Majority
Headnote
Appeal from Trial Term. Action by James R. Curran against the Lake Champlain & Moriah Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted; with costs to appellant to abide event, on the ground that there was no negligence shown as against the defendant.
dissent, the latter in an opinion.
I dissent. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a brakeman, and had been for several years. On the 14th of August, 1908, he was thrown from the rear car, on which he was standing, by the sudden stopping of a train, without any notice by whistle or otherwise from the engineer that the train was to be stopped. The negligence claimed is the failure of the defendant’s engineer to give any signal of intention to stop the train. The action was tried as one to recover damages, as a common-law action of negligence supplemented by section 42a of the railroad law (Laws 1890, c. 565), added by Laws 1906, c. 657. At the time in question the plaintiff was upon a car known as a “jimmy car,” or ore car, of the defendant. Brakemen had to stand on the running board of jimmy cars. They could not get inside of them. He claimed that before the train left the railroad yard at Port Henry he was told by the conductor to get a link to put in place of a broken one that was on the rear car that he had control of and a new pin at the Y and insert them in the proper place to make connection of the
Dissent
Rule_20 of the defendant, so far as introduced here, is as follows: “Engine Steam Whistle Signals.—One short blast,, stop;, apply brakes. Two short blasts, release brakes.” No steam whistle was sounded, it is conceded, at the time of, or just before, this accident. The plaintiff claims it should have been sounded, and, if it had been sounded, he would have had a chance to secure himself upon the car, and would not have been thrown off. The defendant’s testimony is in substance that sometimes it is sounded in the Y and sometimes it is not; also that there was no occasion for sounding it at this time, as that required the application of the brakes, and there was no occasion for applying brakes. The court submitted the case to the jury very clearly as to .whether the failure to give some kind of warning was negligent on the part of the defendant’s engineer, and also as to whether it was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff to he in the position that he was in. The jury, answering both, found a verdict for the plaintiff, thus finding that the defendant was negligent in the manner complained of and that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. A ease quite similar in principle is Jones v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, 134 App. Div. 40 , 117 N. Y. Supp. 1113 , where the conductor was standing on the platform of a dumping car, and the engineer, without any signal or direction from "the conductor, suddenly stopped the train, throwing the conductor off and injuring him. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff in that action, which was set aside by the trial court and a non-suit granted, which the Appellate Division reversed. Breed v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, 131 App. Div. 492 , 115 N. Y. Supp. 1019 , was an action tried as a common-law negligence action, and under section 42a of the railroad law, the same as this one. The negligence was claimed to be that of the engineer of the train in starting his train too quickly when the signal to him was to start slowly. The plaintiff himself gave the signal to draw ahead slowly, and the engineer disregarded this signal, and started so- suddenly as to throw plaintiff off the end of the car in the rear. The judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed by the Appellate Division. In Inglese v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, 133 App. Div, 198 , 117 N. Y. Supp. 392 , the plaintiff was injured by being hurt "in some way by the approach of one of defendant’s trains. The negligence relied on was the negligence of the foreman to give warning to the workmen of the defendant, of which plaintiff was one, of the approach of the train by saying, “Look out!” The court dismissed the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case, "which was reversed by the Appellate Division. It was held that the question of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence was clearly for the jury. I think that the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence were properly submitted to the jury.
Five doctors were examined during the trial ■upon the question of the extent of the plaintiff’s injury. The plaintiff claims, and his doctors substantiate Mm, that he was injured in such a manner that he had nearly lost control of.one of his legs;.that the leg would not foil