Ransom v. Ransom

The plaintiff, who is an attorney and counselor at law, brings this action to have adjudged valid a certain assignment by defendant of part of her interest, both principal and income, in the residuary estate of George Bell, deceased, and to enforce his rights thereunder. George Bell died on December 9, "1881, leaving a last will and testament, wherein, among other things, he provided that the net income of his residuary estate should be divided by his trustees between his nephews George Barker and Charles Barker and his niece Mary Leavitt, share and share alike, during the life of his daughter Catherine B. Bell, less such sum not exceeding $15,000 per annum as the trustees might deem necessary for the support and maintenance of his daughter, and, upon the death of his daughter leaving no lawful issue her surviving, the residuary estate was devised and bequeathed in equal shares to his said nephews and niece. Catherine Bell, the daughter of the decedent, is still living and is of the age of 70 years, unmarried and incompetent, a committee of her person and property having been appointed, and she was incompetent at the time of her father’s death. His estate amounted to upwards of $1,000,000. The proper construction to be given to the will had been a matter of controversy for some years and litigation had ensued; among the questions there involved and bitterly contested being '(1) whether the interest of the nephews and niece under the will was a vested or a contingent one, and (2) whether such interest was alienable. One of the nephews, Charles Barker, claimed that the interest was contingent and inalienable, in order to defeat a certain assignment of an interest therein made by him, and the executors of the Bell estate, of whom George A. Barker was one, sustained him in that contention. The matter had not been finally adjudicated when George A. Barker, the nephew of Bell, on October 1, 1906, married the defendant Edith M. Barker-Ransom, who had been his housekeeper for 16 years. Within a few days thereafter he made his will leaving everything, including his interest in his uncle’s estate, to his wife. On January 27, 1907, George Barker died, and, his will having been offered for probate by his wife, it was contested by his daughters Lizbeth Bell Scott and Ethel I. Barker.

The plaintiff had been an office associate of Mr. Tarrant Putnam, who was attorney for George Barker as one of the trustees of the Bell estate; that having been the sole business of Barker for the 25 years preceding his death. Plaintiff, by reason of his association with Mr. Putnam and his participation in various litigation, became acquainted with the details of the estate and of the interests of the various parties therein, and had earned the confidence of Mr. Barker, whose will he had. drawn, and who advised his wife that the plain

Plaintiff and Mrs. Barker went to the president’s private room, and in his presence the agreement was read over to Mrs. Barker, to

Plaintiff in consideration thereof agreed to render and perform all legal services in any and all suits and proceedings instituted by or against Mrs. Barker affecting in any way her rights and interests in any property of the Bell estate, including the accounting by Mrs. Barker as representative of her husband’s estate of his acts as trustee of the Bell estate, and any services in any wise relating to these matters, including counsel, advice, and negotiations; and, in the event of a final determination in favor of Mrs. Barker, to perform all the legal services affecting her interest in the estate, to and including final accounting and distribution. The agreement contained a further clause that, in the event of it being finally determined that Mrs. Barker had no interest in the remainder, Mr. Ransom was to make no charges for such services as he might have performed under the agreement; it being understood between the parties that whatever compensation was received by Ransom for his services to be performed was not to be payable out of the separate estate of Mrs. Barker, but out of the property of the Bell estate if any was finally adjudicated to her. It was further recited that the assignment by Mrs. Barker of her interest in the estate of George Bell to the extent of $100,000 hereinbefore referred to was collateral, and not additional to this agreement.

At the time of the execution of this agreement, the status of the legal proceedings affecting the rights and interest of Mrs. Barker was as follows: An action had theretofore been brought by Gertrude Stringer against George A. Barker and Jacob Berry, as executors and trustees under the last will and testament of George Bell, deceased, et al., wherein plaintiff, claiming that under an assignment from Charles B. Barker of his interest in the George Bell estate to the extent of $100,000 principal and $5,000 annual income, sued to enforce her rights thereunder. The referee before whom the case had been tried, in passing upon the questions involved, had decided that the interest of Charles B. Barker, which was similar to that of George A. Barker, was a vested remainder, and the Appellate Division in December, 1905, in disposing of the appeal, intimated that such question was not directly involved therein, although in its opinion it said that, if the decision of that question was necessary to the judgment that the assignment was valid and effective, they would be inclined to hold likewise. 110 App. Div. 37 , 96 N. Y. Supp. 1052 . An appeal was taken from this decision and was pending at the time of the making of the agreement in question. George A. Barker in his lifetime had joined interests with his brother in the Stringer suit, and by his answer as trustee of the Bell estate had set up that the interest of his brother under the Bell will was a contingent interest. This position, of course, if sustained, would have determined his own to

