Youngs v. Wedderspoon

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in justice’s court in the town of Middlefield, in this county, on the 15th day of June, 1908, in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $200 damages and $3.10 costs. The action was commenced for the purpose of recovering articles of personal property of the alleged value of $200, consisting of pool tables, chairs, glasses, canned goods, liquors", cigars, pictures, and furniture, which were in a certain saloon known as the “Stone Jug,” in the village of Cooperstown, levied upon and sold by virtue of executions in favor of B. W. Hoye and Frank Pattridge by the defendant as sheriff of Otsego county.

It appears that one A. V. Bowne had been conducting this saloon for about three years and a half, and that he continued as proprietor of the same until April 30,1908, the date of the expiration of the lease. Some time prior to the 27th day of January, 1908, actions had been duly .commenced by Hoye and Pattridge to recover the purchase price of supplies furnished to said Bowne, and were returnable on the 28th and.29th days.of January, at which time each of said• plaintiffs recovered judgment. On the 27th day of January, one and two days,respectively, prior to the return day of the above causes, Bowne ex- ■ ecuted and delivered a bill of sale of the property in the saloon above described to his father-in-law, A. E. Youngs, this plaintiff, the consideration expressed therein being the sum of $200, and this bill of sale was filed in Otsego county clerk’s office, on the same day. On the 3d day of February following, executions were duly issued upon the judgments mentioned, and placed in the hands of the sheriff, the appellant herein, who caused a levy to be made upon the articles of personal property mentioned, took possession of the same, and sold the same at public auction by virtue of said executions on the 6th day of April, .the sale thereof having first been forbidden by Youngs, he claiming title thereto under the said bill of sale.

The appellant contends that the alleged transfer was made with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, and is void as against Hoye and Pattridge as creditors, and is also fraudulent and void against them as judgment creditors. It appears from the evidence that the respondent Youngs was the father-in-law of Bowne, and his testimony is that the conversation relating to the bill of sale took place at the saloon, and “that Bowne wanted to know if he would buy” and said he would, and did make bargain for goods for $200, and paid the money and Bowne gave bill of sale. Exhibit A in evidence.

Bowne, who was called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified that the pictures were hanging on the walls, pool tables were used, liquor decanters, cigars, and canned goods were back of the bar, and in the cases, and were in the same place they were on the 27th day of Jan

Sheriff Wedderspoon, who was called as a witness by both of the parties, testified that he was present when the levy was made, and the inventory of the goods taken, and that he found Bowne in possession and in charge; that all the goods claimed by the plaintiff were in .their usual and customary place in and about the saloon, and were being used in the business of operating it. Thus we have not only the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness Bowne, but the testimony of the sheriff as well, that Bowne was in possession of the property at the time of the levy. It is provided by section 35 of the personal property law (Laws 1909, c. 45 [Consol. Laws, c. 41]):

“Every transfer of any interest in personal property or income, made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or others of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, and every bond or other evidence of debt given, suit commenced, or decree or judgment suffered with such intent, is void as against every person so hindered, delayed or defrauded.”

Again, it is provided by section 36 of this same statute:

“That every sale of goods and chattels in the possession or under the control of the vendor, and every assignment of goods and chattels by way of security or on any condition, but not constituting a mortgage, nor intended to operate as a mortgage, unless accompanied by immediate delivery followed by actual and continued change of possession, is presumed to be fraudulent and void against all persons who are creditors of the vendor, or persons making the sale or assignment including all persons who are his creditors at any time while such goods or chattels remain in his possession or under his control, or subsequent purchasers of such goods and chattels in good faith; and is conclusive evidence of such fraud, unless it appear on the part of the person claiming under the sale or assignment, that it was made in good faith, and without intent to defraud such creditors or purchasers.”

It has been held that none but established creditors of, and subsequent purchasers from, a vendor of chattels, are allowed the benefit of this section, or permitted to allege fraud under this section, so as to invalidate a sale, valid as between the parties. Clute v. Fitch, 25 Barb. 428 ; Frisbey v. Thayer, 25 Wend. 396 ; Skilton v. Codington, 86 App. Div. 166 , 83 N. Y. Supp. 351 . But this section 36 expressly includes among creditors those who are such at any time while the goods remain in the vendor’s possession, or under his control. Stimson v. Wrigley, 86 N. Y. 332 ; Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 115 , 8 N. E. 392 , 57 Am. Rep. 701 ; Knight v. Forward, 63 Barb. 311 ; Wallace v. Nodine, 57 Hun, 239 , 10 N. Y. Supp. 919 .

