Hyperlawhypertext legal database In re Kouwenhoven 118 N.Y.S. 502

← Cases

In re Kouwenhoven

118 N.Y.S. 502 Court N.Y. Sur. Ct. English

Contents

Majority

p. 502
(63 Misc. Rep. 161.)
In re KOUWENHOVEN.
(Surrogate’s Court, Kings County.
April, 1909.)

Headnote

1. Wills (§ 732[2] )—Construction—Payment of Legacies.
Where testator devised and bequeathed to his children in equal shares all the residue of his estate, and his property was such as to show an intent that the realty should be charged with the payment of specific legacies amounting to $100,000 on deficiency of the personal assets, a subse
p. 503
quent clause, providing that in such contingency the children should take the residuary estate in other specified proportions, must be disregarded. •
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 1803; Dec. Dig. 5 732.[2] ]
2. Wills (§ 732[2] )—Payment of Specific Legacies—Rentals.
Where a will gives an executor full power to lease or convey testator’s real estate, rentals received are applicable to the specific legacies.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 1806; Dec. Dig. .§ 732.[2] ]
In the matter of the judicial settlement of William H. Kouwenhov■en, executor of Anthony Carey, deceased.
Decree rendered.
Van Wyck & Mygatt, for petitioner.

Upon the settlement of the executor’s account it becomes necessary to determine whether certain specific legacies were •charged upon both personal and real estate.

The will contains six legacies, amounting to $100,000. It then proceeds :

“Seventh. All the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate I :give, devise and bequeath to my children equally. <
“Eighth. If my estate should not be sufficient to pay these legacies I direct that my children share in my residuary estate in the proportions as follows, namely, John and Joseph one fifth each and each of the others one tenth.
“Ninth. I give my executors or executor for the time being full power and .authority to sell and convey or lease any or all of my real estate.”

Under the power to lease, the executor has received rentals, the •disposition of which requires the determination of the question above stated. The "testator’s holdings of real and personal estate at the time when the will was made were such as to demonstrate an intention that the lands were to be devoted to these legacies, in so far as the personal estate was insufficient for the purpose, unless such intention is forbidden by the eighth paragraph, quoted supra.

The rule which is stated as one which admits of no exception in the •construction of written instruments is that:

“Where an estate Is given in one part of an instrument in clear and decisive terms, such estate cannot be taken away or cut down by raising a doubt upon the extent or meaning or application of a subsequent clause, nor by inference -therefrom, nor by any subsequent words that are not as clear and decisive as words of the clause giving that estate.” Roseboom v. Roseboom, 81 N. Y. 356 , 359.

In Benson v. Corbin, 145 N. Y. 351 , 40 N. E. 11 , it is said:

“Where there is primarily- a clear and certain devise of a fee, about which the testamentary intention is obvious and without ambiguity, the estate thus ¡given will not be cut down or lessened by subsequent words which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. If a slight circumstance or a slender rea:son will in ordinary cases prevent the application of the general rule [that words referring to ‘death’ are construed to mean ‘death during the lifetime of the testator’], the circumstance or the reason must be strong and decisive where the construction collides with a plain devise in fee, and forces a change of its terms by cutting it down to a lesser estate. We do not easily trade a -certainty for a doubt.
p. 504
Under the rule stated in these cases, the eighth paragraph must be disregarded. Grammatically, it contains nothing of a dispositive character, since it only affects to dispose of a residue in case there is none. If it were sought to import into this paragraph a meaning which its terms refuse to yield, any effort to make use of such constructive meaning to cut down the clear and precise gift of the residue contained in the seventh paragraph would be forbidden by the cases cited.

' So far as personal property was inadequate for the payment of the legacies, the testator charged the same upon his real estate,' and the decree should provide that the rentals which the executor has received under the power given to him by the will be applied to the payment of the legacies.

Decreed accordingly.

Cases cited