People ex rel. Merrall v. Cooley

procedure provided in subdivision 3, § 131, Education Law. It is apparent that School Commissioner Cooley does not favor the separation. He declined to issue the certificate until he was satisfied that the entire territory of the village of Lawrence, which is sought to be constituted a separate district, was within the boundaries of Union school district No. 15. It is so required in the education law. More than that, he counseled an appeal by Union free school district, No. 15 to the commissioner of education from the proceedings of the meeting at which the village sought to separate itself from the district. The school district and one Joseph H. Foster, an elector in the district, thereupon appealed to the respondent commissioner of education, claiming that they were aggrieved by the transaction at the village meeting. The education law (section 880, subd. 7) authorizes an appeal to the commissioner of education “by any person conceiving himself aggrieved * * * by any other official act or decision of any officer, school authorities, or meetings concerning any other matter under this chapter, or any other act pertaining to the common schools.” The commissioner of education made an order on May 5, 1911, staying School Commissioner Cooley from issuing the certificate separating the school district as voted at the meeting. The issuance of such a stay is provided for in section 881 of the education law.

The village of Lawrence then made a motion before the state commissioner to dismiss the pending appeals, upon the ground that he had no jurisdiction to hear them, as the appellants were not persons aggrieved within the meaning of the statute. This motion was denied, the village was granted time in which to answer the appeals, but no further proceedings have been taken on such appeals, and they are still pending before the state commissioner.

[1] The relators now ask a mandamus to compel the commissioner of education to rescind the order staying Commissioner Cooley from issuing the certificate of separation of the district, and also commanding Commissioner Cooley to issue the certificate in question.

I think the proceeding for mandamus is improper. These matters are before the commissioner of education for decision. The alleged ground on which the appeals are taken and on which Commissioner Cooley refuses to issue the certificate is that the village of Lawrence is not wholly within school district 15. This is one of the statutory requirements before a separate school district can be formed. The decision of this question, as well as the status of the appellants, is given by the Legislature to the commissioner of education by the education law. It is a part of the general supervisory power which the people have seen fit to vest in the department of education. I think these matters must be decided, in the first instance, at any rate, by the commissioner of education.

[2] I am not called upon here -to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions in the education law, which seek to make the decision of the commissioner of education final and conclusive, and not subject to review in any court. This language is certainly startling at first reading, but I do not think it deprives the courts of jurisdiction

in proper cases, or prevents interference in case the vested rights of any citizen are interfered with. But certainly the Legislature could properly provide that all these 'matters involving the administration of the educational system of the state should be confided in the first instance to the educational authorities.

[3] The relators sought to constitute themselves a. separate district, pursuant to the authority granted in the education law, and. they must take it as a whole. They cannot accept one part of it and reject another. The Legislature might have repealed the education law the day before the village meeting, and there would have been ho authority for the action taken.

[4] So, when they grant the privilege, it seems to me they may provide for its review by the educational authorities. The village itself is a municipal corporation created by the Legislature. It may be that the commissioner of education will sustain the contention of the relators when the matter comes before him. If he does not, and his action is illegal, or without jurisdiction, I am very sure that it can be reviewed notwithstanding the sweeping provisions of the statute which at first blush would seem to make him independent of all authority. But, if he has jurisdiction of the matter and of the parties, the courts will not interfere with his action any more than in many similar departmental transactions under the law. The courts are not without jurisdiction, but, when these matters are.left by the Legislature to other legally constituted tribunals, the courts do not interfere. The language of the statute, which seems to exempt the commissioner from review, has been before the courts, and the individual citizen is not without remedy, if he has a legal grievance. Light v. Skinner, 159 N. Y. 162 , 53 N. E. 806 ; Matter of Light, 30 App. Div. 50 , 51 N. Y. Supp. 743 ; People ex rel. Walrath v. O’Brien, 112 App. Div. 97 , 97 N. Y. Supp. 1145 ; People v. Skinner, 74 App. Div. 58 , 77 N. Y. Supp. 36 ; Union F. S. Dist.v. Village of Glen Park, 109 App. Div. 414 , 96 N. Y. Supp. 428 .

I think that the relators’ application is premature, and that the writ should be quashed and the proceedings dismissed.