Lignante v. Panama Railroad

could be obtained on a steamship of the defendant which was to sail snortly from Colon to New York, but that his wife and himself could not be given accommodations in the same stateroom. He went with his wife by rail to Colon and applied at the ticket office of the defendant for his tickets. He was then informed by the ticket agent that his wife would be assigned to a stateroom in which there were two other passengers, “a lady and child.”' He asked if his wife would have a berth, and the answer was, “yes.” He made no inquiries as to the age or sex of the “child,” and nothing was said to him on either point. After they got aboard the steamship, he found that his Avife was assigned to an unscreened sofa in tne stateroom; the berths being given to the lady and “child.” This “child” turned out to be a ■ boy, about five feet high and apparently between 14 and 15 years of age. The plaintiff objected to the presence ojf this “child” in a room in Avhich she Avould be obliged to sleep at night for nearly a week, and demanded other accommodations; but none were given to her. She refused to sleep in the stateroom and- found herself 'obliged to sleep on steamer chairs for a time, and finally she slept at night on a sofa in the corner of the “social hall” or main saloon of the vessel. From this, great discomfort and loss of sleep resulted, for Avhich she sought damages.

The learned trial court decided as a matter of law that the facts above recited did not make out a breach of contract of carriage, and declined to submit the question to the jury. In this, we thinkj he erred. The contract in question called for a first-class carriage of the passenger. - Carriage of such class implied that the accommodations furnished would be consistent with ordinary decency. It is true that the defendant gave notice that “a lady and child]’ would also occupy the stateroom; - but it gave-no notice that the “child” Avas a lad in the age of adolescence. The use of the word “child” Avas very misleading. While there may be many shades of feminine delicacy, as to which courts will go sIoav in taking judicial cognisance, surely it may hot be said as a matter of law that the contract'of; carriage was performed when a woman passenger -was exposed to. t-hej necessity of robing -and disrobing in a little room occupied by a strange lad of 14 of 15 years of age, and for a period of a. week. Conceqedly the steamship was crowded, and perhaps no better accommodatibns could be given; but it was the duty of the defendant when making its contract to give notice of the exact situation.

[2] We think that the questions of the al and the damages. resulting should have been submitted to the jurye There was no proof of the amount paid for the passage, but damages arising from a breach of the contract to carry], which results in inconvenience and indignity to the passenger whilé in transit, are not limited to the price of passage. Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 178 N. Y. 347 , 70 N. E. 857 , 66 L. R. A. 618 102 Am. St. Rep. 503 ; Busch v. Interborough R. T. Co., 187 N. Y. 388 , 80 N. E. 197 . The same rule has been applied to the relation bf innkeeper and guest. De Wolf v. Ford, 193 N. Y. 397 , 86 N. E. 527 , 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860 , 127 Am. St. Rep. 969 . eged breach of contract

As to the second cause of action arising out of an accident to the plaintiff while occupying a steamer chair rented from the defendant,the proofs were not sufficient to show that such accident was caused by any defect in the chair itself, and the dismissal of that cause of action on such proofs was proper enough.

The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered; costs to abide the event. All concur.