•deceased, and for the benefit of the estate, in consideration that plaintiffs would sell certain building materials to Winberg, and for the benefit of the •estate and in its name, and not intending to render himself formally liable, as the plaintiffs well knew, he guaranteed and promised to be answerable for the payment of the price of materials to be sold to the amount of $7,330 -and no more; that the materials were to be delivered at certain buildings ■of which the testator had died seised and possessed, and which his said executors held in trust. He denies that he ever made, either as executor as ■ aforesaid or individually, any guaranty, except for the said sum, which has ■been fully paid.
At the close of plaintiffs’ case, defendant moved for dismissal, on the ■grounds, first, that the papers on their face are an obligation of the estate, ■and not the defendant personally; and, second, that the guaranty is to pay the amounts due under a contract between Winberg and these plaintiffs, and the only proof of any contract is that for the $7,330, and the receipts are in full therefor. The motion was denied under exception, but after the defend- . ant’s opening the court said that if the second guaranty, made in February, 1906, was a continuation of the first guaranty, and if the goods were not ■delivered to Mr. Winberg—if he was not in charge of the work—that the defendant could not he bound. The court further said that the second guaranty sufficiently referred to the first guaranty, and undoubtedly referred to the $7,330, which was the subject of the contract with Winberg. And after further discussion the court said: “I am inclined to hold that under this •second guaranty * * * there is no personal liability of this defendant.” Wherefore it granted the motion to dismiss, under exception.
Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and THOMAS, JENKS, WOODWARD, and CARR, JJ.J. Stewart Ross, for appellants.
Rufus O. Catlin (James C. Cropsey, on the brief), for respondent.
We think that the “second guaranty” may be regarded as an order upon the plaintiffs to furnish materials of the kind required by the contract of Winberg, but to be delivered in the name of—i. e., to—the estate of Charles W. Smith. Payment is promised, not only for the materials furnished, but for those to be furnished, and payment is guaranteed as before; i. e., as the work progresses. It is true that the plaintiff pleads on a guaranty; but we may gather from the complaint that the materials were to be delivered at certain specified buildings (which it appears were the property of the estate), and, as we have said, the “second guaranty” indicates that there was .a direct order for delivery to the estate. We think, then, that the circumstances admit a consideration that this undertaking was original in its character. See Ward v. Hasbrouck, 169 N. Y. 407 , 62 N. E. 434 . The action was properly brought against the defendant personally. New v. Nicoll, 12 Hun, 431 , affirmed 73 N. Y. 127 , 29 Am. .Rep. 111 , and authórities cited.
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial is granted; costs to abide the event. All concur, except HIRSCHBERG, P. J., who dissents.