Majority
Headnote
1. Taxation (§ 376[1] ) — Assessment of Franchises — Authority of Village Assessors.This is a certiorari to review the relator’s assessment of its franchises in the village of Mohawk, Herkimer county.
The village was incorporated by chapter 157, p. 933, Laws 1844, and is in the town of German Flats. The village of Ilion is also in
“That our reason and information for the assessment of the special franchise assessment was the notice hereinbefore mentioned, served upon us by the town clerk of German Flats, which set forth that the state board of tax commissioners had fixed the value of the special franchise of the West Shore Railroad Company, in the town of German Flats, at the sum of $51,400. That the value of such special franchise was based upon a street crossing at Railroad street, Ilion, N. Y., a street crossing at Water street, Ilion, N. Y., a bridge crossing over Main street, Mohawk, N. Y., and a bridge crossing over Erie ( Canal, Mohawk, N. Y.; and it being within our knowledge and information that out of the five items upon which the special franchise for the said town was so fixed only two of such items were within the village of Mohawk, viz., .the bridges named, and that, therefore, only part of such special franchise for said town was within the village of Mohawk, which village is a tax district within the town of German Flats, and a separate tax district from the village of Ilion, and therefore it became, and was necessary, and our duty, as prescribed by law, in such cases made and prescribed, to ascertain and determine what portion of said $51,400, the value of the town of German Flats’ special franchise for said company as fixed by the said state board, should be placed upon the assessment roll for village purposes; and so we did thereupon duly ascertain and determine that the total valuation of the tangible and intangible worth or valuation of the special franchise in the said bridge crossings in Mohawk, N. Y., was fully worth the sum of $34,300,” etc.
What valuation, if any, the state board put on the said franchises on account of the two bridges in Mohawk, or the said crossings in Ilion, does not appear. Having thus determined, the village assessors entered said sum in said assessment roll on the said 8th day of July.
The relator on the same day appeared and made oral objections to the assessment of said franchise assessment, and an agreement was
The assessment, except that it was limited to a sum not exceeding the $51,400 and not entered on the roll until grievance day, was made as they would assess a house within the village, themselves ascertaining and fixing the value.
My opinion is that the assessment in question was wholly unauthorized :
1. “The state board of tax commissioners shall annually fix and determine the valuation of each special franchise subject to assessment in each city, town, or tax district.” Tax Law (Laws 1899, p. 1590, c. 712) § 42. The state board appoints a day, gives notice for-hearing complaints (Id. § 45), and, when the valuation is fixed, the clerk of the board files with the clerk of the town, or city where such special franchise is assessed, a written statement of each special franchise as finally fixed and determined by said board. The town or city clerk then, in turn, certifies and transmits a copy of said statement to the assessors, or other local officers charged with the duty of making local assessments in each tax district in said city or town, and to the assessors of villages and commissioners of highways with- . in their respective towns and -villages. The valuations, as fixed by the state board, shall thereupon be entered by the assessors in the proper column of the assessment roll with the same force and effect as if originally made by such assessors; and, if a special assessment is wholly within a village, the valuation fixed by the state board for the town shall also be the valuation for the village, and, if a part only of such special franchise is in a village, it is the duty of the assessors to ascertain what portion of the valuation as fixed by the state board shall be placed on the tax roll for village purposes. . Id. § 42. The two bridges, constituting the special franchise of the relator in the village of Mohawk, are apparently wholly within the village, hence there is no question of dividing both or either with the town; but the imperative command remains that it must be “as fixed by the state board.” The terms “as fixed,” “as so fixed,” “has been fixed” by the state board, or equivalent words, may be found at least five'
I have not overlooked the fact that in section 42 the state board is required to make the assessment of the special franchise “in each city, town or tax district,” making no mention of a village; but, turning to section 44, it will be seen that the state board is required to give notice to the party or parties assessed of the “total valuation of such special franchise, and the value thereof in each city, town, village or tax district.” Again, returning to section 42, we find “the valuation so fixed by the state board shall be the assessed valuation on which all taxes based on such special franchise in the city, town, or village for state, municipal, school, or highway purposes shall be levied during the next ensuing year.” It seems to me that, though the statute may not make a village one of the territorial units for a special franchise assessment by the state authorities, yet that each franchise (here, each bridge) in a village must be separately assessed by said state board.
