People ex rel. Lathers v. Raymond

“Except as otherwise provided in this act, if a vacancy shall occur otherwise than by expiration of term, in any elective office of the city, the common council shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy for the balance of the unexpired term. A vacancy occurring in any appointive office of the city, otherwise than by expiration of term, shall be filled for the balance of the unexpired term by the same authorities and in the same manner as an appointment for a full term.”

If the appointments were made by the aldermen or by the common council, the recognized procedure would be a choice by that body subject to the approval by the mayor. Cassidy v. City of Brooklyn, 60 Barb. 105 , affirmed on opinion 47 N. Y. 659 ; People ex rel. Ennis v. Schroeder, 76 N. Y. 160 ; People ex rel. Kehoe v. Eitchie, 76 Hun, 80 , 28 N. Y. Supp. 600 . I do not find a provision in charter or in statute, and I am not cited to any one, other than the section discussed, that expressly provides for the removal of the three commissioners. They cannot be removed at the pleasure of the appointive power, for they have definite terms of office. Section 1, c. 661, p. 1521, Laws 1907.

If, then, the common council have the power of removal, it must be found in the inherent power in a municipal corporation to remove its officers. This power is recognized. Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.) §'240, citing authorities which find their source in the judgment of Lord Mansfield in the famous case of Rex v. Richardson, 1 Bure, 517, says:

“The power to amove a corporate officer from his office, for reasonable and just cause, is one of the common-law incidents of all corporations. This doctrine, though declared before, has been considered as settled ever since Lord Mansfield’s judgment in the well-known case of The King v. Richardson. It is there denied that there can be no power of amotion unless giveh by charter or prescription; and the contrary doctrine is asserted—that from the reason of the thing, from the nature of corporations, and for the sake of order and government, the power is incidental.”

See, too, Mechem on Public Officers, § 446.

No question is presented in this case of a limitation by the Legislature upon this municipal corporation as to the power of removal perforce of a prescribed procedure, which, however, the Legislature, when legislating, within the Constitution might have ordained. People ex rel. Percival v. Cram, 164 N. Y. 166 , - 58 N. E. 112 ; Matter of Stutzbach v. Coler, 168 N. Y. 416 , 61 N. E. 697 . I think that this inherent power of removal is vested in the common council of this city. Dillon, Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.), at section 242 says:

“By the corporation at large, as used in the preceding section, is meant the different ranks and orders which compose it, including the definite and indefinite bodies. The essentials in such a corporation of a valid corporate assembly have previously been described. Our American corporations, however, have no ranks, orders, or integral parts corresponding to the constitution of an old English corporation. Here the common council, or the elective governing body (whatever name be given to it) exercises all of the powers of the

incorporated place. Has the council, as the representative of the corporation, the incidental powers of a corporation, such as the power to amove, or the power to ordain by-laws? Or is the council in the nature of a select body, possessing no right to exercise any of the ordinary incidental powers of the corporation, unless expressly authorized by charter or legislative grant? The question not being judicially settled as to our municipal corporations, the opinion is ventured that, in the absence of an express grant or statute conferring or limiting the power, the common council of one of our municipal corporations, as ordinarily constituted, does possess, in the absence of any express or implied restriction in the charter, the incidental power, not only to make by-laws, but, for cause, to expel its members, and, for cause, to remove corporate officers, whether elected by it or by the people.”

See, also, section 243.

And section 58 of the charter provides:

“The common council shall exercise all of the corporate powers conferred by this act”—which act in itself constitutes the municipal corporation. Section 2, Charter.

It is well settled that such removal must be for just cause. Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 251. And- Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Richardson, supra, indicates the classes of misconduct which may-subject the officer to such penalty:

“(1) Such as have no immediate relation to his office, but are in themselves of so infamous a nature, as to render the offender unfit to execute any public franchise.

“(2) Such as are only against his oath, and the duty of his office as a corporator; and amount to breaches of the tacit condition annexed to his franchise or office.

“(3) The third sort of offense for which an officer or corporator may be displaced is of a mixed nature; as being an offense not only against the duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at common law.”

See, too, State ex rel. v. Walker, 68 Mo. App. 110 -119.

The offending must not be merely trivial, but it must be “of a serious nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the corporation.” Dillon, Municipal Corporations, § 252, citing authorities. As removal for cause is adversary or judicial, or at least quasi judicial, it requires notice to the officers proceeded against and a hearing. Dillon, Municipal Corporations, § 251; Rex v. Richardson, supra; People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582 -588; People ex rel. Gere v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 191 -198; Andrews v. King, 77 Me. 234 . - And the determination upon such hearing is subject to review by certiorari. People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, supra; State v. Common Council, 53 Minn. 238 , 55 N. W. 118 , 39 Am. St. Rep. 595 .

