Majority
Headnote
1. Master and Servant (§ 20[1] )—Termination of Employment.This is an action to enjoin the defendants from performing certain acts to the detriment of the plaintiff’s business in their conduct of a strike in which a portion of his employés have engaged. The action was tried before me at the Westchester Special Term in January, 1908, and decision was then reserved, briefs to be submitted by counsel at their convenience. The brief in behalf of the plaintiff was not received until last October, and that in behalf of the defendants was not received until about 10 days ago. Although the case is
The weight of the evidence appears to me to fully establish the following material facts:
The plaintiff is and for some years has been engaged in the business of manufacturing speedometers; that is, instruments for measuring the speed of automobiles. They were made under his own inventions, and for some 10 years prior to 1907 he had been manufacturing and selling them in the city of New York. In 1906, with the view of changing his factory to the country, he purchased land at New Rochelle, and thereon erected a factory and installed in the same machinery, all to the cost of about $250,000. About the 1st of January, 1907, he.began manufacturing in such factory. Some days prior to the 14th of March of that year he discharged or caused to be discharged from his service one Manning, who was the foreman of the toolroom in that factory. There is some conflict in the testimony as to the cause of such discharge; but, in the view of the law hereinafter taken and stated, it is unnecessary to solve that conflict. Shortly thereafter, first within a day or two, James P. Schofield, who was the business agent of District Dodge No. 15 of the International Association of Machinists, called at the plaintiff’s office in New York City with • a view of seeing him at least in regard to the discharge of Manning, who was also a member of such association. Machinists, or at least many of them, are organized in a voluntary association, of which the general organization is known as the International Association. Next below that come various district organizations, each for a given territory and known as “district lodges,” and finally below the district lodges are local organizations known as local lodges, several coming under the jurisdiction of each district lodge. All the lodges are voluntary associations, and are entirely unincorporated. The locality of the plaintiff’s factory fell within the jurisdiction or limits of Local Lodge No. 460, and that within those of District Lodge No. 15. In a general way the object of the association in its several branches is largely to promote the interests of its members, and its active work . evidently is to promote such interests in the relations of its members with their employers. Many of the men employed in the plaintiff’s factory were members of such Local Lodge No. 460.
During the forenoon of the 14th of March, 1907, the plaintiff’s superintendent by his direction discharged five other foremen at the factory, viz., the defendants William Volkman, Robert Long, Thomas Shore, Prank Meyers, and Alexander Robinton. Between the discharge of Manning and that of the other foremen Schofield had several times called at plaintiff’s office in New York City to see him; • but without success, leaving for him his business card as such business
It was substantially the daily practice of the pickets, if their persuasions were not successful, .to address openly upon the public streets and near the factory to tbe persons whom they accosted as actual or prospective employés epithets offensive. and even indeed indecent.
The law of this case is well settled, as both counsel seem to agree. It may, therefore, be briefly stated without attempting to verify the statement by citation of authorities. The “law of strikes” is well established, at least to the following extent: In the absence of a contract for an unexpired specified term of service and hire, there being here no question of any such, the employer has the absolute right at any time and for any cause to discharge his employés, one or more, and, on the other hand, his employés have the right at any time, singly or collectively, and for any cause, even at their own mere will, to leave his employment, and, if such employés think they have any grievance against him, their employer—e. g., for the discharge of a fellow employé—they may not only strike—that is, themselves leave his employment—but may by picketing, attempt to peaceably persuade other workmen not to enter his employment and take their vacant places, and even to persuade their former fellow workmen still remaining in the service, to leave and join them in the strike. Their efforts to attain such result, however, must be confined to acts of peaceable persuasion. Certainly they may not extend to violence, threats, or even verbal abuse; and, if they do so extend, they thereby become unlawful. The evidence in this case amply demonstrates that the picketing of the plaintiff’s factory at New Rochelle for the period of at least six months after March 14th, when the strike began, was constantly, that is, practically daily and openly, of such unlawful character, by reason at least of the use of abusive epithets, as is plain from the above recital of facts. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the plaintiff’s cause of action has been established against those of the defendants
The following named defendants have been clearly .proven to have so participated, viz.: Thomas Shore, William Volkman, Trank Meyers, Charles Meyers, James Kelly, Trank E. Becker, Robert Long, Howard Grosvenor, George Long, and George Harrison. The grave question for determination is the question whether or not the two lodges, District No. 15 and Local No. 460, each of which is a voluntary association, not incorporated, consisting of more than seven persons and here sued under section 1919 of the Code of Civil Procedure by its president as a defendant herein, should be held responsible for such unlawful conduct of the picketing. It is not clear that either lodge can be held responsible for the initiation of the strike, and it is immaterial whether it can be so held, because the strike itself was not unlawful. Both lodges, however, maintained, the strike by money contributions made at frequent and stated intervals to support the strikers and especially the picketing. It does not appear that the above recited unlawful conduct of the picketing was ever expressly brought to the notice of a meeting of either lodge; but the same must have been wéll known to their representatives. The business agent of District Lodge No. 15 frequently visited the scene of the strike, attended local meetings of the strikers, and, if he had kept his eyes and ears open, must have become well informed as to the unlawful character 'of the picketing, viz., the constant and public use of abusive épithets by the pickets as above described. Those things were done so openly and regularly that any one interested in the conduct of the strike could, by the least observation or inquiry, have ascertained them at any time for months. I think, therefore, that those lodges in thus regularly sustaining the picketing by pecuniary support for so long a time must be held to have so acted with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the unlawful conduct of the picketing, and therefore that they must be held to have aided and abetted such unlawful conduct. Hence I conclude that the plaintiff’s case is established against the two lodges^ District No. 15 and Local No. 460, as well as against the defendants above named as having been proven to have personally participated in the verbal abuse.
The acts of actual, substantial violence proven appear to me not to have been sufficiently frequent or notorious as to charge the lodges or the strikers, other than those who actually participated in them, with having aided and abetted them. Inasmuch as the evidence as to the constant use of abusive epithets is so ample and is in itself sufficient to establish the unlawful character of the picketing, I do not deem it necessary to inquire and determine to what extent the efforts at boycotting are to be regarded as illegal. In any event, the evidence as to them does not seem to be sufficient to establish that either lodge aided and abetted them.
It remains to determine what the plaintiff shall be permitted to recover as incidental damages against the two lodges and the above-named defendants who actually participated in the unlawful conduct of the picketing. I think that such damages should include what the
My conclusion on the whole case, therefore, is that the plaintiff is. entitled to judgment for relief by way of injunction, and incidentally for damages in the amount last named against both of said lodges or their representative, officers, defendants - herein, and also against the individual defendants above stated to have actually participated in the unlawful conduct of the picketing. The form of the decision should be settled upon notice.