The defendant further resists the relief sought by the plaintiff on the ground of laches. This action was not brought until 14 months after the right of action accrued. In my opinion this delay was not sufficient to deprive the plaintiff of his rights. Covart v. Johnston, 61 Hun, 622 , 15 N. Y. Supp. 785 , Id., 137 N. Y. 560 , 33 N. E. 338 , is cited tó the contrary. That case was decided on several grounds, and the question of laches was intermingled with other questions which controlled the decision.

Nor do I think that the objection urged by the defendant as to the-fact that in the contract between the parties the land is described as being in Suffolk county presents any insuperable difficulty to the plaintiff’s relief. This "contract was the result of considerable correspondence between the parties. The land lay in a neighborhood, generally known as Amityville, near the dividing line between Nassau and Suffolk counties. Both parties had clearly in mind the identical property, and there was no mistake between them as to what they were dealing with. Under these circumstances the use of the word “Suffolk” instead of “Nassau” is too insignificant a variation to render this case-subject to the authorities cited by the defendant.

Judgment is therefore directed for the plaintiff, except as to the-strip of land running along the highway.

Judgment for plaintiff.