Aside from the questions of law, section 2140 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, so far as the facts are concerned, that the court shall determine the question by the criterion “whether there was, upon all the evidence, such a preponderance of proof, against the existence of any of those facts, that the verdict of' a jury, affirming the existence thereof, rendered in an action in the Supreme Court, triable by a jury, would be set aside by the court, as against the weight of evidence.” And this court in its first department has said:

“When charges have a real basis or foundation, are made in good faith, and not as a mere pretext for removal, and they are of a substantial nature, showing some neglect of duty on the part of the officer, or something which

materially affects his official acts,' or his standing and character, and the officer is given an opportunity to explain away the charges, which explanation is received and acted upon in good faith, then the sufficiency of the proof. and the propriety of the removal under the statute rest entirely with the removing officer. People ex rel. Mitchel v. La Grange, 2 App. Div. 444 , 37 N. Y. Supp. 991 .” People ex rel. Walsh v. Brady, 48 App. Div. 128 , 62 N. T. Supp. 603.

The board was created pursuant to the said chapter of the Laws of 1907. Its three members were appointed in August of. that year, of whom all are removed by these proceedings. Of that number Mr. Lathers had been a sewer commissioner for the five years previous to his appointment, Dr. Vulte had been a sewer commissioner from 1888 to 1895 and health commissioner, and Mr. Cooper had been a health commissioner. All were laymen. Among their other duties, those of the old sewer commissioners were cast upon them. The common council which heard and acted upon these charges took office on January 1, 1908. The charges were preferred in August and September, 1908, and after due notice were heard. The deféndants were adjudged guilty of insubordination and neglect of duty, in that they passed this resolve:

“That no contract will hereafter be awarded by this board unless the comptroller has certified on the same that the funds are available to pay for such work.”

Mr. Lathers testified that before the passage of this resolve he called upon the new comptroller of the city and told him that, inasmuch as the old sewer commissioners in former years had such trouble in “financing,their contracts,” the board had decided that it would not do work unless it was “financed,”, and that the comptroller, who was a lawyer, suggested the passage of a resolution that the contracts should be indorsed by him to the effect that the money was in sight or provided by resolution. It appears that the comptroller informed two of the commissioners that each commissioner was personally liable for letting contracts without provision having been made for the payments thereunder, and Dr. Vulte testifies that the comptroller said that he would hold any member of the board liable for such action. Mr. Lathers testified that such alleged liability was then first called to his attention. After this interview with the comptroller, the board passed this resolve. This testimony is not contradicted. It further appears without contradiction that eight days after the passage of the resolution the commissioners met the mayor and the aldermen (with one or possibly two exceptions) at the home of the mayor, and that Mr. Lathers said that his board had a deficit of $16,000, that they would not do work until the money was provided, that the board did not mean that the money must be in bank, but that its use must be authorized by proper resolution, or that it must be set aside to the credit of the board. He gave his reasons for this attitude, drawn from his past official experience. The mayor thanked the commissioners and said that he was in accord, and none of the aldermen expressed any dissent. It further appeared that the resolve remained upon the records until July 24, 1908, when the commissioners received a communication from the corporation counsel that the resolve was ultra vires,

I cannot see any proof of insubordination, which, as I understand it, means disobedience of lawful authority or resistance to it. In view of the experience of the sewer commission, and of its inability to procure the means for outstanding public work which were available, these commissioners decided upon a halt in their work, and after consultation with the comptroller, and under his advice and warning, formulated their decision by this resolution. They communicated their course to the head of the city and a majority of the members of the common council, and received approval from the mayor, and heard no dissent from those aldermen.. When informed by the legal officer of the city that its resolve was beyond its powers, the commission rescinded it forthwith. It is not contended that the passagé of such resolution was in the teeth of any express prohibition, but that it trenched on the power of the common council. The resolve on its face indicates action in good faith in furtherance of a conservative course in city administration, and in accord with the checks required by the charter of the greatest city of this continent. See section 149 (Laws 1901, p. 50, c. 466), Greater New York Charter.

