Manser v. Astoria Veneer Mills

The complaint alleges the employment of the plaintiff by the defendant at its veneer plant at and that—■ Ryker avenue, Astoria,

“while in the lawful performance of such work, and without any fault whatsoever on his part, his hair was caught in certain uriguarded and unprotected cogwheels, being part of the machinery in defendant’s said mills, and this infant plaintiff was pulled in Jjy the hair, and a portion of his scalp was torn off, and his head was seriously injured, and all o f which was solely caused by and solely the result of the negligence and carelessness of the defendant, its agents, and servants, in failing to give this infant plaintiff a reasonably safe and suitable place in which to perform his work, and in failing to properly guard and protect the said cogwheels in which p aintiff’s hair was caught, but,- on the contrary, leaving the same unguarded alnd unprotected, in violation of the provisions of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897, known as the ‘Labor Law of the State of New York,’ and also by reason of the further negligence and carelessness of the defendant in employing this infant plaintiff when he was under the age of 16 years, and between the ages of 14 and 16 years, and in not having a certificate executed by a health officer,” etc.

The plaintiff’s bill of particulars further alleged that the—■

“respect in which the place furnished to plaintiff in which to work was not reasonably safe and suitable is that the floor abojut the machinery where plaintiff was compelled to work was oily, dirty, and slippery, and that the-cogwheel of the machinery about which he worked was unguarded and unprotected, in violation of section 81 of chapter 415 of the Laws of 1897,” and that the “respect in which the cogwheels mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint were not properly guarded and protected is that there was nothing about said cogwheel to prevent the same from coming in contact with the person of this plaintiff.”

The issue fairly tendered by this complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars, was that the plaintiff, while employed upon a machine in the defendant’s plant, was injured by reason of the unguarded cogwheels, in connection with an oily, dirty, and slippery floor, when, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff was not employed to work upon a machine in the mill at all, but was engaged fcjr the purpose of nailing cleats upon the ends of boards mounted uppn a two-wheeled cart, after the same had been delivered in the yard of'the mill by means of a long table, equipped with rollers and operated by cogs, which carried the lumber away from the machines. This table, known as a “conveyer,” was 105 feet long, a trifle over 4 feet in width, and 34 inches in height. At intervals of about 4 feet there were rollers 18 inches in length, and extending crosswise óf the table, and operated by cogwheels; some of the witnesses testifying that these were fully protected, while the plaintiff and his witnesses testify that they were exposed at the ends. This table extended away .from the mill out into the yard, and the duty of the plaintiff was to go to a build

[1] His place of employment was the lumber yard of the defendant, and his duties had no relation whatever to the machine (the table with rollers) which concededly worked the injuries, and the learned trial court properly held that the plaintiff had no standing under the provisions of th.e labor law, except as the leaving of the cogwheels unguarded might have a bearing upon the question of the reasonable safety of the place afforded him for his work. The theory upon which the case was tried, and upon which it was given to the jury, was that at the particular point of the accident there was a mixture of oil and sawdust, causing a slippery condition of the floor, which had not been observed by the plaintiff during his 9 or 10 days employment there, though being familiar to some of the other witnesses, and that the plaintiff, having been instructed by his foreman to place the cleats under this table and to take them from thence to the point where they were to be used, had, in obeying this instruction, stepped upon this slippery place and slipped, throwing him into the unguarded cogwheel, producing the injuries. The learned trial court in its charge to the jury said:

“A very important question here * * * relates to the directions which the plaintiff says were given by Mr. Augustine, the foreman, to the young man to carry the cleats from the place where they were found, and put them under the table, and then take them from there to the place where they were to be nailed onto the boards. He says those were the instructions which were given to him. On the other hand, Mr. Augustine says that he gave him no such instructions; that he was told to take them directly over to where the buggies were. * * * That is an important question in the case, for this reason: If such direction was not given, if you shall take the story of Mr. Augustine in preference to the story of the plaintiff, * * * and you shall say no such direction was given to put those cleats under the runway, and that the placing of them there was the voluntary act of the plaintiff himself, that defeats his cause of action.”