I conclude, therefore, that the village assessors are without power to fix values in villages; that their duty is merely clerical—ministerial —to make such entry on the assessment roll as the state board shall fix for them; and that the assessment (i. e., ascertained value) of a special franchise, wholly within a village, can be made only by the state board. Any other construction of the tax law would lead to confusion and a possible conflict of judgment between the village assessors on the one hand, the town authorities on the other, and the state board on still another. “It is * * * a cardinal maxim of interpretation to so construe the words of a statute, if possible, as to uphold, rather than defeat, it; if susceptible of two hostile constructions, to give it that which will sustain and effectuate its object.” Per Hubbard, J., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 448 . “If one construction would lead to an unreasonable result, it is to be avoided, if possible; for ‘a bad result suggests a wrong conclusion.’ If another construction would lead to a reasonable result in harmony with legislative custom and history, as well as with the general purpose of the statute, it is to be adopted if the language used will permit.” Per Vann, J., People v. Fitzgerald, 180 N. Y. 275 , 276, 73 N. E. 55 , 56. “It is tiie duty of the court, when passing upon an act of the Legislature, to uphold and give effect to it if possible.” Per Gray, J., People ex rel. Strough v. Canvassers, 143 N. Y. 84 , 88, 37 N. E. 649 , 650_
_ 2. Concededly the village of Ilion is entitled to some of the benefit of the assessment of $51,400 laid upon the relator by the state board. Possibly the town of German Flats may also be entitled to a portion of the assessment. Whether it is does not appear. The assessors of the village of Mohawk have assumed to carve out as its share the sum of $34,300. Whether that is an equitable division we have no means of knowing, except from the return which is silent as to the amount that should be appropriated to the other village, or- by the town, if any.
“Shall the village of Mohawk make an apportionment for all of the bene- - ficiaries within the .town of German Flats without permitting the other or others to participate in the division?”
Evidently the answer must be in the negative; for, if .otherwise, by the same statute the village of Ilion, taking “time by the forelock,” could do precisely what the village of Mohawk assumed to do, and the latter would be obliged to acquiesce, right or wrong. The statute does not seem to make provision for a possible conflict of interest between a town and village, or between two villages in a town where the assessment, as here, has been made by the state board covering the entire town with the villages therein in a single lump sum. I think the state board in making the assessment, instead of placing it upon the whole town in bulk, ought to have fixed the value of each franchise, and,, to have specified, or made clear, so that the assessors might know, the amount which should have been apportioned to each village for the purpose of local taxation, and that the assessors of the village of Mohawk are without power to make the apportionment.
3. The respondent’s counsel contends that the charter of the village of Mohawk provides a method for reviewing an illegal assessment, and that the relator’s remedy is under it rather than the general statute. Laws 1894, p. 315, c. 99, § 38. He overlooks the fact that the same statute provides that the charter provision shall not preclude the party from invoking any other method of relief.
4. He further contends that a certiorari to review the- assessment does not lie, because the relator omitted to file a written objection, duly verified, on the day fixed by the village assessors for hearing complaints, as required by section 36 of the tax law (Laws 1896, p. 810, c. 908). This not being a case of overvaluation, but an assessment made without jurisdiction, the omission to file an objection in writing was not a waiver of a right to challenge the validity of the assessment. People ex rel. West S. R. R. v. Adams, 125 N. Y. 471 , 484, 26 N. E. 746 ; People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Feitner, 39 Misc. Rep. 474 , 80 N. Y. Supp. 138 .
The assessment in question may be stricken from the roll, but without costs.
Ordered accordingly.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Champlin v. Gray 185 N. Y. 196 p. 1095
- People ex rel. Sims v. Board of Fire Commissioners 73 N. Y. 437 p. 1096
- Masterson v. Townshend 123 N. Y. 458 p. 1096
- People ex rel. Strough v. Board of County Canvassers 143 N. Y. 84 at 88, 37 p. 1097
- People ex rel. West Shore Railroad v. Adams 125 N. Y. 471 at 484, 26 p. 1098