It is plaintiff’s contention that he called Mrs. Barker’s attention to the decision .of the Appellate Division regarding the proper construction of the Bell will, and the learned court at Special Term by its decision has found that the agreement in question was executed by the defendant without the practice upon her of any fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment by the plaintiff, although he has also found that plaintiff had not stated to the defendant the actual conditions which existed with respect to her husband’s interest in the Bell estate, and regarding actual work necessary to be done to protect her rights with sufficient fullness to make her clearly understand the whole situation.

The plaintiff then began to render services as attorney and counsel for Mrs. Barker in both the Bell and Barker suits. In the case of Stringer v. Young, representing her, he filed a brief in the Court of Appeals reversing the position theretofore uniformly taken by George Barker, and urged that the share of Charles Barker, instead of being a contingent remainder, was a vested interest. The Court of Appeals ( 191 N. Y. 157 , 83 N. E. 690 ) in February, 1908, determined that the interest of the nephews was a vested interest, and not a contingent one. Plaintiff commenced an action on behalf of Mrs. Barker for an accounting and construction of the Bell will in the county of New York, but the suit of Young v. Barker, hereinbefore referred to, was tried instead. Young v. Barker was an action brought by the trustees of the Bell estate in Westchester county for the settlement of their accounts and for a construction of the Bell will as to the Barker remainder in which final judgment was entered May 7, 1909. Upon the accounting part of this action plaintiff prepared the accounts of George Barker as trustee of the estate and the trustees accounted generally. There were numerous controversies as to the rights of the respective parties, and the contentions of Mrs. Barker were fully sustained, an appeal from such judgment having since been affirmed. 141 App. Div. 801 , 127 N. Y. Supp. 211 . There was also a proceeding, “In the Matter of Leavitt,” brought to secure the appointment of an additional trustee. Plaintiff also represented Mrs. Barker in the action brought by the daughters in the Supreme Court to revoke the probate of their father’s will, being the suit known as Scott v. Barker. The will was attacked upon the grounds of lack of mental capacity, fraud, and undue influence, and, after a lengthy trial, the jury found a verdict setting aside the probate of the will, which judgment was reversed upon appeal and a new trial

Upon the following day plaintiff furnished her with a typewritten copy of this statement of transactions. The first date when defendant made any complaint to plaintiff regarding the extent of his compensation appears to have been on May 6, 1909, when she called upon plaintiff, and told him that she was not satisfied with the percentage she was to pay him, and asked him to reduce the amount of the contract. Plaintiff did reassign to her a 5 per cent, interest out of the 25 per cent, which he was to receive, leaving him with 20 per cent, of the Barker remainder. Plaintiff did that to make the transactions satisfactory to her, and, while Mrs. Barker in one answer states that it was satisfactory to her at that time because it was. all she could get from him, in the next answer she says that it was satisfactory, but she did not tell him so, but only said: “If that is the best you can do, all right. I will have to take it.” The reconveyance of the 5 per cent, to her by the plaintiff was made on May 7, 1909, at which time she paid him a consideration of $2,500 for the execution of the reassignment. At the same time she requested him to cancel the collateral assignment, which was done. On June 15, 1909, Mrs. Barker discharged plaintiff as her attorney, and notified him that Rollin M. Morgan would represent her in his stead.

On June 30, 1909, she married Perte V. Ransom. In July, 1909, she repudiated the assignment in question, and notified plaintiff of her refusal to be bound thereby. In her answer the defendant sets up various defenses to the agreement sued upon, among others that she was ill when she signed the assignment, and that plaintiff had fraudulently represented to her that it was fair and equitable and due him that it should be signed; but it sufficiently appears that she was fully aware of the nature of the paper she was signing, that no fraud was perpetrated upon her, and that she signed it freely and voluntarily. This applies to both the assignments executed by her.

