Majority
Headnote
1. Judgment (§ 720[1] )—Conclusiveness.This is an appeal by defendants, constituting the municipal civil service commission of the city of New York, from an order directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue requiring them to certify the name of relator as coroner’s physician upon the regular monthly pay rolls of the borough of Queens, city of New York, for the months from July to December, 1910, inclusive. The precise question at issue is whether or not relator legally held the office of coroner’s physician in the borough of Queens for the months for which he seeks to be certified.
The office of coroner’s physician is filled by appointment by the coroner. Section 1571, c. 466, Laws 1897 (Greater New York charter) provided that:
“Each of said coroners [being the coroners in the several boroughs] shall possess all the powers and perform all the duties vested in or imposed upon coroners by any existing laws relating to coroners in the city of New York as heretofore known or bounded, or by any law of this state.”
The same provision is preserved in, section 1571 of the Revised Charter of 1901 (Laws 1901, c. 466). By section 1769 of the consolidation act (Laws 1882, c. 410), it was provided that:
“Each coroner of said city [being the former city of New York] shall on assuming office appoint a qualified physician who shall be a resident in said city and shall be known as a coroner’s physician. Any vacancy in the office of coroner’s physician shall be filled by the board of coroners. The board of coroners for cause may remove the physician appointed by them.”
The result of reading these two sections together, as they must be read, is that since the creation of the present city of New York the law has been that each coroner of any borough shall, on assuming office, appoint a coroner’s physician. There has been some difference of judicial opinion whether the term of office of a coroner’s physician is coterminous with that of the coroner who appointed him, or whether it is continuous subject to termination only by removal or resignation. The better opinion, as we consider, and certainly that supported by the greater weight of authority, is that the appointment of a coroner’s physician is personal to each coroner, and that the term of office of each physician is coterminous with that of the coroner who appointed him, unless he has been sooner removed. People ex rel. Williams v. Zucca, 36 Misc. Rep. 260 , 73 N. Y. Supp. 311 ; People ex rel. Whitman v. Goldenkranz, 38 Misc. Rep. 682 , 78 N. Y. Supp. 267 ; Matter of Flynn, 65 Misc. Rep. 233 , 119 N. Y. Supp. 1079 ; People ex rel. Schulum v. Harburger, 132 App. Div. 260 -265, 116 N. Y. Supp. 994 . In view of the .adjudication to which we shall^presently refer, it is not’ absolutely necessary to decide this question, which is dealt with here Only in consequence of the difference of opinion which seems to have prevailed at Special Term.
[1] The relator was first appointed coroner’s physician on January 1, 1898, and held that position, without interruption until December 31, 1905, having been reappointed once in the meantime. The charter of 1897, supra, provided that there should be three coroners in the borough of Queens. This number was reduced by the Revised Charter of 1901, supra, to two; but there continued to be three cor
[2] When he was first appointed in 1898 the position of coroner’s physician was not classified under the civil service rules, and appointments thereto were not required to be made from an eligible list. Since then, however, the, position has been classified as subject to competitive examination. We find no legal obstacle to such classification. Matter of MacLeod, 71 Misc. Rep. 166 , 129 N. Y. Supp. 883 . After it had been decided that relator had not been legally reappointed on January 1, 1906, he attempted by mandamús to compel the civil service commission to certify him as eligible to appointment as police surgeon. Pending the determination of that application (which was ultimately denied) Coroner Schaeffer on March 3, 1910, requested the respondents to exempt relator from competitive examination under rule 12, par. 6, of the civil service rules, to permit his appointment as coroner’s physician at $125 per month. The rule referred to provides that:
“The commissioners may by resolution exempt from competitive examination any person engaged in private business who shall render any professional, scientific, technical, or expert service of an occasional and exceptional character to any city officer, and the amount of whose compensation in one year shall not exceed $750."
[3] The office of coroner’s physician having been placed in the competitive class, and the relator not having held office continuously, he could only be appointed from an eligible list in accordance with law and rules and regulations of the civil service list, unless he came within one of the exceptions. He cannot claim as one of those who may be reinstated, because a reinstatement must be made within a year from the date on which the person to be reinstated was separated' from the service. Rule 12. In this case relator ceased to be a coroner’s physician December 31, 1905. Nor can he claim the advantages of the three-year rule referred to by the learned justice below, for that only applied to a transfer from one department, office, or institution to another. Rule 14. It is conceded that relator, at the time of his attempted appointment by Coroner Schaeffer, was not upon any eligible list for the position to which it was attempted to appoint him. He apparently, some years before, had been on an eligible list, which had been canceled and superseded by a later list upon which his name did not appear. Considering the attempted appointment by Coroner Schaeffer on January 1, 1910, as an original appointment, subject to then existing laws and unaffected by the relator’s previous official history, and thus I think we must consider it, it is plain that the attempted appointment was illegal and invalid, and that relator did not thereby become a coroner’s physician.
It follows that the order appealed from must be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion for a mandamus denied, with $50 costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Williams v. Zucca 36 Misc. Rep. 260 p. 211
- MacLeod v. McGuire 71 Misc. Rep. 166 p. 213