Majority
Headnote
1. Dead Bodies (§ 9[1] )—Right of Possession—Civil Liability fob Illegal Acts—Damages.This is an action by a parent to recover damages for the wrongful and unlawful dissection of the remains of her son, and for the wrongful and unlawful removal and detention of parts of the remains. On the 2d day of April, 1907, one Frank Hassard, the plaintiff’s son, a coach driver of the age of 28 years, while driving a coach returning from a funeral, was thrown from the coach in. 106th street, in the borough of Manhattan, New York, by an obstruction projecting from a building that was being erected adjacent to the street. He was removed to a drug store in the vicinity, and an ambulance was summoned, and he was taken to the Harlem Hospital, where he arrived at 8:30 p. m., and died at 10 minutes before midnight. The defendant performed an autopsy on the body, and removed the heárt and spleen, and cut them into many pieces, and had them preserved in alcohol in a jar in his office, and he refused on demand of a sister of the decedent made at the instance of the plaintiff to replace them in the body from which he had removed them. It was conceded that the decedent was unmarried, had no children, and resided with the plaintiff, who was his mother, and that upon her rested the obligation to bury the remains, and that she “had a right to bring this action.” It also appeared that it was known that the decedent left a mother and relatives, and their whereabouts was known, but their consent to the autopsy was neither requested nor obtained. It further appears that complaint was made to Cor'oner Plarburger in behalf of the plaintiff, and that he summoned the defendant and inquired why the autopsy was made when the death was not involved in mystery, and there was no suspicion concerning it, and the only explanation offered by the defendant was that the decedent had a greatly enlarged spleen, and it was an interesting case. The defendant did not even claim to have been directed by a coroner to hold an autopsy. He merely asserted that it was “his privilege to make the dissection.” It appears that the plaintiff became aware of the fact that the body had been dissected and these organs removed and not replaced, and that she was greatly distressed thereby. A certificate made by Coroner Dooley, to the effect that he had taken charge of the remains ori the 3d day of April, 1907, and was holding an inquest thereon was offered in evidence, together with a certificate made by the defendant, signed “T. D. Lehane, Coroner’s Physician,” certifying that the decedent died on the 2d day of April, 1907, and “that the cause of his death was abdominal hemorrhage, rupture of spleen; fell off a carriage.”
The plaintiff on the facts stipulated had a legal right to the possession of the corpse of her son in the condition it was in at the instant of death for the purpose of preserving and burying the remains, and without her consent, or statutory authority therefor, no one had a right to deprive her of such possession, or to dissect or. otherwise mutilate the body of her son, and the law gives her a cause of action to
It is contended, however, on the part of the respondent that he is protected by certain local statutes. Section 2 of chapter 833 of the ■ Laws of 1873 authorized a coroner “when necessary, to employ not more than two competent surgeons to make post mortem examinations and dissections, and to testify to the same, the compensation therefor to be a county charge.” Section 1773 of the consolidation act (chapter 410, Laws 1882), which it is claimed, and we have as- - sumed without examination, because we find nothing in it to sustain the claim made thereunder by the respondent, was still in force, provided as follows:
“When In the city of New York any person shall die from criminal violence or by a casualty, or suddenly, when in apparent health,.or when unattended by a physician, or in prison, or in a suspicious or unusual manner, the coroner shall subpoena one of the coroner’s physicians,, who shall view the body of such deceased person externally, or make an autopsy thereon as may be
required. It shall be the duty of the physician to whom such subpoena is so issued, to make the inspection and autopsy required and to give evidence in relation thereto at the coroner’s inquest. The testimony of such physician and that of any other witnesses that the coroner shall find necessary shall constitute an inquest.”"
It would seem that there was no ground even for doubting that the decedent’s death was due to the fall from the seat of the coach upon the pavement, and that viewing the remains without an autopsy should have sufficed. Assuming, however, that the coroner, if acting in good faith, would have had a right under the provisions of this section of the consolidation act to hold an inquest to determine the cause of death as provided in the statute, still there is no evidence here that the coroner subpoenaed the defendant for the purpose of viewing the body 'of the decedent, or of making the autopsy, and there is no evidence of any direction by or authority from the coroner to dissect the body to any extent whatever. Doubtless, if the defendant made the autopsy by the direction of the coroner, that would justify the dissection of the body (Statutes, supra; People v. Fitzgerald, 105 N. Y. 146 , 152, 11 N. E. 378 , 59 Am. Rep. 483 ; Crisfield v. Perine, 15 Hun, 202 , affirmed 81 N. Y. 622 ), but it would not, in the absence of further directions from the coroner or district attorney, or other evidence, warrant the removal or detention of any part of the body.
It is contended that, since it was unlawful and would constitute a misdemeanor for the defendant to dissect the body without authority from the coroner, such authority must be presumed. It appears, however, that the defendant did not claim to the plaintiff’s daughter, or to Coroner Harburger, that he was authorized to dissect the body by any coroner, and therefore there can be no presumption that he was so authorized, even if such presumption would otherwise prevail, as to which we deem it unnecessary to express an opinion.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
CLARKE, MILLER, and DOWLING, JJ., concur. INGRAHAM,. P. J., concurs in result.
Cases cited
- Foley v. Phelps 1 App. Div. 551 p. 163
- Jackson v. Savage 109 App. Div. 556 p. 163
- People v. Fitzgerald 105 N. Y. 146 at 152, 11 p. 164