Again the court said:

“So you see, gentlemen, it is quite important to give consideration to every question in this case, not only the question of direction, but the question of conditions which were there, the question of the direction of the work given by the foreman, and the claim that a part of the direction in connection with the work was the putting of the cleats under the table at this particular place, where, as the plaintiff says, he was exposed unwarrantably, and in violation of the master’s duty, to accident and injury, even while he was exercising due care on his part.”

[2] It is true that this charge was not excepted to on the part of either party, but the defendant’s exception to the denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint fairly raises the issue, as well as the order denying the motion for a new trial on the usual grounds.

[‘3] The respondent, evidently recognizing the weakness of the case upon the theory thus presented, urges upon this appeal that the proximate cause of the accident was, not the alleged direction of the defendant’s foreman, but the slippery condition of the floor at the point of the accident; but it is very certain that, if the plaintiff had not been

[4] It being clear, then, that the verdict must rest upon the alleged order of the foreman, let us consider for á moment the duties of the defendant, under the common law, for ncj question of the employer’s liability law is here involved. What ajre the duties of the master? He is bound to furnish a reasonably safe place in which his servant is to perform his work, he is bound to furnish him with reasonably safe tools and appliances, and he is bojund to exercise reasonable care in the selection and employment of tjhose who are to participate in the work. No one has suggested that the defendant had failed in the discharge of its duty in the selection of fellow servants of the plaintiff. No one questions the competency of Mr. Augustine as foreman of the establishment. There is evidjence undisputed that the defendant had supplied the plaintiff with the cleats and the nails and hammers necessary to perform his work, which was of the simplest character, requiring practically no instructions. The place provided by the defendant for the plaintiff to work \Vas the millyard, and the performance of this work, in so far as the nlaster was concerned, required merely that the plaintiff should go to the warehouse and get his cleats, return with them to the buggies, and nail them on; and this did not, as we read the record, require him |to go nearer than- 30 feet to the point where the accident occurred.| Clearly the master could delegate to a competent foreman the details of the work which was being carried on in that lumber yard. Having provided a competent foreman, proper tools and appliances, and a place which was safe for the performance of the duties required of him, the master was not bound to anticipate that the foreman would issue an order inconsistent with the efficiency and economy of the work, and which would expose the plaintiff to the danger which ¡ he has encountered. The duty of the master was complete when he ¡had used reasonable care in the selection of fellow servants. He was not bound to follow

[5] The rule is well settled, in common-law actions, that the master is not responsible for the negligent performance of some detail of the workpntrusted to the servant, whatever may have been the grade of the servant who executes such detail. If it is the work of the servant, and he volunteers to perform it, and the master is not at fault in furnishing proper materials, there is no breach of duty on the part of the latter. Kimmer v. Weber, 151 N. Y. 417 , 422, 423, 45 N. E. 860 , 56 Am. St. Rep. 630 .

In the case now before us, the general place for the plaintiff to perform his work was the millyard, and his duties required him to go to a warehouse, procure his materials, and nail the cleats upon boards upon the buggies; and all of these,dúties could be discharged in the most economical way, without the plaintiff being anywhere near the machine which injured him. This machine or table was 105 feet long, and the rollers, requiring oil, were a little over 4 feet apart, and there is no evidence that there was any other place along the whole length of this table where there was any oil, or any danger to be apprehended, and there is no evidence that the defendant’s foreman designated this particular spot for piling these cleats, assuming him to have given an order in the premises. The plaintiff admits that he was free to place his cleats at any point under this table of 105 feet in length, and to say that a master, having fulfilled all of his obligations in reference to employes and their tools and appliances, is bound to see to it, not only that the foreman does not give foolish orders, but that the servant, in obeying these orders, does not himself make a poor selection of a place within á range of 105 feet, where no other defect is suggested, is entirely unreasonable, and therefore not the law of this state.

The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial granted; costs to abide the event. All concur.