In re Simmons

In Burchard v. State of New York, 128 App. Div. 750 , 113 N. Y. Supp. 233 , this court reversed a judgment of the Court of Claims because that court had disregarded evidence introduced both by the claimant and the state as to the value of land taken for canal purposes, and had awarded a judgment for less than the estimated value as given by any witness, including the witnesses of the state. That case, however, is not here applicable. The functions and duties of commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings are vastly different from those of the Court of Claims. It is well settled that the former may seek information from various sources and supply themselves with knowledge pertaining to the subject-matter of their inquiry, independently of the parties, and that they are unhampered by technical rules of evidence and unrestricted as to their sources of information. Matter of Thompson, 85 Hun, 438 , 443, 32 N. Y. Supp. 897 ; City of Syracuse v. Stacey, 45 App. Div. 249 , 259, 61 N. Y. Supp. 165 ; Matter of Staten Island Rapid Transit Company, 47 Hun, 396 ; Harlem River & Portchester Railroad Company v. Reynolds, 50 App. Div. 575 , 64 N. Y. Supp. 199 ; New York & Massachusetts Railroad Company, v. Lent, 51 Hun, 644 , 4 N. Y. Supp. 88 . The information thus acquired by the commissioners, independently of the evidence produced by the parties, may properly be utilized by said commissioners. In the very nature of things it does not get into the record and cannot be considered by an appellate court. We are obliged to assume, in reviewing their determination, that the commissioners acquired and made proper use of such evidence in reaching their conclusion, as well as the written evidence produced by the parties, and that they also acted upon the personal inspection of the real estate which the statute requires them to make.

It is quite true that the commissioners are not at liberty to disregard the evidence which the parties produce. It is said that, although the commissioners may act upon knowledge acquired aliunde the record, nevertheless knowledge thus acquired should only be used for the purpose of weighing and giving proper effect to the record evidence, and that their determination, when reviewed on appeal, must appear to have some support in the evidence appearing in the record. It is urged that when a party takes property by the right of eminent domain, and produces evidence as to the value of such property, it may justly be assumed that the value thus fixed represents the minimum which a court should be willing to allow for property thus forcibly taken; that it is reasonable to assume that when a party places a value upon property which he is willing to pay therefor, and produces expert witnesses to establish such value, the value as thus estimated bears such an element of probability that it should be accepted. We do not think that this case presents that question. The order appealed from shows on its face that the appellant’s property was assessed at $1,200. This is some evidence of value appearing in the record,

Complaint is also made that proper provision was not made for the disbursements of the appellant. We have examined this question, and think that he has no just ground for complaint in that respect.

The order, so far as appealed from, should be affirmed with costs. All concur.