Majority
Headnote
1. Landlord and Tenant (§ 323[1] )—Cropping Contract—Nature op Relation.It is apparent from the agreement or lease that the defendants McClellan had no right to dictate in what fields, in what manner, or at what time the cattle should be pastured, or what care should be taken of them to prevent their escape. Those matters were left solely with the tenant. He was carrying on the farm, and had exclusive control of the farm and the stock, except as otherwise provided in the lease. The McClellans were only interested in one-half the results which came from his management.
It is not always easy to determine the relative rights of the owner and the occupier of a farm worked on shares. The parties may so formulate the agreement that the occupier is the mere servant of the owner, or the occupant, in other cases, may be the tenant, and the relations subject to all the terms applying to landlord and tenant, except that in place of a money rental the landlord receives half the crop. They may ordinarily be considered as tenants in common of the crops and farm products, which are to be divided, but are not in any sense partners in the business. In this case the parties have chosen to treat their relations as that of landlord and tenant; and, while the lease in many respects is very minute as to what the tenant may or may not do, the same minuteness is substantially found in most cases where a money rental is to be paid. There, usually, the milk is placed in a factory, and the moneys therefrom are paid, in great part, to the landlord until his rent is paid, and other conditions are inserted in
• In Lettis v. Horning, 67 Hun, 627 , 22 N. Y. Supp. 565 , Kelly, by written contract, “took the defendant’s farm for one year from March 1, 1891, to work on shares.” He was to have 20 cows on the farm and 1 bull. It was held that the bull was not left upon the farm for the benefit of the tenant, but the tenant was merely a bailee of it, keeping it there solely for the accommodation of the owner, and apparently- upon that fact alone the liability of the owner rested. We may fairly assume that, if the injury had been committed by one of the leased cows which were upon the farm for the tenant’s benefit, the result would have been otherwise. In Marsh v. Hand, 120 N. Y. 315 , 24 N. E. 463 , Cumber worked the Hands farm on shares for a year. The ram belonging to the Hands was to be.kept on the farm with the sheep, but the tenant was the mere bailee of the ram, receiving no possible benefits from it. It was held that, Cumber having traded the ram off and acquired a vicious ram in its place, the Hands were not liable for injuries committed by it, as the ram was not their property. The assumption that otherwise the Hands would be liable must rest upon the fact that the injury was committed by a ram which was not held for the benefit of the tenant, but. he was simply pasturing and feeding it for the owner and for his benefit the next year. It was not necessary to the decision, and the case is not an authority against the views here expressed. That case shows that the tenant under such a lease’is not a servant of the landlord, but an independent contractor, and that the landlord is not liable for his negligence or the manner in which he performs the duties resting- upon him; the court saying at page 322 of 120 N. Y., page 465 of 24 N. E.:
“While they furnished and left the stock on the farm, and were to have a share in the products, he had the entire responsibility of carrying on the business of working it, and accounting for their share in the results. He was the contractor who undertook to do all this, subject only to the terms of the-contract he had made with them to do it.”
And at page 323 of 120 N. Y., page 465 of 24 N. E.:
“The practical effect of the contract was that the executors should have 'a share of the products by way of compensation for the use of the property, and that Cumber was entitled to the other share as compensation for his labor in performing the contract. No negligence of the latter in the performance of his work to the prejudice of third parties could charge the Hands, with liability.”
The cattle upon the McClellan farm were partly- owned by the tenant and partly by the -landlords, and, if liability were established' against the landlords, it could only be for the amount of damage actually committed by their cattle; it being fairly assumed that all the cows trespassing did about an equal amount of damage. Partenheimer v. Van Order, 20 Barb. 479 ; Wood v. Snider, 187 N. Y. 28 , 79 N. E. 858 , 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 912 .
The judgment of the County Court and justice’s court against the McClellans is therefore reversed, with costs to them in all courts. All concur.
Cases cited
- Van Slyck v. Snell 6 Lans. 299 at 302 p. 824
- Marsh v. Hand 120 N. Y. 315 p. 824
- Partenheimer v. Van Order 20 Barb. 479 p. 825
- Wood v. Snider 187 N. Y. 28 at 79 p. 825