Majority
Headnote
1. Master and Servant (§ 117[2] )—Injuries—Negligence—Construction of Elevator.The plaintiff has recovered a verdict for the negligence of the defendant in causing the death of his son, 16 years of age. The defendant is engaged in the business of manufacturing collars and cuffs in the city of Troy, and had in its employ at the time of the accident about 400 servants. The plaintiff as one of such servants was killed in an elevator.
The building in which defendant conducted its operations consisted of two stories and a basement. The elevator traveled in a shaft extending from the basement to the second story. It had no attendant, and was operated by a cable." Whenever any one had occasion to use the elevator, he would pull the cable up or down as the case might be, and thus bring the elevator to the desired floor. This was done without any signal or warning to any one who might chance to be using the elevator at one of the other floors. The floor of the elevator was about five feet square, and its entrance was protected by automatic gates at each floor of the building, which ascended as the elevator ap
I think the evidence justifies the inference that the defendant was negligent in not providing some rule or system which would prevent the attempted simultaneous operation of the elevator by different employés on different floors of the building. It is clear that an accident might happen to one employé properly using the elevator .by the efforts of another employé to operate it at the same time from another floor. And considering the large number of employés, and the extensive nature of the defendant’s business, it should have taken appropriate steps to guard against such a contingency. But the difficulty with the plaintiff’s case is that no connection has been shown between such negligence and the accident. Neither does it appear that the ■deceased was free from contributory negligence. The elevator at the time of the accident was subject to his own operation or manipulation. The only narrative of his conduct is given by a witness called by the plaintiff, who testified that a minute or two before he heard of his ■death he saw him in the basement with the truck. The witness says: “I saw him put the truck on the elevator and ascend upstairs.” If by this statement the witness meant that the deceased rode upstairs on the elevator, he was guilty of contributory negligence, for the evidence shows that he was under specific instructions not to ride on the elevator. If, however, we assume that he walked upstairs after depositing the truck in the elevator, as it was his duty to do, we are then left entirely in the dark as to his conduct on reaching the floor above. It was his duty to there stop the elevator as it approached that floor. Whether inadvertently he allowed it to pass the level of the floor, and was killed in a procrastinated effort to stop it, or whether in some other manner due to his own heedlessness he met his death, we are unable to say. The jury could not say, but could merely speculate and conjecture. It might throw considerable light on the casualty if plaintiff had informed us whether or not the truck was found on the elevator floor with the body of the deceased, for we might then draw an inference as to whether he had brought the elevator to a stop, and re
The rule requiring proof of freedom from contributory negligence is relaxed to the extent that less evidence is required where the victim of the accident has lost his life and no one saw the occurrence. But, nevertheless, there must be some evidence which tends legitimately to prove the fact. In this case there is an absence of any evidence on that point. As we have seen, the plaintiff has not even placed us in possession of facts susceptible of proof. Moreover, this is not a case where freedom from contributory negligence can be .inferred from the nature of the accident itself, for the reason that the operation of the elevator was directly under the control of the deceased, and upon his acts in the management of the same the accident may have de-pended, and it was necessary to show, not necessarily by direct evidence, but by circumstances having at least some probative force, that it was not his act or omission which brought upon himself the unfortunate fatality.
The judgment and order must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.