on this second policy fell due September 12, 1873, and was paid on that' day, the assured then living in New York city. Thereafter, and in the spring of 1874, being about to go wTest, the assured handed the policy of insurance and the book to his mother, calling her attention to that part of the book oi; pamphlet specifying the reasons why insurers should prefer the defendant, and reciting that “all of its policies are non-forfeitable. All of its policies are incontestable. It allows 30 days’ grace in payment of premium. ” The assured’s father being aware of these representations of the defendant at that time was possibly the reason why the assured then particularly called the attention of his mother only to them. Thereafter, and in the spring of 1874, the assured went to Wisconsin. On Saturday, the 12th day of September, 1874, the day when, according to the terms of the second policy, the premium was due, at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, the father of the assured, at his home in the upper part of the city of New York, received through the mails a letter from the assured inclosing the money to pay the premium. Belying on the defendant’s representations as to its policies being non-forfeitable and incontestable, and as to 30 days’ grace being allowed in the payment of premiums, etc., and his son having also relied upon the same representations, Mr. Fowler did not on that day take the premium to the defendant. On the following Monday, however, it was tendered, and refused on the ground that it should have been paid the previous Saturday, and that the policy therefore became forfeited. The reliance of the assured upon the representations of the defendant, and the reliance of his father thereupon, as the reason for not having paid such premium on September 12th, was explained to the defendant, but without avail. Thereafter the premium was tendered regularly up to the time of the death of the assured in 1880, after which proofs of death were put in, but rejected. The policy having been assigned to plaintiff, this action was thereafter brought to trial in January, 1885, resulting in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, which, upon an appeal taken by the defendant, was affirmed at general term, ( 41 Hun, 357 ,) but thereafter reversed in the court of appeals, (116 H. Y. 389, 22 H. E. Bep. 576,) upon the grounds that when it is expressly provided that the premium on life insurance policies ' shall be paid on or before a certain day, and in default thereof the policy ' shall be void, the non-payment of the premium on that day works a forfeiture; that it did not appear upon the record as it then stood that the father of the ‘ assured had been induced by the statements contained in the pamphlet issued by the defendant that 30 days’ grace was allowed for the payment of the premium, or that he was misled by such representations, and induced to act ■ as he did, or that the assured had been misled by the defendant’s representations; and that therefore the representations contained in the pamphlet did not modify the terms of the policy, or constitute a waiver of its conditions. Thereafter the action was brought to trial, and the complaint dismissed. 'From the judgment thereupon rendered on his decision, the plaintiff appeals.
Argued before Van Bruñí, P. J. and Daniels, J.Henry C. Wilcox, for appellant. William, H. Arnoux, for respondent.
The action was brought to recover the amount of a policy of life insurance. It was before this court in 1886, when, on account of assurances contained in a pamphlet issued and circulated in defendant’s business, it was concluded that the policy was not forfeited by the failure to pay the interest on the premium notes held by the company, at the time when it became due. There was then evidence before the court from which it could be reasonably inferred that the omission to pay arose out of reliance placed upon ' the statements contained in the pamphlet, and the company was therefore held to be liable to the plaintiff as the assignee of the insurance. Fowler v. Insurance Co., 41 Hun, 357 . But a different view of the case was taken by the court of appeals, which reversed the judgment, ( 116 N. Y. 389 , 22 N. E. Rep.