At the close of the plaintiff’s case defendant offered to stipulate that the court should decide upon a quantum meruit the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery and tendered judgment for $22,000, less the amount already paid the plaintiff, being at the rate of $50 per day for .the period of time that Mrs. Barker’s affairs were in his hands. This being declined by the plaintiff, after some discussion, defendant was allowed to amend her answer by alleging that the agreement in suit was an agreement between attorney and client, and that the court should allow what it considered to be equitable under the circumstances for the services rendered. Under this amendment of the pleadings, the learned court finally determined, in view of the cir

The judgment appealed from herein did not set aside or declare invalid the assignment upon which the action was brought, but proceeded upon the theory that, as plaintiff had come into a court of equity, he could obtain a decree for only so much as equitable doctrines permit. The leading case relied upon is Whitehead v. Kennedy, 69 N. Y. 462 , wherein the court said:

“The plaintiff on the trial assumed the burden of proving that the agreement of October 25, 1865, was just and fair, having in view the general principle that an attorney who seeks to avail himself of a contract made with his client is bound to establish affirmatively that it was made by the client with full knowledge of all the material circumstances known to the attorney, and was in every respect free from fraud on his part, or misconception on the part of the client, and that a reasonable use was made by the attorney of the confidence reposed in • him. The general principle is firmly established and universally recognized.’’

To the same effect are Place v. Hayward, 117 N. Y. 187 , 23 N. E. 25 , and Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167 . But the first case cited was one where the services for which the assignment was given were past services, and the court expressly refused to determine how far section 303 of the Code changed the rule when the services were prospective. The two latter cases are those of a gift by client to attorney and of an assignment given to secure an alleged debt. The court expressly refused to set aside the present assignment for all purposes and to settle plaintiff’s fees upon a quantum meruit basis, holding that this would be inequitable, but enforced the assignment only to the extent to which it deemed the compensation warranted by the services rendered.

[1] The learned court expressly recognized the propriety of contingent fees based upon a percentage basis, although it be altogether disproportionate to what would be reasonable compensation for the lawyer’s services if paid for in cash when rendered. As he said in his opinion:

“Not only is there long delay in recovery, but services covering years may never be compensated at all. I think that the contingent fee should often be approved, not only in the case of the penniless litigant, but also in the case of the litigant in the position of Mrs. Barker, possessed of but moderate means. One so situated should be able to arrange with some attorney in such a way that, if unsuccessful, her own funds should remain altogether intact or be diminished only by a moderate retainer; while, in return for the risk that his services may thus be thrown away or only in small part

compensated, he has a chance of receiving an- amount much greater than their cash value. In fact, when a lawyer sues his client upon a quantum meruit the law as laid down by our courts makes the fee largely contingent upon success. Randall v. Packard, 142 N. Y. 47 , 36 N. E. 823 . * * * The contingent fee has long been sustained, not only in this state (Fowler v. Callan, 102 N. Y. 395 [ 7 N. E. 169 ]), but by the Supreme Court of the United States also (Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. 415 [ 14 L. Ed. 753 ]; Stanton v. Embury, 93 U. S. 548 [ 23 L. Ed. 983 ]; Ingersoll v. Coran, 211 U. S. 335 [ 29 Sup. Ct. 92 , 53 L. Ed. 208 ]).”

[2] Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed when this agreement was entered into read as follows, so far as is material to the question herein involved:

“The compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law.” Now section 474 of judiciary Law [Consol Laws, c. 30].

The source of this provision is section 303 of the Code of Procedure, providing in part:

“All statutes establishing or regulating the costs or fees of attorneys, solicitors and counsel in civil actions, and all existing rules and provisions of law, restricting or controlling the right of a party to agree with an attorney, solicitor or counsel for his compensation, are repealed; and hereafter the measure of such compensation shall be left to the agreement, expressed or implied, of the parties.”

