Majority
Headnote
1. Easements (§ 17[1] )—Acquisition—Conveyances.The question presented by this appeal is whether or not ' the commissioners of estimate and assessment were justified in valuing the property of the Hunt’s Point Realty Company, lying in the bed of Edgewater avenue, and taken in this proceeding as land incumbered with private easements for light, air, and access in favor of adjacent property fronting on the road. The respondent claims that it is entitled to be awarded the full value of the land, as if unincumbered by any easement, and available to its owner for any use whatever. There is no question of dedication to the public, and no such dedication is claimed to have been made.
The sole question is whether the street when taken had been burdened by private easements, for it is manifest that, if so burdened, its value to the owner would be quite different and much less than its value would have been if wholly unincumbered. Matter of 116th Street, 1 App. Div. 436 , 37 N. Y. Supp. 508 ; Matter of the City of New York, Decatur Street, 196 N. Y. 286 , 89 N. E. 829 . The circumstances under which this question arises are as follows: The Hunt’s Point Realty Company owned a tract of land comprising the property to be acquired in this proceeding for Edgewater road, and all the lots on both sides of the road and abutting thereon. The Edgewater road was a street duly laid out on the city map, and proceedings to acquire it were initiated on February 8, 1907, by the adoption by the board of estimate and apportionment of the customary resolution directing the corporation counsel to take the necessary steps. Commissioners of estimate and assessment were appointed on May 27, 1907. While these proceedings were pending, and in contemplation of a proposed sale by the realty company of its property, the said company opened negotiations with the city of New York, which resulted on May 1," 1908, in an agreement that, if the city of New York would take the necessary steps to vest title in the city of New York prior to June 12, 1908, the company would (1) waive interest in any award that might be made for the taking of the property; (2) pay the assessments levied upon each and every lot owned by the company at the time of the agreement, regardless of whether or not the lands were owned by it at the time the assessments became liens; and (3) pay 86% per cent, of the commissioners’ fees and of the expenses and disbursements of the pending condemnation proceeding, excepting the amount of the awards made for the taking of lands required to be taken by the city of New York. A bond was to be given by the company to insure the performance of this contract. It is not very apparent how the city of New York gained any advantage from this agreement. It saved interest on the awards from the time of vesting title until the date of this confirmation of the commissioners’ report, but the early vesting of title was to be for the benefit of the company. For the rest it was of no consequence to the city who paid the assessments, whether the
The reason for inducing the city to enter into this agreement is frankly conceded by the realty company. It desired to sell its land while the proceedings were pending, but was “familiar with the law of this state to the effect that completed sales of property made by means of a map showing lots as fronting upon proposed streets, one of which was the very street in process of acquirement by the city of New York, would, if said sale was made and the deed given prior to the vesting of title in the city of New York, create private easements in favor of the grantees, which private easements, in turn, would reduce the award to be made for the portion of the property to be acquired for said Edgewater road from a substantial to a nominal amount.” The object in having an early date fixed for vesting title in the city was that the company might so frame its contracts for the sale of the property that the sales would not be completed until after title had vested in the city, so that, at the date of vesting of title, the company would be the owner of record of both the street and the lots abutting thereon. In fulfillment of the above mentioned contract, the board of estimate and apportionment adopted the requisite resolution to vest title in the city on June 2, 1907. Up to this time, the realty company had filed no map of its property showing the proposed streets which subdivided it. It had, however, caused such a map to be prepared, and on May 12, 1908, held an auction sale of its property or a part thereof. This sale was advertised and made with reference to a map, which was1 widely advertised and distributed, and displayed at the sale, upon which the company’s property was shown as subdivided by streets, and with the property abutting on said streets laid out in numbered lots. On this map Edgewater road was depicted, and of the lots sold a number were among those shown on the map as fronting on Edge-water road. The terms of sale, which constituted the contract of sale between the company and the purchasers, fixed June 12, 1908, as the date upon which the deeds of the property were to be delivered and possession of the property taken over by the vendees. This was 10 days after title to the property had vested in the city. The respondent contends that, by reason of the foregoing facts, it has avoided the operation of the rule which would have entitled it to only nominal awards if title to the city had vested after title to the abutting lots had passed to the purchasers. In so contending, however, the respondent gives more heed to the letter of the rule than to its reason, and fails to give due weight to the nature and effect of a contract for the sale of real estate. The question we have to consider is as to the rights of the purchasers of lots from the realty company who held contracts of purchase on the day that title to the street passed to the city. One of the commonest and best recognized methods of creating private easements over projected streets is to sell lots abutting thereon by reference to a map showing the streets as projected (Lord
The order appealed from must therefore be reversed with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion for the confirmation of the commissioners’ report granted, with $10 costs.
INGRAHAM, P. J. I dissent for the reasons stated in the opinion of Houghton, J., in Matter of West 177th St., 135 App. Div. 520 , 120 N. Y. Supp. 354 .
Cases cited
- In re Opening One Hundred & Sixteenth Street 1 App. Div. 436 p. 932
- In re the City of New York 196 N. Y. 286 p. 932
- Lord v. Atkins 138 N. Y. 184 p. 934
- Gates v. De La Mare 142 N. Y. 307 p. 934
- Williams v. Haddock 145 N. Y. 144 p. 934
- Hathaway v. Payne 34 N. Y. 92 p. 934