Majority
Headnote
Criminal Law (§ 999[1] )—Commitment—Validity.The defendant returns that the relator is held under a commitment by a magistrate for a term of six months. The relator traverses the return and demurs to the sufficiency of the commitment.
The commitment states that the relator is committed for six months under the provisions of chapter 410, p. 1, of the Laws of 1882, as amended by chapter 353, p. 559, of the Laws of 1886. This chapter, however, is further amended by chapter 436, p. 1022, of the Laws of 1903, and the sufficiency of the return must be tested by such law. The law, as amended, provides that every commitment made under the act shall state the name and age of the female, and that such commitment shall' state the term of the commitment, which, if the female is an adult, shall be three years, or, if such female is a minor, during her minority, unless sooner discharged by the trustees, etc. The commit
As the power to fix the term of imprisonment depends on the age of the female as found by the magistrate, and as the statute expressly requires this fact to be stated by the commitment, I therefore think that this commitment fails to state one of the facts upon which it was based, that the proviso saving a commitment which is defective as to form is not applicable, and that this commitment is void. I do not think the case of Kuhn v. House of Mercy, 133 N. Y. 207 , 30 N. E. 853 , in point. In that case the commitment did not make a finding as to age; but it was inartificially expressed, and any interpretation of the language of the commitment on this subject was sufficient to sustain it. In People ex rel. Ginter v. House of Mercy, 57 Misc. Rep. 657 , 110 N. Y. Supp. 172 , the commitment recited that the female was of the age of 21 years, indicating that the statement'of the adjudication was a mere clerical error; whereas, in this case the commitment contains no recital of the age of the female, nor any adjudication' thereon. Neither is there any authority for a commitment of six months.
It is not necessary to consider the other points raised by the relator’s counsel. Writ sustained, and relator discharged.
Writ sustained, and relator discharged.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Kuhn v. Protestant Episcopal House of Mercy 133 N. Y. 207 p. 947
- People ex rel. Ginter v. Protestant Episcopal House of Mercy 57 Misc. Rep. 657 p. 947