It is not claimed that the agreement in question is restrained by any provisions of the statute law, but that, the interest assigned being disproportionate to the services rendered which formed the consideration for its execution, the court has power to modify or annul it. The relation of attorney and client is one which creates a degree of trust and confidence upon the part of the latter in the former which is only natural and necessary, and of which no attorney should be permitted to avail himself to his profit and to the client’s loss. The attorney is an officer of the court, and, when he actively seeks its aid in the assertion or protection of his rights in any manner against his client, he should be prepared to establish his good faith and honesty in the transaction, and be required to do so. Not only does his client trust him, but he has come for advice, which he is prepared to follow, upon matters of which he knows little or nothing. The selection of an attorney is a matter of personal choice, but the confidence reposed in him should exist because of the professional relationship. Hence it cannot be said, even in view of the plain phraseology 'of the code section, that the court is without power to inquire into the good faith of an agreement between attorney and client, even if reduced to writing. But, when parties are free to contract, their agreement should not be set aside unless fraud has been perpetrated, undue influence exerted, material facts affecting the subject-matter misrepresented or suppressed, or advantage taken of a position of confidence and trust to obtain an unconscionable advantage over the party. So in Werner v. Knowlton, 107 App. Div. 158 , 94 N. Y. Supp. 1054 , it was said, in an action brought to recover for the value of professional services fixed by express contract, approving of a refusal in effect to charge the jury that plaintiffs could not recover unless the jury approved of the rate

“We do not think that an attorney who expressly fixes the rate of compensation of the client, in the absence of some evidence of fraud or overreaching, is compelled to submit the validity and binding force of his agreement to any such test as this. Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides that the compensation of the attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied,.which is not restrained by law. If the contention of the counsel for the appellant upon the facts as developed in this case is correct, it would be entirely useless for an attorney to make an agreement fixing his compensation. Any agreement which he and his client might make fixing for the protection of both the value of the services to be rendered would always be subject to revision and modification by a court or jury which might entertain a different idea of value/’

In Ransom v. Cutting, 112 App. Div. 150 , 98 N. Y. Supp. 282 , affirmed 188 N. Y. 447 , 81 N. E. 324 , an agreement to pay a contingent of 10 per cent, was held neither champertous nor unconscionable. The court said:

“An attorney or counsellor at law by express provision of statute can agree with his client as to the amount to be paid for services to be rendered (section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure), and an agreement made for that purpose, in the absence of evidence showing that a fraud had been perpetrated on the client, or that he did not fully understand the purport óf the agreement, must be enforced like other contracts according to its terms. The statute gives the right to an attorney and client to make a contract as to the former’s compensation, and it is a matter of no importance, when the contract is brought under review, what the compensation to be paid is, providing the contract is legal in other respects. The court cannot make contracts for parties, and only has the power to construe them as made. If the contract as made were the result of a fraud practiced upon the client, or if it appeared that the compensation were so excessive, in view of the services rendered as to indicate that an improper or undue advantage had been taken of the client, relief would be afforded.’’

In McCoy v. Gas Engine & Power Company, 135 App. Div. 771 , 119 N. Y. Supp. 864 , it was said:

“The word ‘unconscionable’ has frequently been applied to contracts made by lawyers for what were deemed exorbitant contingent fees, but by that nothing more has been meant than that the amount of the fee standing alone and unexplained may be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage was taken of the client, or, in other words, that a legal fraud was perpetrated upon him. Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 185 N. Y. 520 [ 78 N. E. 179 ].”

Matter of Friedman, 136 App. Div. 750 , 121 N. Y. Supp. 426 , affirmed 199 N. Y. 537 , 92 N. E. 1085 , was a case where a contract for 50 per cent, of a recovery in an accident case was held not to be fraudulent per se nor evidence of improper or undue advantage. As was said:

“One-half of a recovery as contingent payment for legal services may be more beneficial to the client than to the lawyer. There is no limit to the work he promises and must render, and his professional services and disbursements rendered and made by him at his peril, and he has a legal right to make an engagement that has in view the probabilities and hazards in such regard. This is not a question of ethics, of the highest professional proprieties, but of legal action.”

In that case, however, the court found reasons for reducing the compensation to 25 per cent., plus the disbursements. In Murray v.

“I£ the compensation seemed large when finally determined by the resistance of the defendant to the claim, it must be remembered that the compensation agreed upon was contingent and therefore properly larger than if absolute. and then, when entered into, the extent of the services required could not be forecast.”

