People v. Redwood

in question was of the breed commonly used in hunting deer, and the learned trial court by a very fair and impartial charge explained and submitted! that question to the jury. In the course of his charge, however, he said that intent to violate the statute was an element that must be proved to recover a penalty under the statute in question. At the close of the charge, an exception was taken to such instruction, and the plaintiff’s counsel asked the court to further charge that such intent might be drawn from the circumstances, and need not be specifically proven. The court modified the charge in this regard, apparently to the satisfaction of plaintiff’s counsel. Thereupon the defendant’s counsel requested the court to further charge that the acts must be such as to show that there was an intent to violate the law, or to perform an act prohibited by law, and the court so charged! to which the plaintiff excepted.

We are of opinion the learned court fell into error in charging the request of either of the counsel to the effect that intent to violate was a necessary element of violation or incurring of the penalty. In an action for a penalty for the doing of a prohibited act, the question of defendant’s intent in doing the act is immaterial. People v. Snyder, 90 App. Div. 422 , 86 N. Y. Supp. 415 . One can commit a crime even like selling milk below the standard prescribed by law without knowing that it is below the standard, and without intending to violate the law. People v. Kibler, 106 N. Y. 321 , 12 N. E. 795 .

The court also charged, at the request of defendant’s counsel, that the defendant had a legal right to pursue with the dog in question foxes on the private lands of his employer by his direction, without incurring any penalty in so doing, and counsel strenuously maintains that such charge was correct. The defendant was superintendent of a very large private park in the Adirondacks. If the dog was of the breed commonly used in hunting deer, the defendant had ho right to let him run at large on his employer’s land or anywhere else in the Adirondack preserve. While the owner of a private park owns his' land and has been given great privileges by the Legislature with, respect to fishing and hunting thereon, the wild game roaming over it belongs to the people of the state, and they have the right for the purpose of protecting game in general to make -proper regulations as to time and manner of hunting and killing. If the dog was of the breed commonly used in hunting deer, the defendant had no more right to let him loose'on the preserve of his employer than he had to kill out of season the deer which happened to be on the lands of his employer. As the statute stood at the time of the alleged violation, if the dog was not of the breed commonly used for hunting deer, or was one of another breed not trained or which would not pursue deer, the defendant had the right to hunt, foxes with him by direction of his employer or otherwise. In the light of the main charge of the court, the request was doubtless understood by him to refer only .to the right of the defendant to hunt foxes with a dog which would not pursue deer. The language of the request, however, is so broad that the jury might have understood the instruction to be that the defendant had the right, at the direction of his employér, to hunt foxes with the particu

lar dog in question whether he was of the kind commonly used in hunting deer or not, and we cannot say that they did not so interpret it.

It follows that the judgment must be reversed and! a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.