Hebron v. City of New York

Before 1906 an ordinance of the city of New York required a license fee for private hack stands, which were spaces reserved to the licensee, into which no other hackmen could come. But by the new Code of Ordinances for Greater New York, approved on November 8, 1906, all previous ordinances were repealed, including this for private hack stands. Nevertheless the plaintiff came down to the bureau of licenses and paid $100 for four stands, in the years 1906, 1907, and 1909, and $200 (by two payments), in the year 1908, and. received the yearly licenses. It is stated that plaintiff was notified, first in writing, and then by a special officer, to renew his licenses, or they would be revoked. He sued in May, 1912j to recover back the $500, alleging that the payments were made under a mutual mistake of fact, and recovered judgment in the Municipal Court.

The appeal by the city raises two questions: The effect of a mistake of law; also the liability of the city to refund moneys thus paid into the license bureau. Plaintiff urged that his mistake or ignorance as to the repeal of this ordinance was a mistake of fact, and cites Pitcher v. Turin Plank Road Co., 10 Barb. 436 , where it appeared that the Public Roads Act had superseded a prior Turnpike Act, which had imposed a penalty for running into a gate. There a minor had paid to the Road Company $10 in settlement of a supposed penalty for running into a gate, but subsequently, on attaining full age, brought suit to recover it back. While the court spoke of the mistake as to the repeal of the earlier statute as a mistake of fact, it rested its decision upon the ground, taken by the County Court, that the agreement settling the liability, being made with a minor, was open to review, and the payment should not bind the infant, but was recoverable back. This case, therefore, is no authority for the respondent in the case at bar.

[2] While the courts in other jurisdictions have at times gone far in relieving against a mistake of law, such cases have been recognized as exceptions, since on grounds of public policy the rule must remain:

“Ignorance ol the deed may excuse, but ignorance of the law excuseth not.” St. Germain, Doctor and Student, p. 79; Newburgh Savings Bank v. Town of Woodbury, 173 N. Y. 85 , 65 N. E. 858 .

[3] The chief question, however, is the liability of the city for these license moneys thus paid in after the repeal of this ordinance. The evidence does not show any duress or restraint, so as to make out legal coercion, or other facts sufficient to malee these payments involuntary. Vanderbeck v. City of Rochester, 122 N. Y. 285 , 25 N. E. 408 ; Wood v. Mayor, 25 App. Div. 577 , 49 N. Y. Supp. 622 ; Buckley v. Mayor, 30 App. Div. 463 , 52 N. Y. Supp. 452 . The most that the evidence shows is that the hack stand moneys were taken under a claim of right.

The liability of municipalities stands on a different footing from other corporations or persons. Those dealing with a municipality are charged with knowledge of the limitations of the powers óf their officers and agents, because set forth in the statutes and municipal charters. Can it be held that the law imposes such a duty upon a municipality to return moneys voluntarily paid under a mistake that the city can be sued for money had and received? In his work on Municipal Corporations, Judge Dillon groups together fines, licelnses, and taxes, voluntarily paid, under mistake of law:

“Money voluntarily paid to a'corporation under a claim of right, without fraud or imposition, for an illegal tax, license, or fine, cannot, without statutory aid, there being no coercion, no ignorance or mistake of facts, but only ignorance or pure mistake of law, be recovered back from the corporation, either at law or in equity, even though such tax, license fee, or fine could not have been legally demanded and enforced.”

Such was the text in the 4th edition (section 944), repeated with a wealth of citations in the 5th (1911) edition, § 1621. This rule, necessary almost for the preservation of municipalities, has been rigidly followed in this state. Phelps v. Mayor, 112 N. Y. 216 , 19 N. E. 408 , 2 L. R. A. 626 ; Flynn v. Hurd, 118 N. Y. 19 , 22 N. E. 1109 ; Vanderbeck v. City of Rochester, 122 N. Y. 285 , 25 N. E. 408 .

Instead, therefore, of the law imposing on the city, through its officials, a duty to refund such voluntary payments, the law deems the

For four years the plaintiff continued to take out his yearly licenses, and presumably to enjoy the exclusive privilege of having his hacks upon the private stand he had previously occupied. It was unlike a single erroneous payment of a tax or assessment. The ordinances had been in 1907 assembled in a compilation or Code, readily accessible. If, after the expiration of these four years, such a suit would be successfully maintained, then a breach dangerous and far-reaching would be made in the safeguards that the law has placed upon the municipal treasury, for which innovation we find no support or authority in the decisions of this state.

Judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event. All concur.