Majority
Headnote
1. Appeal and Error (§ 1001[2] )—Verdict—Conclusiveness.This is a statutory action to recover for the death of Edward Anderson, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, a domestic building corporation. The defendant had the contract for furnishing and erecting the structural ironwork on the building known as the City Investment Building, at the southwesterly corner of Broadway and Cortlandt street, extending through to Church street, in the borough of Manhattan, New York, the dimensions of which are 311 feet by 130 or 140 feet, and the decedent was in its employ, classified as an ironworker. The accident occurred on the 22d day of June, 1907. At that time the structural ironwork had been completed to the sixth floor and partly above that point.
The defendant employed a general superintendent and two assistant superintendents, one for the easterly and the other for the westerly half of the building. Under the superintendent and assistant superintendents, the employes were divided into small gangs of from five to seven or eight men, performing separate functions, under the immediate direction of a “pusher” or foreman. There were six erecting, or derrick, gangs, three employed on the easterly and three on the westerly half of the building. Each of these gangs had a derrick operated by steam power from an engine in the basement or at the ground floor, and their duties were to hoist the iron' girders, columns,
On the day in question the derrick used by decedent’s gang was on the sixth floor, where it had been used for some time. It was evidently a very high derrick, for it had a boom 75 or 80 feet long, and, while it was necessary to lower and raise the boom and swing it from right to left at times, it is to be inferred that it was not necessary to move the derrick after it had once been placed in position on a given floor. Perpendicular column beams had been installed, extending up to the ninth floor, but the horizontal column beams to connect them had not been put in place. Edwards announced to the members of his gang his intention to hoist three column beams to connect the upright columns in the same panel on the seventh, eighth, and ninth-floors, and the boom of the derrick was swung to the proper position for the performance of this work. The column beams were on the sixth floor, and were about 15 feet in length, 1 foot in depth, as they would be in place in the floor, and they had flanges at the top- and bottom about 5 inches in width, and the web was about % of an inch in thickness, and weighed from 600 to 800 pounds. A sling was passed around one of the beams and the fall was attached, and the beam was hoisted to the seventh floor, Edwards riding upon it and signaling the bellman with respect to swinging and lowering it into place. The upright column beams were about 14 inches thick by 20 or 22 inches wide, and on the sides to which these horizontal' column beams were to be attached they had flanges extending out from 5 to 7 inches, and between these flanges at the respective floor lines lugs were attached to the column beams of the same width as the
The action is sought to be maintained under the employer’s liability act (Consol. Laws, c. 31) on the theory that the pusher was a superintendent, or engaged in superintendence, within the meaning of that statute, and that he was guilty of négligence in detaching the fall from the beam which had been put in place at the seventh floor before bolts were inserted through the ends of it and secured by nuts. The learned trial justice carefully confined the evidence to this issue, and he submitted to the jury on the evidence, which was conflicting, the question as to whether Edwards’ principal duties were those of superintendence, and instructed the jury by a very clear and impartial charge that this was the only theory upon which the liability of the defendant could be predicated. No ruling of the learned trial justice in receiving or excluding evidence, or in instructing the jury, is questioned or questionable. Therefore, if the plaintiff presented a prima facie case, the judgment can be disturbed only upon the theory that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. On that question we are of opinion that the verdict should not be permitted to stand. There was testimony given in behalf of the plaintiff to the effect that Edwards’ order “All off,” when he was about to unhook the sling from the first beam which had been hoisted, meant that the bellman ■ should signal the engineer to lower the hoist, and that the other beam should be hoisted at once to the eighth floor, and also to the effect that he added to the words “All off” language constituting an express instruction to hoist the other beam. Many witnesses, however, including Edwards, testified that he gave no order or instructions other than by using the expression “All off”; and this is quite probable, for the other men of his gang understood their duties and what was desired without further instructions. The bellman, after giving various conflicting versions of what Edwards said, concedes that if Edwards said nothing but “All off,” he would understand that it was his duty, without further order, to signal the engineer to lower the fall, and that the other members of the gang would then proceed with the work, and that according to the usual course of business in the performance of this. routine work daily, without any signal from the hookers-on or any one else, he would signal the engineer to lift the load when it appeared to him to be ready to be lifted, as he did on this occasion. Moreover, it is apparent from his testimony that the accident was caused either by his giving a signal to hoist the column at full speed before the decedent and Cunningham were in a position to steady and guide it, or by the failure of the decedent to perform his duty to guide it. It is manifest that such a weight suspended on a cable from the boom of a derrick from 60 to 80 feet above would sway and swing if hoisted rapidly unless carefully started and guided, and this was the purpose for which the guy rope was intended. It does appear that occasionally in hoisting such girders the ball came in contact with and bumped a beam, girder, or column, and while it may be that the force of the contact between the ball and this beam, or between the other beam and it, was not sufficient to tear the beam
We are of opinion, also, that the notice served in an attempt to comply with the requirements of the employer’s liability act was insuEcient. The notice states the alleged negligent cause of death, but it fails to state the physical cause thereof. It gives notice that on the 22d day of June, 1907, on the premises situated on the southeast corner of Church and Cortlandt streets—the building ran through from Broadway to Church street—in the borough of Manhattan, New York, where certain building operations were being conducted by defendant, the decedent while at work in defendant’s employ “received injuries from which he died,” and the only provision of the notice which has any possible bearing on the physical cause of the injuries is that they were caused by the negligence of the defendant, or of a person or persons in its employ intrusted with and exercising superintendence, or acting as superintendent, “in the operation of a derrick and the placing of a certain beam,” and by reason of the negligence of the defendant or of its superintendent “in the use of improper, unsafe, and inadequate machinery and appliances connected with and used in your said work, and by reason of defects in the ways, works, and machinery connected with and used in your said business.” Under the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Logerto v. Central Building Co., 198 N. Y. 390 , 91 N. E. 782 , this notice appears to be fatally defective in not stating the physical cause of the injuries which resulted in the death of plaintiff’s intestate. We must assume, in view of that decision, that a notice cannot be saved under section 2 of the employer’s liability act on the theory of unintentional inaccuracy with respect to the cause, which has not been prejudicial, where there has been no physical cause stated at all. The defendant duly objected to the admission of the notice in evidence, on the ground that it was insuEcient, and it moved for a nonsuit on the same ground, and at the close of the evidence moved to strike out the notice and for a dismissal of the complaint and for the direction of a verdict on the ground that the notice was insuEcient. We are of opinion that these objections and motions were well founded, and should have been sustained and granted. It is manifest that there is no cause of action at common law on the facts pleaded or proved, for the rea
It follows that the judgment and order should be reversed, with costs, and the complaint should be dismissed, with costs.
INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN and SCOTT, JJ., concur. MILLER, J., concurs on the last ground.
Cases cited
- Logerto v. Central Building Co. 198 N. Y. 390 p. 225