Under other specifications the relators were adjudged guilty of insubordination, neglect of duty, and irregularity, in that as such commissioners, since May 19, 1908, they wholly neglected and refused to lay and to construct public cross-walks on Webster avenue as ordered by the common council, also a public sewer in part of Union avenue, and since June 3,1908, to procure bids for the completion of the work of curbing, guttering, and flagging certain specified streets, and since said date that they failed and refused to proceed with work upon a public sewer in Hillside avenue. The answer of the commissioners as to Webster avenue was that the common council had never asked for any estimate of the cost, or maps or profile, and that no appropriation had been made for the work. The commissioners evidently rested upon section 4 of the said chapter 661, p. 1533, of the Laws of 1907, which provides:

“When any of said work is to be done the common council shall take such action in regard thereto as is now provided by law, and shall thereupon order the board of public works to submit to it proper maps, profiles and estimates and other details for said work and may then order said work done by the said board of public works.”

It also appears that there is evidence that it was customary to set aside money for such work. However, after the board of public works had rescinded the said resolution of January 9th, a contractor was asked to make a bid for the work, which was not" required to be done under advertisement. The contractor came back after making an appointment with the engineer, and asked whether the money had been appropriated, and, when told it had not, refused to bid. Mr. Lathers told the mayor, who asked him to try to get some other bids, and he

Thus, very shortly after these resolutions of the common council, there was held this meeting at which the whole matter was gone into. It does not appear that there was any complaint thereat as to any neglect or refusal of the board of public works to go forward with the work. Mr. Lathers testified that he could not recall any complaint, and Dr. Vulte testified that nothing was said as to the failure of the board to proceed with the curbing or guttering, the sewers, or the work mentioned in the charges or specifications. On July 14th a conference was held between the board of public works and the public improvement committee of the common council, and it was agreed that the common council would sell the necessary certificates of indebtedness and bonds, in order that the work might go forward, and the board of public works agreed to proceed therewith. .This was after discussion pro and con as to the propriety and advisability of this step. The advertising for the work was begun. On July 21, 1908, the public improvement committee of the common council recoil-mended to the council the issue of bonds and certificates, and the common council passed a resolution therefor. Bids were then received by the board of public works, and contracts for all the work excepting the cross-walk on Webster avenue, which was under $200, were awarded. It appeared at the hearing of these charges that those contracts were ready.

Two of the three supplemental charges filed on September 10, 1908, were for neglect of duty and violation of law, and the third was for insubordination. and neglect of duty. These charges and the specifications thereunder upon which the commissioners were adjuded guilty relate to certain contracts for sewer construction. It was adjudged: That these commissioners, having officially exacted from Rumsey, as trustee of the. Rumsey estate, $2,525 in payment of assessments for public sewers, failed to pay it over to its owner, the city, save $91; that

“Estimated amount of $No liability hereunder entered on the books of the city of New Rochelle. Edward Stetson Griding, Comptroller.”

It would have been manifestly unjust tharc a private owner who had defrayed the entire cost of the improvement should pay over the amount thereof to the city, which had neither incurred liability nor made any outlay. So far as the withdrawal of the warrant is concerned, it appeared that, in response to a general question of the propriety of this step, the commissioners were advised by the corporation • counsel in writing that it might be taken.

It appeared from the testimony of Mr. Lathers that when Mr. Dorr appeared before the board and asked permission to connect his house,

I think that a verdict of a jury against these relators, to the effect that they were guilty of insubordination or neglect of duties or of irregularities in their offices, could not stand. There is practically no question over the records, or that the relators did or omitted to do what was charged against them; but, on the other hand, the testimony of the commissioners in explanation of their conduct is in many instances corroborated by the records and by other witnesses, and such testimony is not materially contradicted. There is no impugnment of their good faith and no proof that their acts and omissions were not open and well known or communicated by them to the city authorities. There is not the slightest proof of any corruption of peculation, and, as far as I can see, these officials were intelligent and honest citizens, who strove without pay to serve the public interests of the city.

Their alleged “insubordination”—which I understand means disobedience of lawful authority or resistance to it—consisted of passing a resolve that they would not do anymore work until the means were provided, which was dictated by experience of past deficits and complications, advised by the chief fiscal officer of the city, a lawyer, with his warning that they would be personally liable for public work not thus provided for. The action and the reasons therefor were communicated to the mayor and the aldermen, with approval from, the one and without disapproval from the other. This resolve was rescinded forthwith when it was pronounced ultra vires.' The other acts of insubor-' dination" dr neglect of duty dr of irregularity were in "part deduced from

The determination should be annulled in every respect, and the relators reinstated, with $50 costs and disbursements. All concur.