No reason appears to -have been assigned why the transfer of this property from Bowne to his father-in-law was made one day prior to the rendition of the judgment against Bowne on the Hoye action, and two days prior to the rendition of the judgment in the Pattridge action. There is very little evidence in the case in relation to the transaction, nor does it appear that Bowne and his father-in-law stood in relation of debtor and creditor. Even in order to make a transfer

„ It is claimed by plaintiff that he paid Bowne $200 for the goods and stock, but not the slightest evidence appears in the case at to what became of the money or that Bowne paid any of his debts. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show the bona fides of the sale, but there is no such evidence in the case. It also appears, and is practically undisputed, that Bowne remained in possession of the saloon, in possession of the property, and conducted the business down to the expiration of his lease and license.

It has been said that an honest purchaser buys because he wants the property, and its possession, and therefore, naturally, and usually takes it. The absence of this fact indicates some purpose different than that of an honest purchaser, and likewise proof of good faith and honest intention.- The business continued in the name of Bowne, the goods were in and about the place the same at the time of the levy as they were at the time of the execution of the bill of sale, the sign was on the door, and no act or thing was done to intimate ownership in Youngs. There is no law which requires the filing of an unconditional bill of sale, but the statute does say that there must be an immediate and continuous change of possession of the things sold. Continued use of property transferred by an insolvent debtor is a badge of fraud, and the absence of any evidence of transfer, purchase, or control indicates some purpose different from that of an honest purchaser, and requires proof of good faith and honest intention. Hickok v. Cowperthwait, 134 App. Div. 620 , 119 N. Y. Supp. 390 . The sale must be accompanied by actual and continued change of possession as well as by a nominal and constructive change. The burden of showing this is on the plaintiff. No such evidence appears in this case, nor from which the justice before whom this cause was tried could have found such, a question of fact in favor of the plaintiff. Siedenbach v. Riley, 111 N. Y. 568 , 19 N. E. 275 .

It was held in Sjoberg v. Field, 50 Misc. Rep. 412 , 100 N. Y. Supp. 531 , that in-an action to set aside a bill of sale made by defendant to his mother that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, it appearing that the mother left the son in full possession and control of the property after the bill of sale had been made, executed, and filed, and the son continued to conduct the business as before, merely adding the word “agent” to his name. A similar case to this is found in 19 Misc. Rep. 163 , 43 N. Y. Supp. 281 , Rheinfeldt v. Dahlman, where one brother purchased of another a butcher shop, and it appears the vendee left the vendor in charge of the market, but went further than this plaintiff did. He called at the market early mornings, and again in the evening, talcing the cash, and closing the store! McAdam, Judge, in his opinion, says:

“These facts do not establish the actual and continued change of possession contemplated by the statute. To take the case out of the statute, the acts of the parties must have been of such a character as to unequivocably place the property within the power, and under the exclusive dominion, of the buyer, and the change of possession necessarily is an open and public one, which is

to continue and be manifested by outward and visible signs, such as to render it evident that the possession of the judgment debtor has entered, for he must cease from his apparent as well as real ownership.”

The immediate delivery followed by actual and continued change of possession required by the statute to prevent the creation of the presumption of fraud has been construed and declared by the courts to mean the actual delivery and open public change of possession, to be continued and manifested by outward and visible signs, such as rendered it evident that possession and the apparent as well as the real ownership of the vendor is ended. Allen v. Gray, 63 Misc. Rep. 219 , 115 N. Y. Supp. 931 . While it is true that a change of property made in good faith to secure an antecedent debt is not necessarily fraudulent, the mere proof that it was so given does not as a matter of law disprove the existence of fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor. This is clearly so when other circumstances exist which indicate that real purpose of the transfer was to hinder creditors in the collection of their just claims, and epable the assignor or vendor to still control and make use of such property for his own benefit. Cole v. Tyler, 65 N. Y. 73 ; Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 71 , 45 Am. Rep. 160 . The use that is made of assigned property and the acts of the parties to such an assignment in connection with it furnishes valuable data to judge of the motive, and intent with which it was executed. Forbes v. Waller, 25 N. Y. 430 .

The bill of sale was not accompanied by an immediate delivery followed by actual and continued change of possession. The sign on the door was not changed, the goods left in the possession of the vendor, no claim made by the plaintiff that the business was his to any one, and there is no evidence in the case of the good faith and honest intention of the parties. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the entire transaction was a mere contrivance to save this property from the lien of judgments about to be rendered in favor of. Hoye and Pattridge, and to hinder and delay them in the collection of just and honest obligations. It follows that the judgment redovered by this plaintiff herein should be reversed.

Judgment reversed, with costs.