Majority
Headnote
Chattel Moetgages (§ 250[2] )—Breach—Provision to Pay Money in Installments.An order to show cause.was heretofore granted by one of the justices of this court, returnable this day, why an order should not be granted herein setting aside the writ of seizure made herein on August 27, 1910, and why an order should not be made directing the plaintiff, his attorney, the sheriff of the county of New York, or his deputy, to relinquish possession of the goods and chattels named in said writ, and why such goods and chattels should not be-, delivered over into the custody of the defendants, and why the defendants should not have such other and further relief in the premises as to the court may seem just and proper.
It appears from the papers submitted upon the motion that the plaintiff’s assignor sold goods, wares, and merchandise contained in-the premises No. 1007 Southern Boulevard, borough of the Bronx, in the city of New York, to one Jennie Abramson, defendants’ assignor, for a consideration; that said Jennie Abramson, as collateral security for the payment of the sum of $1,300, made and executed and delivered to the said plaintiff’s assignor a chattel mortgage covering the property so sold and delivered, which chattel mortgage was duly recorded in the proper office in the city of New York, and was given to secure the payment of 12 promissory notes, one in the sum of $500, due August 17, 1910, with interest, and the remaining payable, respectively, in the sum of $75 each, on the 17th day of each month thereafter until the full amount is paid, with the exception that the last note is in the sum of $50, due July 17, 1911. Said mortgage-given to secure said notes provided, upon condition that if the said; party of the first part shall and do well and truly pay unto the said! party of the second part, her executors, administrators, and assigns, the sum of $1,300 in installments as aforesaid,' then these presents shall be void. And the said party of the first part, for herself, her executors, administrators, and assigns, does covenant and agree to and with the said party of the second part, her executors, administrators,, and assigns, that, in case default shall be made in the payment of the-said sum above mentioned, then it shall and may be lawful for, and1 the said party of the first part does hereby authorize, said party of the second part, her executors, administrators, and assigns, with the-aid and assistance of any person or persons, to enter her dwelling house, store, and other premises, and such other place or places as-the said goods and chattels are or may be placed, and take and carry
The defendant contends that, although she has defaulted in the payment of said first note, a writ of seizure couldl not be issued against said property, for the reason that the conditions of said mortgage or the covenants therein contained do not warrant it. Thus a serious question is presented to me as to whether, when a' mortgage is made in the manner herein described," and a default occurs in the payment of one of said notes, the plaintiff under said mortgage can take possession of said property. The plaintiff contends that irrespective of said mortgage failing to contain a clause “that upon the failure to pay any one of said installments mentioned therein the whole amount, upon default in payment of one of said notes, becomes due immediately,” and cites numerous authorities to uphold his contention; but from an examination of one of them I find that he has not fully read the authority quoted as written by the learned judge. Counsel also cites Baumann v. Cornez, 15 Daly, 450 -452, 8 N. Y. Supp. 480 , 481. Judge Bischoff, in writing the opinion, said:
“A stipulation in a chattel mortgage that upon default in the payment of the sum secured, or any installment thereof, or upon the removal of the chattel without the consent of the mortgagee, the mortgage debt remaining unpaid shall at once become due and payable without demand, and if not paid the mortgagee may proceed to take possession, is not unconscionable, and contravenes no law or rule of public policyand upon such default the mortgagee’s right to possession accrues without prior demand for payment of the mortgage debt. * * * And this mortgage also contained a clause that upon default in the payment of the sum secured or of any part thereof or any of the installments thereof, or in case of any attempt to remove or secrete or to sell or dispose of the mortgaged chattels or any part thereof; * * * also that the mortgagee might, whether any installment was due and unpaid or not, take possession of the chattels at any time and retain the same to his own use and benefit, in which latter case, however, the mortgagee should return to the mortgagor all moneys then actually paid by the mortgagor on account of the mortgage debt, after first deducting from such moneys a reasonable sum for cartage and for the depreciation of the chattels from use.”
The conditions herein above recited, giving unto the mortgagee power to remove and take said property, were, first, upon default in the payment of. the sum secured or of any part thereof, or. second, any of the installments thereof; but the mortgage upon which the motion is predicated contains no such provisions, as the only condition that can be spelled out wherein said mortgagee can seize said property is contained in the following clause, to" wit: “That in case default shall be made in the payment of the said sum above mentioned, then it shall and may be lawful” for the said party "of the first part, etc., to seize said property, which could not mean anything else except upon the failure to pay the principal, $1,300, secured by said notes. Robinson v. Wilcox, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 160 ; Halstead v. Swartz, 46 How. Prac. 289. The breach of the mortgagee’s contract ■does not occur until the last note first, becomes due and pay able,., and the plaintiff cannot, in the absence of a special provision in said mort
For the reasons herein stated, the motion to vacate the writ of { -seizure is granted. /
Motion granted,
Cases cited
- William Wharton, Jr., & Co. v. Winch 140 N. Y. 287 p. 1015