Majority
Headnote
1. Street Railroads (§ 93[1] ) — Persons On ob Near Track—Injuries—Negligence.The plaintiff was the foreman of a firm of contractors named Snare & Triest, who were engaged in extending the platform on the northerly side of the New York terminal of the Brooklyn Bridge. This structure was built of iron, and at the time of the accident the plaintiff had commenced putting in place an iron girder about 25 feet long and weighing about 1% tons. The defendant was running a line of surface street cars over the bridge. It oper
It seems to me quite clear that there was no evidence to justify a finding of negligence against the railroad company. There was no relation between the plaintiff and the railroad company that imposed upon the latter the duty of an employer towards an employé. The plaintiff was in charge of the work. He was perfectly familiar with the situation, and could see the danger in allowing this girder to swing out over the railroad track, and it was his duty to take measures to prevent an accident. He made no request to the railroad company to stop the trains while he was engaged in this work, but expected to be able to hold the girder back so that trains could pass. He held the girder back for the first train to pass; and, when the second train approached, he also held the girder back in a position to allow the train to pass in safety. There is nothing in the absence of the flagman that had anything to do with the accident, because all that he motioned the flagman to do was to stop the train until he could swing the girder back. He had swung the girder back before the train arrived, and he had it in
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint both at the close of the plaintiff’s case and at the close of all the testimony. That motion was denied, but it does not appear that the defendant excepted. The question as to whether the verdict was against the evidence is, however, presented by the appeal from the order denying a motion for a new trial. I also think it was error to refuse to charge as requested by the defendant that:
“If in approaching this iron the motorman saw that his car could pass in safety, and there was sufficient room for him to pass in safety, and the plaintiff gave no signal to indicate that he understood to mean to stop, then their verdict must be for the defendant, the iron having come in contact with the body of the car after the front had passed.”
The court refused to charge this request, and charged the jury that:
“If the circumstances were such that an ordinarily prudent person in charge of this car would have been justified in concluding that he could have passed in safety, then the defendant would not have been guilty of negligence.”
That was excepted to by the defendant. This was error. There was nothing to indicate that, if the girder was off the track, it was unsafe for the car to pass; and, if the plaintiff made no signal to stop the car, it was not the duty of the motorman to stop.
The judgment and order should therefore be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
PATTERSON, P. J., and LAUGHLIN and SCOTT, JJ., concur. CLARKE, J., dissents.