• All of these decisions are in accord with the Matter of Eitzsimons, 174 N. Y. 15 , 66 N. E. 554 , wherein a contingent fee of 50 per cent, was upheld. The court said:

“The statute conferred upon the parties the right to make the contract and conferred upon the court no authority to make it for them. If, however, upon a proper examination of the appellant’s claim, it shall be found that the agreement between himself and his client was induced by fraud, or what the compensation provided for was so excessive as to evince-a purpose to obtain improper or undue advantage, the court may correct such abuse.”

In the case at bar, none of these conditions exists. There is no proof of fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation or suppression of facts, nor can it be said that the amount is so large as to be unconscionable, even though it be 25 per cent, of a $400,000 estate, recovered after litigation. Mrs. Barker had ample funds of her own. She desired to retain them. She was unwilling to risk any part of them in asserting a claim to a share in an estate as to which her husband, one of its trustees, had taken a position different from that she was asked to take. She seemingly did not intend to do anything to enforce her rights, unless it could be done without risk of expense to her,' Under these conditions, a contingent contract was a natural and proper one. The attorney may not have been able to make her realize all the legal difficulties or advantages in the future, but he advised her of the vital fact of the Appellate Division decision. She knew the extent of her prospective interest, and she knew how large the fee would be, for she executed an assignment to the extent of $100,000 of her interest to secure it. Not only did she not complain, but the agreement was drawn upon her insistence in writing. It was read to her and she understood it. She was repeatedly told to get independent advice, and would not do it. When she signed it, she did so before an outside notary, after it was read to her, in the presence of a disinterested witness, and after her protest that she only went there to please plaintiff, as it was satisfactory to her. The second agreement is equally unobjectionable from every point of view. In the interim she had talked the matter over with many people, and, while some told her she was paying too much, she never wavered in her belief that it was proper. Her present husband, an attorney, has been advising her from at least March, 1908. Even when she asked for a reduction on the contract in May, 1909, having had advice from outside friends for more than a year, she did not demand it as a right, but made a request, and accepted the 5 per cent, retransferred to her without protest and paid therefor $2,500.

[4] Under all these conditions, it cannot be said that any reason had been shown for depriving the plaintiff herein of the agreed compensation for his services. He has secured for his client the favorable determination of her rights in the $400,000 estate, constituting her husband’s remainder in the Bell estate. He has satisfactorily and successfully carried on the other matters intrusted to him and covered by his agreement. Neither as to the original agreement of June 7, 1907, or the substituted one of January 27, 1909, is there proof of either fraud, misrepresentation, suppression of the facts, or undue influence, nor can either be said to be unconscionable. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to the relief sought, but upon the present findings judgment cannot be directed in his favor.

The judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.

LAUGHLIN and MILLER, JJ., concur.

(dissenting in part). Prior to the death of the defendant’s husband, the plaintiff had been his attorney. He had been recommended to the defendant by her husband, and immediately after his death she placed all her affairs in the plaintiff’s hands, and depended entirely upon him for legal advice. The dependence of the defendant upon the plaintiff deepened as the various litigations involving the estate of her husband’s uncle, in which her husband was interested, and in relation to her husband’s estate proceeded. Finally the time came when this agreement that plaintiff seeks to enforce was executed. The services which he undertook to render by this agreement related entirely to services to be rendered in relation to the Bell estate. At that time the opinion had been expressed by the Appellate Division in the Second Department that the remainder was vested, ■in which event the defendant’s husband would have been entitled to about $400,000 from the Bell estate. The defendant was reluctant to involve herself in any expense in relation to the litigation in regard to the Bell estate, and the defendant proposed that plaintiff should take the case on a contingent fee. The plaintiff suggested a 25 per cent, fee, which, if the opinion of the Appellate Division were sustained, would mean to him for services that he was to render thereafter in relation to the Bell estate the sum of $100,000. The plaintiff was a young man, who had been in practice but a few years, with no extensive court experience and no experience in litigation of this character. He prepared an assignment of one-quarter of the defendant’s interest in the Bell estate, which she executed. He prepared a long and somewhat intricate contract, which she signed. In fact, she signed everything that the plaintiff proposed, without question— as he says, almost resented the suggestion that she consult anybody else in regard to the making of the contract—quite conclusive evidence of the trust that she reposed in the plaintiff. The litigation in regard to the Bell estate continued, and the plaintiff’s own statement of the

McLaughlin, j., concurs.