Majority
Headnote
1. Factors (§ 38[2] )—Violation of Instructions—Remedy.Plaintiff brings this action to recover $2,989, with interest and protest fees, on four past-due promissory, notes made payable to his order by the defendants in their copartnership name in the year 1909. Defendants have served an amended answer, which does
The plaintiff has demurred to each of said counterclaims upon the grounds (1) that said counterclaim is insufficient in law upon the face thereof.; (2) that it appears upon the face of said counterclaim that it sets forth a cause of action in tort against a copartnership of which plaintiff was formerly a member, and that it did not arise out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of plaintiff’s claim, and is not connected with the subject of plaintiff’s action; (3) that it appears upon the face of said counterclaim that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the plaintiff.
The question is whether the counterclaims pleaded by defendants, state causes of action on contract in favor of defendants against the plaintiff. Code Civ. Proc. § 501. The question is not whether on the facts pleaded the plaintiff could be made liable in trover as for conversion. Clearly the pleader states merely a disregard of instructions on the part of plaintiff’s firms, and has not alleged in terms conversion, fraud, willful misconduct, or wrongful act, nor undertaken to treat-such firms as tort-feasors, as the rule seems to permit him to do in cases where the commission merchant sells in violation of principal’s instructions. Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Mather, 181 N. Y. 205 , 73 N. E. 987 . Even if, upon the facts alleged, a cause of action in tort might be read into the pleading, every intendment is in favor of construing the counterclaims as being in contract. Goodwin v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 639 . And,, where the tort is waived, the debt may be counterclaimed in an action on contract. Conyngham v. Shiel, 20 Misc. Rep. 590 , 46 N. Y. Supp. 374 ; Slade v. Montgomery, 53 App. Div. 343 , 65 N. Y. Supp. 709 .
Defendants allege that plaintiff assumed and agreed to pay merely the “obligations” of his former firms. The word “obligation” has been given wide and varied meanings, being limited, on one hand, to-sealed instruments of a certain kind only, and extended, on the other, to include all legal duties. 29 Cyc. 1308. Giving the word the meaning now commonly assigned to it in law, it implies no more than a cause of action evidenced by a writing and would not extend to an unliquidated liability, sounding in tort. Munzinger v. United Press, 52 App. Div. at p. 341, 65 N. Y. Supp. 194 ; Thorn v. Hall, 10 App. Div. 412 , 41 N. Y. Supp. 1054 , affirmed 160 N. Y. 661 , 55 N. E. 1101 . But in disposing of the demurrer it is fair to assume that the pleader used the wqrd in the wider sense. For mere faults -of- indefiniteness the remedy is by motion under Code Civ. Proc. § 546. Marie v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14 .
The demurrer is overruled, with costs, but plaintiff may withdraw his demurrer and reply on payment of the costs of the demurrer.
Judgment accordingly.
Cases cited
- Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Mather 181 N. Y. 205 p. 696
- Conyngham v. Shiel 20 Misc. Rep. 590 p. 696
- Scott v. Rogers 31 N. Y. 676 p. 697
- Spofford v. Rowan 124 N. Y. 108 p. 697
- Colgrove v. Tallman 67 N. Y. 95 p. 697
- Marie v. Garrison 83 N. Y. 14 p. 697