Majority
Headnote
SPECIFIC Performance (§ 106[1] )—Parties.On the 31st day of January, 1908, Joseph Lawson entered into a contract for the conveyance of certain real estate, situate in the borough of Brooklyn, to one Joseph Pettit, assignor of plaintiffs, and on the following day he departed this life, leaving a last will and testament, by the terms of which, after various specific bequests, he conveys to his executors "all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real, personal and mixed,” in trust for the purpose of providing an income of $60 per month to his widow, with an additional provision for an income of $20 per month for his daughter, during the life of his widow, and upon the latter’s death the trust is to terminate, the property is to be sold, and the proceeds divided among his children. The plaintiffs claim that the legal title to the real estate involved is in the widow and heirs at law, and that, while the executors have tendered a deed of the premises, in accord with the terms of the contract of January 31st, this would not serve to give them good title.
We think the learned court at Special Term has properly denied the motion. The executors take the title to the testator’s property as trustees under the express trust, and whether it be considered as real estate, or as having been converted into personalty through the operation of the contract of January 31, 1908, under the general rule prevailing in such cases (Williams v. Haddock, 145 N. Y. 144 , 150, 39 N.
The order" appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur.
Cases cited
- Williams v. Haddock 145 N. Y. 144 at 150, 39 p. 561